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	 This	 thesis	 disrupts	 competing	 interpretations	 about	 Eliza	 Haywood’s	
sexual	 attitudes	and	political	 alliances	by	 focusing	on	 the	 innovative	elements	of	
her	 work	 that	 foster	 the	multiguity	 that	 leads	 to	 such	 debates.	 Specifically,	 this	
thesis	 argues	 that,	 throughout	 her	work,	Haywood	 is	 in	 dialogue	with	 the	male-
dominated	 sceptical	 tradition.	Haywood,	 by	 employing	 the	narrative	 elements	of	
various	 genres	 that	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 tensions	 between	 scepticism	 and	
credulity—genres	 such	 as	 apparition	 narratives,	mock-history,	 travel	 narratives,	
and	 legal	 discourse—engages	with	 debates	 about	 knowledge	 and	 judgment	 that	
troubled	 her	 contemporaries	 and	 dominated	 print	 culture.	 By	 doing	 so,	 she	
unsettles	and	challenges	conventional	understandings	of	scepticism	that	privilege	
custom	and	tradition.	Most	studies	of	eighteenth-century	scepticism	and	literature	
neglect	 work	 by	 women	 writers,	 including	 Haywood;	 therefore,	 this	 study	 also	
challenges	conventional	understandings	of	what	constitutes	sceptical	literature	in	
the	 eighteenth	 century.	 As	 a	woman	writer,	Haywood	privileges	 scepticism	over	
credulity	even	as	she	challenges	custom	and	seeks	to	discover	a	reliable	standard	
of	judgment	that	is	functional	in	a	liberal	society.	To	this	end,	Haywood	fosters	and	
develops	 the	 judgment	and	autonomy	of	her	 readers	by	either	 shifting	authority	
onto	 them,	 or	 by	 offering	 model	 standards	 of	 judgment	 for	 them.	 This	 thesis	
examines	four	works	from	four	genres	across	four	decades	of	Haywood’s	career:	A	
Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer	 (1724),	 The	 Adventures	 of	 Eovaai	 (1736),	 The	 Female	
Spectator	 (1744-1746),	 and	The	History	of	 Jemmy	and	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 (1753).	 The	
first	 two	 chapters	 discuss	 the	 nature	 and	 development	 of	 Haywood’s	 extreme	
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	 In	 an	 episode	 from	Book	3	 of	The	Invisible	Spy,	 the	 narrator,	 Explorabilis,	
secretly	observes	a	woman	whom	he	has	heard	possesses	great	quantities	of	wit	
and	 charm.	 At	 first	 glance,	 he	 finds	 no	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 she	merits	 such	
praise;	nevertheless,	he	writes,	 ‘[A]s	 I	 thought	 it	unfair	 to	give	a	verdict	on	mere	
appearances,	 I	 suspended	 my	 judgment	 of	 her	 understanding	 ‘till	 I	 had	 more	
substantial	proofs’.1	Although	this	passage	focuses	on	what	seems	to	be	a	relatively	
trivial	 matter	 of	 judgment,	 it	 signals	 three	 central	 problems	 that	 pervade	 Eliza	
Haywood’s	 work:	 the	 reliability	 of	 other	 people’s	 testimony,	 the	 reliability	 of	
appearances,	 and	 the	 proper	 processes	 of	 judgment	 in	 the	 face	 of	 uncertainty.	
These	 problems	 also	 constitute	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis,	 in	 which	 I	 argue	 that	
Haywood,	 throughout	her	career,	 is	 in	dialogue	with	male	 traditions	about	 these	
specific	 problems	 of	 judgment.	 With	 this	 argument	 I	 challenge	 readings	 of	
Haywood	 that	 focus	on	her	 efforts	 to	 establish	 authority	only	within	 a	 ‘feminine	
province’,	and	instead	I	argue	that	Haywood’s	interest	in	authority	extends	beyond	
the	domestic	 sphere,	 not	 only	 into	 the	 realm	of	 politics,	which	by	now	has	been	
well	documented,	but	also	into	other	areas—such	as	natural	philosophy,	historical	
discourse,	 travel	 narratives,	 and	 legal	 discourse—that	 serve	 as	 flashpoints	 for	
debates	 about	 scepticism	 and	 credulity.	 Specifically,	 I	 argue	 that	 Haywood	 is	 a	
sceptical	writer	who	challenges	what	Michael	McKeon	calls	the	‘naïve	empiricism’	








challenge	 conceptions	 of	 early	 eighteenth-century	 scepticism	 that	 rest	 almost	
entirely	on	a	male	tradition.	Furthermore,	this	thesis	demonstrates	that	Haywood’s	
scepticism	 fosters	narrative	 innovations	 in	 her	work	 that	 have	been	overlooked.	
These	narrative	innovations	occur	as	Haywood’s	texts	unsettle	authorial	authority	
and,	instead,	shift	interpretive	authority	and	judgment	onto	the	reader.	Important	
to	 my	 argument,	 however,	 is	 that	 this	 position	 of	 readerly	 authority	 is	 not	 a	
comfortable	one.	Rather,	even	as	Haywood	puts	the	reader	in	a	position	to	judge,	
she	demonstrates	that	a	significant	level	of	anxiety	inheres	within	such	a	position.		
This	 anxiety	 is	 crucial	 to	 Haywood’s	 sceptical	 pedagogy	 and	 has	 received	
insufficient	 attention,	 as	 other	 epistemological	 themes,	 such	 as	 curiosity	 and	
secrecy,	have	dominated	Haywood	scholarship.	Essentially,	this	anxiety	is	pushed	
upon	the	reader	who	must	learn	to	negotiate	narratives	from	unreliable	‘relators’,	
and	 who,	 therefore,	 develop	 a	 ‘novel	 authority’,	 by	 which	 I	 mean	 a	 capacity	 to	
exercise	their	authority	both	as	novel	readers	and	as	autonomous	individuals	in	a	
liberal	society.		
	 In	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 Haywood’s	 sceptical	 aesthetic,	 I	 study	 four	
different	 texts,	 in	 four	 different	 genres,	 across	 four	 different	 decades.	 This	
approach	offers	a	‘long	view’	of	Haywood’s	work,	to	use	Juliette	Merritt’s	language,	
that	considers	‘a	[sustained]	set	of	preoccupations	and	strategies’	throughout	her	

















biography	 (of	 sorts)	 that	has	been	unjustifiably	neglected,	 and	The	Adventures	of	
Eovaai	 (1736),	a	satire	 that	 is	Haywood’s	most	political	work.	With	 these	 texts,	 I	
show	that	Haywood	is	in	dialogue	with	natural	philosophers	and	historians,	and	I	
show	 how	 her	 extreme	 scepticism	 puts	 the	 reader	 in	 a	 position	 of	 anxious	
authority.	 In	 chapters	 three	 and	 four,	 I	 show	 how,	 in	 the	 1740s	 and	 1750s,	
Haywood,	 while	 maintaining	 her	 focus	 on	 doubt,	 invokes	 the	 imagination	 to	
mitigate	the	extreme	scepticism	of	her	earlier	texts.	In	chapter	three,	I	examine	the	
periodical	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 (1744-46),	 showing	 how	 Haywood	 unsettles	
authority	through	her	use	of	 travel	narratives,	and	in	chapter	 four	I	show	that	 in	
The	 History	 of	 Jemmy	 and	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 (1753),	 which	 critics	 have	 largely	





and	 Interpretation,	 Vivasvan	 Soni	 claims	 that	 the	 literature	 of	 the	 eighteenth	
century	reflects	a	crisis	of	 judgment	that	modern	scholars	have	not	only	failed	to	









the	 two	 opposing	 poles	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	 problem	 and	 short-circuit	 the	
process	 of	 judgment.	 As	 he	 puts	 it,	 ‘On	 the	 one	 hand,	 empiricism,	 realism,	 and	
sentimentalism	seek	to	determine	judgment	too	quickly	or	bypass	it	altogether;	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 a	 nascent	 aestheticism	 finds	 its	 vocation	 in	 the	 suspension	 of	
judgment.	 Where,	 then,	 are	 we	 to	 find	 the	 resources	 to	 think	 an	 alternative	
practice	of	judgment?’4	Soni’s	answer	to	this	question	is	the	novel,	but	he	suggests	
that	not	all	eighteenth-century	novels	provide	such	space.	Rather,	he	says,	it	is	only	
the	 novels	 that	 resist	 traditions	 of	 sentimentalism,	 realism,	 and	 didacticism	 that	
‘take	the	problem	of	judgment	seriously’.	For	Soni,	such	novels	from	the	eighteenth	
century	 are	 those	 written	 by	 Henry	 Fielding,	 Jean-Jacque	 Rousseau,	 William	
Godwin,	 and	 Jane	 Austen.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 surprising	 list.	 However,	 in	 this	 thesis,	 I	
suggest	 that	 his	 list	 neglects	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 women	 writers	 before	 Jane	
Austen	 have	 engaged	 with	 the	 problems	 of	 autonomy	 and	 judgment,	 and	 I	
specifically	 seek	 to	 include	Eliza	Haywood	among	 those	authors	known	 for	 their	
focus	 on	 these	 problems.	 Although	 Haywood	 is	 sometimes	 characterized	 as	 a	
didactic	 writer,	 which,	 according	 to	 Soni’s	 criteria	 would	 exclude	 her	 from	
consideration,	in	actuality,	many	of	her	texts	are	difficult	to	finalize	and,	therefore,	
foreground	the	crisis	Soni	identifies.	Moreover,	the	tensions	within	the	body	of	her	
life’s	 work	 are	 particularly	 difficult	 to	 reconcile	 or	 resolve,	 and	 these	 tensions	
make	visible	the	‘space	of	autonomous	judgment’	that	Soni	describes.		
	 My	 strategy	 of	 addressing	 these	 tensions	 is	 to	 recognize	 the	 thread	 of	









reliable,	 by	which	 I	mean	 true	 or	 correct,	 and	 good,	which	 can	 sometimes	mean	
moral	 but,	 for	 Haywood,	 and	 for	 my	 analysis,	 more	 often	 means	 prudent.5	This	
sceptical	thread	in	Haywood	has	been	little	studied	in	individual	texts	and	has	not	
been	considered	across	her	body	of	work.	Consequently,	it	has	silently	complicated	




an	 Arbiter	 of	 Judgment.	 As	 Kathryn	 King	 writes	 in	 the	 epilogue	 to	 A	 Political	
Biography	of	Eliza	Haywood,		
Insufficient	attention	has	been	paid	to	Haywood’s	representations	of	
lies,	 secrecy	and	hidden	 lives	and	 to	her	 imaginative	attention	 to	a	
cluster	 of	 closely	 related	 Enlightenment	 themes:	 scepticism,	
credulity,	 collective	 delusion	 on	 the	 part	 of	 an	 easily	 infatuated	
public,	 the	power	of	print	 to	represent	and	misrepresent	 .	 .	 .	 .	 	The	
day	 is	 coming,	 I	would	guess,	when	 the	Enlightenment	 themes	will	
elicit	from	a	new	generation	of	readers	much	the	same	kind	of	rapt	
attention	that	has	been	given	to	her	sex-and-gender	themes.6		
This	 ‘cluster	 of	 closely	 related	 themes’	 forms	 a	 constellation	 that	 joins	 up	 the	



















figure	a	kind	of	Cartesian	 scepticism	 that	 illuminates	 the	 importance	of	doubt	 in	
the	 process	 of	 judgment.	 This	 scepticism,	 which,	 for	 Haywood,	 is	 sometimes	
extreme,	has	a	wide	breadth	of	influences,	including	amatory	fiction,	biographical	
narratives,	 natural	 philosophy,	 historical	 discourse,	 travel	 narratives,	 and	 legal	
discourse,	 and	 these	 influences	 both	 inform	 the	 content	 of	 Haywood’s	 texts	 and	
shape	her	experiments	with	narrative	form.	One	of	the	most	significant	features	of	
Haywood’s	 scepticism	 is	 the	 way	 it	 foregrounds	 the	 burdens	 and	 anxieties	
inherent	to	autonomy,	authority,	and	the	process	of	judgment.	In	discussions	about	
Haywood	and	authority,	the	importance	of	these	anxieties	has	gone	unaddressed.	
Although	 scholars	 have	 studied	 Haywood’s	 establishment	 of	 herself	 as	 a	 writer	
with	authority,	they	have	not	studied	the	degree	to	which	Haywood	characterizes	
this	authority	as	so	difficult	to	employ.7		
	 Soni	 describes	 the	 eighteenth-century	 crisis	 of	 judgment	 as	 the	 tension	
between	 the	 reliance	 on	 predetermined	norms	 (a	 reliance	 that	 effectively	 short-












(in	which	one	 refuses	 to	 judge	or,	 at	 least,	 claims	 to	do	 so).	He	 equates	 the	 first	
with	a	conservative	reliance	on	societal	norms,	and	the	second	with	philosophical	
scepticism	 and	 much	 of	 aesthetic	 literary	 theory.	 Although	 Haywood’s	 texts	
occasionally	 privilege	 predetermined,	 heteronomous	 norms,	 many	 of	 her	 texts	
emphasize	 instead	 the	need	 for	 reflective,	 autonomous	 judgment	 that	 challenges	
precepts.	Haywood	focuses	not	only	on	the	right	(or	rightness)	of	such	 judgment	
and	 autonomy,	 but	 also	 (and	 especially)	 on	 the	 burden	 and	 anxiety	 of	 such	
judgments.	This	anxiety	 leads	Haywood	to	privilege	the	temporary	suspension	of	
judgment	 in	 the	 face	 of	 uncertainty,	 as	 can	 been	 seen	 in	 the	 example	 from	The	




true	 knowledge	 need	 not	 be	 pursued	 and	 judgments	 should	 not	 be	 made.	 This	
scepticism,	 typically	 called	 pyrrhonism	 because	 it	 originated	 with	 the	 Greek	
philosopher	Pyrrho	(360	BCE	–	270	BCE),	 is	also	 found	 in	 the	writings	of	Sextus	
Empiricus	 (160	 CE	 –	 210	 CE),	 another	 Greek	 sceptic	 whose	 writings	 were	 a	
significant	influence	on	French	philosophers	such	as	Michel	de	Montaigne	(1533-
1592),	Francois	de	la	Mothe	Le	Vayer	(1588-1672),	Pierre	Gassendi	(1592-1655),	
Rene	 Descartes	 (1596-1650),	 and	 Pierre	 Bayle	 (1647-1706).	 Although	 not	 all	 of	











	 Haywood’s	 scepticism,	 however,	 does	 not	 feature	 the	 permanent	
suspension	of	 judgment	associated	with	pyrrhonists.	Rather,	hers	 is	a	 temporary	
suspension,	like	that	which	characterizes	Cartesian	scepticism.	In	pyrrhonism,	the	
epoché,	or	point	of	suspension,	is	located	at	the	end	of	inquiry:	it	is	a	place	for	an	
individual	 to	 rest	with	 the	understanding	 that	knowledge	cannot	be	achieved,	 so	
there	need	be	no	irritable	reaching	after	it.	For	Descartes,	however,	the	suspension	
of	 judgment	 is	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 inquiry	 and	 serves	 to	 provide	 space	 for	 the	
reflective	 judgment	 that	 is	about	 to	begin.	Essentially,	 this	means,	of	course,	 that	
Descartes	was	not	truly	a	sceptic	but	rather	that	he	used	the	attitude	of	scepticism,	
by	 which	 I	 mean	 its	 emphasis	 on	 doubt,	 as	 a	 way	 of	 testing	 and	 evaluating	
perceptions	and	judgments.	As	Christian	Thorne	puts	it,		
[O]ne	of	scepticism’s	central	notions	 is	 the	suspension	of	 judgment	
or	epoché,	that	moment	in	which	dogmatic	knowledge	claims	loosen	
their	grip	on	cognition.	But	what	kind	of	skepticism	you	get	depends	
entirely	 on	 where	 in	 your	 philosophical	 narrative	 you	 place	 this	















elaborately	 orchestrated	 anti-skepticism,	 engineered	 to	 find	 a	way	
out	of	doubt.9	
As	 Thorne	 explains,	 Descartes	 used	 his	 method	 of	 doubt	 to	 show	 the	 ultimate	
absurdity	of	scepticism.	Nevertheless,	he	is	still	associated	with	sceptical	thinking,	
which	 is	 a	 careful	 inquiry	 dominated	 by	 doubt.	 One	 key	 distinction	 between	
Descartes	 and	 Haywood,	 however,	 is	 that	 Haywood’s	 scepticism	 is	 not	
‘engineered’.	Her	scepticism	and	doubt	are	the	results	of	the	problems	faced	by	the	
modern	individual	 in	daily	 life	(as	one	can	see	in	her	earliest	amatory	fiction).	 In	




	 I	 call	Haywood’s	 scepticism	Cartesian	 for	 a	 few	 reasons.	 First,	 despite	 the	
fact	that	Haywood’s	scepticism	is	at	times	extreme,	implying	that	knowledge	might	
be	 impossible	 to	 achieve	 through	 the	 senses	 and	 that	 right	 judgment	 might	 be	
impossible	to	achieve	through	reason,	she	does	not	reach	the	same	conclusions	or	
implications	 as	 the	 pyrrhonist	 sceptics	 do.	 Pyrrho	 and	 his	 descendants,	 which	
include	both	Sextus	and	Montaigne,	suggest	that	one	can	never	know	what	is	true	












pyrrhonists	assert	 that	 truth	and	morality	cannot	be	known,	 they	assert	 that	 the	
only	 way	 to	 act	 (privately	 or	 publicly)	 is	 to	 follow	 custom.	 This	 means	 that,	
regarding	 government	 or	 religion,	 sceptics	will	 follow	 custom	 and	 precepts	 and	




more	 of	 a	 doubting	 Cartesian	 than	 a	 true	 pyrrhonist.	 	 Third,	 I	 characterize	
Haywood’s	 scepticism	 as	 Cartesian	 because	 of	 her	 rationalism.	 Even	 though	
Haywood	can	be	quite	sceptical	about	an	individual’s	ability	to	reason	well,	she	is,	
as	I	will	show,	even	more	sceptical	about	the	reliability	of	our	sensory	perceptions.	




liberal	 government,	 shared	 these	 anxieties.	 Douglas	 Casson	 describes	 Locke’s	
anxiety	this	way:		
The	problem	of	judgment	lurks	at	the	very	centre	of	the	tradition	of	
liberal	 theory.	 Here	 we	 find	 a	 seemingly	 contradictory	 view	 of	
human	 reasonableness.	 The	 plausibility	 of	 consensual	 government	
rests	on	faith	in	human	judgment	and	the	trust	that	those	around	us	







Hobbes	 addressed	 this	 tension	by	placing	 absolute	 authority	with	 the	 sovereign,	
essentially	 implementing	 the	default	position	of	 the	pyrrhonist	 sceptics.11	Casson	
says	 that	although	Locke’s	 first	 response	 to	 the	 ‘crisis	of	authority’	was	sceptical	
and,	 like	 Hobbes’s	 position,	 ‘absolutist’,	 he	 eventually	 moved	 toward	 a	 liberal	




based	 on	 his	 conclusion	 that	 experience	 can	 provide	 a	 common	 vocabulary	 and	
standard	 by	 which	 to	 make	 reasonable	 judgments,	 thereby	 allowing	 separate	
autonomous	 individuals	 to	 have	 a	 shared	 standard	 of	 judgment.	 Although	
Haywood	 shares	 the	 anxieties	 of	 Locke	 and	 the	 sceptics	who	 preceded	 him,	 she	
rejects	not	only	the	pyrrhonists’	position	of	following	custom,	but	she	also	rejects	
the	 Lockean	 notion	 that	 experience	 can	 be	 a	 standard	 for	 judgment.	 Haywood’s	
texts	 show	 that	 she	 had	 too	 many	 doubts	 about	 the	 reliability	 of	 individual	


















fact,	 it	 is	 Haywood’s	 resistance	 to	 both	 the	Hobbesian	 solution	 and	 the	 Lockean	
solution,	 in	 spite	 of	 her	 scepticism,	 that	 make	 her	 work	 so	 interesting	 and	
important	as	Enlightenment	fiction.		
	 Haywood,	 of	 course,	was	 not	 the	 first	woman	writer	 to	 question	 custom.	
Many	before	her	had	done	so.	As	Hilda	Smith	points	out,	Bathsua	Makin	(c.	1600	–	
c.	1675)	 ‘saw	custom	at	 the	heart	of	women’s	problems’,	and	Mary	Astell	 (1666-
1731)	 urged	 women	 to	 use	 Cartesian	 methods	 to	 ‘examine	 “the	 Doctrine	 on	



























Smith	 cites	 these	 seventeenth-century	 women	 writers,	 in	 part,	 to	 defend	 their	
interest	 in	 reason	 and	 autonomy,	 both	 of	 which	 were	 ways	 of	 knowing	 that	
became	 somewhat	 anathema	 in	 the	 1980s	 among	 some	 feminist	 literary	 critics	
who	 focused	 on	 communicative	 reason	 and,	 especially,	 relational	 thinking	 as	
explained	 by	 Carol	 Gilligan	 in	 her	 1982	 book	 on	moral	 reasoning,	 In	a	Different	
Voice.	 In	 the	 1980s	 interest	 in	 autonomous	 thinking	 became	 contrary	 to	 the	
feminist	project	that	 focused	more	on	women’s	 ‘ways	of	knowing’.	16	However,	as	
Smith	 argues,	 these	 seventeenth-century	 women’s	 defences	 of	 their	 reason	 and	
their	desire	for	authority	were	central	to	their	progress	during	the	Enlightenment	
period.	Haywood	shared	the	suspicion	of	precept	expressed	by	her	precursors,	but	
this	 suspicion	 was	 at	 odds	 with	 sceptical	 philosophy	 and,	 especially,	 sceptical	




	 The	 influence	 of	 scepticism	 in	 eighteenth-century	 literature	 has	 been	
studied;	however,	existing	studies	focus	almost	entirely	on	male	writers.	Eve	Tavor	
Bannet’s	 1987	 monograph	 Scepticism,	 Society,	 and	 the	 Eighteenth-Century	 Novel	
















Richardson,	 Fielding,	 and	 Sterne.	17	In	 the	 same	 year,	Michael	McKeon	 published	
his	influential	Origins	of	the	English	Novel:	1600-1740,	 in	which	he	argues	that	the	
novel	 developed	 dialogically	 as	 it	 moved	 from	 ‘romance	 idealism’	 to	 ‘naïve	
empiricism’,	then	from	‘naïve	empiricism’	to	‘extreme	skepticism’,	and	finally	from	
‘extreme	scepticism’	back	to	some	elements	of	‘romance	idealism’	(which	McKeon	
equates	 with	 ‘conservative	 ideology’).18	McKeon	 focuses	 on	 Cervantes,	 Bunyan,	
Defoe,	Swift,	Richardson,	and	Fielding.	About	15	years	later,	in	2003,	Fred	Parker	
published	Scepticism	and	Literature:	An	Essay	on	Pope,	Hume,	Sterne,	and	Johnson	in	
which	 he	 explores	 ‘skeptical	 thinking’	 in	 literature	 as	 it	 manifests	 through	
playfulness	and	irony.19	Although	these	texts	serve	as	helpful	foundations	for	any	
consideration	 of	 scepticism	 in	 eighteenth-century	 literature,	 their	 neglect	 of	
women	 writers	 is	 problematic.	 Granted,	 Bannet	 and	 McKeon’s	 studies	 were	
published	in	the	early	days	of	the	recovery	of	eighteenth-century	women	writers,	
but	the	omission	is	still	noteworthy,	especially	since	even	more	recent	studies	that	
investigate	 scepticism	 have	 continued	 to	 focus	 primarily	 on	 male	 writers	 and	



















Donoghue’s	 2002	 study	 of	 skepticism	 and	 fiction	 does	 not	 mention	 Haywood,	





1660-1760	 discusses	 women	 writers	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 supernatural,	 a	 topic	
which	 frequently	 invokes	 questions	 related	 to	 scepticism,	 and	 he	 does	 mention	
Haywood,	 but	 he	 does	 so	 only	 briefly	 when	 he	 discusses	 her	 Duncan	 Campbell	
texts,	quickly	concluding	that	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer	 is	 ‘pure	entertainment’	and	























	 This	 association	 of	 scepticism	 with	 male	 writers,	 perhaps	 even	 with	
masculinity,	 itself,	 is	 not	 a	 new	 one.	 Damaris	 Masham	 (1659-1708)	 suggests	 as	
much	in	a	letter	to	John	Locke	when	she	states,	‘Besides	being	myself	cur’d	of	some	
sort	 of	 Scepticisme	by	 arguments	However	 solid	 in	 themselves	have	been	 to	me	
effectual,	 I	 think	 that	 I	 may	 much	 more	 Advantageously	 employ	 my	 Houres	 in	
Purusing	the	end	of	these	Speculations	then	[sic]	in	Indeavoring	to	Extricate	those	




Women,	 the	Novel,	 and	Natural	 Philosophy,	 1660-1727,	 notes	 that	 ‘[a]utonomous	
action	 and	 independent	 perception	 and	 analysis	 were	 not	 part	 of	 conventional	
femininity’.26	Such	eighteenth-century	restraints,	however,	do	not	fully	explain	the	
regular	 exclusion	 of	 women	 from	 late	 twentieth-	 and	 early	 twenty-first-century	
studies	 of	 scepticism	 in	 eighteenth-century	 literature.	 This	 exclusion	 seems	
especially	 significant	 if	 one	 takes	 seriously	 Eve	 Tavor	 Bannet’s	 claim	 that	 ‘[t]he	
eighteenth-century	 fictions	 which	 twentieth-century	 criticism	 has	 characterized	
both	 as	 “novels”	 and	 “good	 novels”,	 all	 grow	 out	 of	 the	 eighteenth-century	
skeptical	tradition’.27	
	 Certainly	 the	 lack	of	modern	editions	(especially	before	 the	digitization	of	












of	work,	and	perhaps	such	 limitations	 led	critics	 like	John	Richetti	 to	conclude	 in	
1998	 that	 Haywood’s	 ideas	 of	 conduct	 are	 focused	 on	 the	 ‘customary’	 and	
‘traditional’	 rather	 than	 on	 the	 ‘rational	 patterns’	we	 see	 later	 in	works	 such	 as	
Pamela. 28 	For	 Richetti,	 Haywood’s	 complexity	 pales	 even	 next	 to	 Behn	 and	
Manley’s.	He	says,	
[I]n	 Behn	 and	 Manley,	 the	 narrative	 voice	 suggests	 an	 alternative	
way	 of	 reading	 for	 more	 than	 enjoyable	 fantasy	 and	 that	 voice	
distinguishes	 itself	 as	 a	 moral	 intelligence	 from	 the	 thoughtless,	
merely	hedonistic	characters	in	the	fiction	itself.	Haywood’s	writing	
is	 largely	 another	 story	 in	which	 the	 reader	 is	 offered	 intense	 and	
uncritical	 involvement	 in	 passions,	 white-hot	 excitements,	 and	
deliciously	unbearable	tragedies.	
For	 Richetti,	 Haywood’s	 texts	 are	 less	 complex	 that	 Behn’s	 and	 Manley’s,	 even	
though	 the	 latter	 have	 fairly	 unambiguous	 political	 implications.	 Even	 Ros	
Ballaster	 claimed	 in	 1992	 that	 ‘[t]he	 business	 of	 Haywood’s	 amatory	 plots	 is	 to	
engage	 the	 female	 reader’s	 sympathy	 and	 erotic	 pleasure,	 rather	 than	 stimulate	
intellectual	 judgment’.29	Recent	 criticism	 has,	 of	 course,	 corrected	 these	 early,	
reductivist	 assessments,	 and	 Ballaster,	 herself,	 has	 changed	 her	 evaluation	 of	
Haywood’s	 work;30	however,	 general	 studies	 of	 scepticism	 and	 judgment	 still	
exclude	Haywood	and	most	women	writers,	except	for	Jane	Austen.	Another	cause	













theorists	 who	 challenged	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 self,	 the	 nature	 of	 autonomy,	 and	
rationality	 as	 legitimate	 categories	 of	 knowing,	 so	 they	 might	 have	 been	 less	
interested	 in	 this	 particular	 approach	 to	 a	 writer	 like	 Haywood. 31 	A	 final	
explanation	 can	 be	 found	 in	 a	 problem	 that	 Vivasvan	 Soni	 identifies	 in	 Austen	
scholarship.	He	claims	that	many	readers	approach	Austen	with	a	predetermined	
hermeneutic	 that	 leads	 them	 either	 to	 ‘finding	 in	 her	 pedagogy	 of	 judgment	 a	
conservative	 reinforcing	 of	 norms	 or	 “rescuing”	 her	 from	 the	 charge	 of	
conservatism’.32 	I	 would	 argue	 that,	 perhaps,	 the	 same	 problem	 occurs	 with	
Haywood.	If	one	reads	Haywood’s	work	in	order	to	determine	whether	or	not	she	
is	conservative	or	progressive,	one	can	overlook	other	themes	as	well	as	important	
elements	 of	 her	 narrative	 structure.	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	 need,	 as	 Kathryn	 King	
suggests,	 for	 additional	 consideration	 of	 Haywood’s	 epistemological	 concerns	
beyond	the	binary	readings	of	‘sexually	progressive’	versus	‘sexually	conservative’.		
	 Even	 though	 scholars	 have	 not	 previously	 identified	 Haywood’s	 place	
within	 the	 sceptical	 tradition,	 they	 have,	 in	 fact,	 begun	 to	 study	 philosophical	
concepts	 in	 her	work,	 and	 several	 of	 them	 serve	 as	 foundations	 for	 this	 study.33	


















Wilputte	 and	 Karen	 Bloom	 Gevirtz.	 Wilputte	 consistently	 examines	 the	 way	
Haywood’s	narrative	structures	impact	the	reader’s	potential	interpretation	of	her	
work.	 Even	 though	 I	 resist	 some	 of	 her	 conclusions,	 Wilputte’s	 writing	 on	 The	
Adventures	of	Eovaai	 greatly	 informs	my	own	 interpretation	of	 that	 text,	 and	her	
arguments	about	the	Female	Spectator	serve	as	foundations	for	my	own	analysis	of	
the	 periodical.	 In	 addition,	 her	 recent	 article	 about	 Haywood’s	 Dalinda	 (1749),	
shares	my	 interest	 in	 problems	 of	 empiricism	 and	 judgment,	 and	 it	 investigates	
Haywood’s	 interest	 in	 legal	 discourse,	 an	 interest	 I	 also	 consider	 in	my	 chapter	
about	The	History	of	Jemmy	and	Jenny	Jessamy.34	Karen	Bloom	Gevirtz’s	work	looks	
at	 the	 ‘new	 science’	 or	 natural	 philosophy	 of	 the	 late	 seventeenth	 and	 early	
eighteenth	centuries,	 and	her	 studies	of	knowledge-making	and	empiricism	have	
been	 especially	 important	 for	 my	 chapters	 on	A	 Spy	Upon	 the	 Conjurer	 and	 The	
Adventures	of	Eovaai,	each	of	which	consider	Haywood’s	dialogue	with	the	natural	
philosophers.	 Even	 beyond	 those	 chapters,	 however,	 Gevirtz’s	 work	 has	 been	
informative	 for	my	 own	 analysis	 since	 scepticism	 is	 an	 integral	 concern	 for	 the	
natural	philosophers	and	those	engaged	with	the	‘new	science’.35	
	 These	Haywood	scholars,	however,	do	not	offer	extended	consideration	of	




















that	 the	 exploration	 of	 judgment	 he	 describes	 in	 Austen	 can	 also	 be	 found	 in	
Haywood’s	work.	 Hina	Nazar,	 in	 her	 book	Enlightened	Sentiments:	 Judgment	and	
Autonomy	in	the	Age	of	Sensibility	deals	directly	with	the	problems	of	judgment	and	
autonomy.	 Like	 Soni,	 Nazar	 parses	 the	 distinctions	 between	 reflective	 judgment	
and	determined	judgment,	and	she	studies	the	processes	of	reflective	judgment	in	
the	works	of	Richardson,	Rousseau,	Godwin,	Hume,	Adam	Smith,	and	Austen.	Her	
scholarship	 is	 a	 significant	 influence,	 in	 particular,	 on	 my	 argument	 about	 The	
History	of	Jemmy	and	Jenny	Jessamy,	in	which	I	assert	that	an	‘enlarged	mentality’	is	
a	key	part	of	Haywood’s	response	 to	her	earlier	scepticism.	There	are	significant	
distinctions	 between	 Nazar’s	 work	 and,	 my	 own,	 however.	 The	 most	 obvious	
distinction	 is	 that	 Nazar	 does	 not	 include	 Haywood	 in	 her	 study.	 The	 second	
distinction,	which	is	an	important	point	to	make	for	this	thesis	in	general,	is	that	I	
do	 not	 label	 Haywood	 as	 a	 sentimental	 writer.	 This	 means	 that	 my	 analysis	 is	
focused	on	Haywood’s	 concern	 for	 reliably	 correct	 and	prudent	 judgment	 rather	
than	on	moral	judgment	or	concerns	about	aesthetics	or	‘taste’.	Although	Haywood	
is	not	completely	unconcerned	with	sensibilities	that	connect	to	taste	and	morality,	
and	 I	 address	 these	 elements	 to	 some	 degree	 in	 chapters	 three	 and	 four,	 those	
sensibilities	are	not	my	central	concern	in	this	thesis	because,	in	part,	I	do	not	see	
them	as	Haywood’s	 central	 concern,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	much	 critical	 attention	












and	 political	 alliances.	 We	 have	 very	 little	 certain	 knowledge	 about	 Haywood’s	
biography	other	than	that	she	was	an	English	playwright,	actress,	and	writer	who	
worked	 primarily	 in	 London	 and	who	 knew	 or	 collaborated	with	 other	writers,	
including	Aaron	Hill,	Richard	Savage,	Henry	Fielding,	and	William	Hatchett.	37	Her	
publications,	 which	 spanned	 from	 1719	 to	 1756,	 despite	 their	 common	 themes,	
differ	significantly	in	terms	of	their	attitudes	towards	passion,	politics,	and	gender	
norms.	When	reading	multiple	 texts	by	Haywood	(and	often	when	reading	 just	a	
single	 text),	 one	 finds	 that	 sometimes	 passion	 is	 good;	 sometimes	 it	 is	 bad.	
Sometimes	 one	 political	 alliance	 seems	 right;	 sometimes	 another	 seems	 best.	
Sometimes	young	women	should	obey	their	parents;	sometimes	 they	should	not.	
Alexander	 Pettit	 has	 argued	 that	 Haywood	 ‘quite	 consciously	 argues	 for	 the	
necessity	 of	 “rules”	 and	 “customs”	 as	 safeguards	 against	 feminine	 error,	 and	
furthermore,	 [that	 Haywood]	 believes	 that	 “feminine	 distress”	 is	 averted	 when	
women	act	in	conformity	to	custom	and	ensured	when	they	do	not’.	In	this	section,	
I	challenge	Pettit’s	claim,	however,	and	show	that	sometimes	Haywood’s	heroines	

















claim	 is	 certainly,	 to	 some	 degree,	 self-evident,	 its	 implications	 deserve	 further	
examination,	 especially	 since,	 if	 each	 case	 is	 different,	 its	 circumstances	must	 be	







in	 circumstances,	 or	 the	 significance	 of	 ‘particularity’,	 her	 works,	 to	 use	 Soni’s	
phrase,	‘take	judgment	seriously’.		
	 This	 interest	 in	 circumstances	 reflects	 a	 kind	 of	 casuistry	 in	 Haywood’s	
fiction,	or	a	reliance	on	case-by-case	reasoning.	Henry	Fielding	satirizes	this	kind	
of	 thinking	 in	 Joseph	Andrews	 through	an	 interpolated	 tale	 in	which	a	gentleman	
narrates	 his	 experience	 as	 part	 of	 a	 club	 that	 follows	 the	 ‘Rule	 of	 Right’,	 which	
holds	 that	 ‘there	was	nothing	 absolutely	 good	or	 evil	 in	 itself;	 that	Actions	were	
denominated	 good	 or	 bad	 by	 the	 Circumstances	 of	 the	 Agent’.40	However,	 the	
gentleman	begins	 to	doubt	 the	 ‘infallibility’	 of	 the	 club’s	principles	when	 several	
members	 abscond	 with	 other	 members’	 money,	 and,	 in	 one	 case,	 another	















is	 rather	 loose	 in	 that	 it	 is	 somewhat	 different	 from	 the	 idea	 of	 precept	 as	 an	
authoritative	 rule,	 and	he	 implies	 that	precept	 is	not	 a	 rigid	principle	but	 rather	
one	to	be	evaluated	through	practice	and	circumstantial	details.	In	this	sense,	he	is	
discussing	precepts	that	result	from	reflective	judgment	rather	than	precepts	that	
guide	 determined	 judgment.	 It	 is	 also	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 precepts	 McKeon	
discusses	 can	 be	 somewhat	 difficult	 to	 implement.	 For	 example,	 he	 says,	 ‘In	 the	
first	 number	 of	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 Haywood	 makes	 a	 preceptual	 distinction	
between	a	mature	love	based	on	a	rational	apprehension	of	the	other	and	the	more	
common	immaturity	of	slight	infatuation’,	which,	McKeon	adds,	‘is	clarified	as	the	
necessity	 of	 knowing	 the	 sincerity	 of	 the	 other’.42	However,	 Haywood	 shows	 us	




difficult	 to	 distinguish	 true	 love	 from	 false	 love;	 therefore,	 following	 a	 precept	












in	her	 subsequent	work.	About	mid-way	 through	 the	novel,	 the	heroine	Melliora	
absents	herself	from	her	guardian,	Count	D’Elmont,	because	she	loves	him	but	he	is	
married.	 Since	 she	 does	 not	 want	 to	 be	 part	 of	 an	 illicit	 intrigue,	 she	 goes	 to	 a	
convent	 to	 suffer	 her	 love	 at	 a	 safe	 distance.	 Later,	 however,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	
novel,	D’Elmont	is	no	longer	married	(because	of	the	accidental	death	of	his	wife),	
so	Melliora	returns	to	present	herself	to	the	Count.	Up	to	this	point	in	the	novel,	all	
of	 the	 sexually	 aggressive	 characters	 in	 the	 novel	 have	 been	 punished	 or	
dismissed,	but	Melliora,	 the	pillar	of	proper	 love,	mirrors	 their	sexual	aggression	
when	 she	 returns	 to	D’Elmont.43	In	 this	 scene,	 D’Elmont	 has	 retired	 to	 his	 room	
and	 is	 thinking	 about	 Melliora.	 He	 hears	 someone	 enter	 his	 room,	 but,	 in	 the	
candlelight,	 he	 can	 see	 only	 enough	 detail	 to	 determine	 that	 the	 intruder	 is	 a	
woman.	 At	 first,	 he	 thinks	 she	 is	 a	 servant,	 but	 then	 she	 speaks,	 disguising	 her	
voice:		
‛I	come,’	she	says,	‘to	talk	to	you,	and	I	hope	you	are	more	a	chevalier	
than	 to	 prefer	 a	 little	 sleep,	 to	 the	 conversation	 of	 a	 lady,	 tho’	 she	
visits	you	at	midnight.’	These	words	made	D’Elmont	believe	he	had	











This	 sexually	 assertive	 and	 socially	 improper	 behaviour	 from	 Melliora	
transgresses	 both	 custom	 and	 decorum	 and	 matches	 the	 aggressive	 behaviour	
seen	 in	 other	 female	 characters	 such	 as	 Ciamara	 and	Alovysa,	 and	 also	 in	 Count	
D’Elmont,	 himself.	 This	 time,	 to	 the	 credit	 of	 his	 virtue,	 D’Elmont	 asks	 the	
mysterious	 guest	 to	 leave,	 but	 she	 replies,	 ‘Is	 this	 the	 courtly,	 the	 accomplished	
Count	D’Elmont?	So	famed	for	complaisance	and	sweetness?	Can	it	be	he,	who	thus	
rudely	repels	a	lady,	when	she	comes	to	make	him	a	present	of	her	heart?’	(249).	










	 These	 exact	 behaviours—the	 bedroom	 ambush,	 the	 abandonment	 of	
















would	 suggest	 that	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 amatory	 signs	 in	 this	 scene	 reflect	 a	
broader	 or,	 at	 least,	different	 problem,	 too,	 namely	 that	 circumstances	 are	 often	
more	 important	 than	 precepts	 or	 custom	 and,	 therefore,	 signs	 might	 mean	
different	things	from	one	case	to	the	next,	even	outside	of	the	problem	of	gender.	
As	 the	 narrator	 of	 Haywood’s	 novel	 Life’s	 Progress	 through	 the	 Passions	 (1748)	
states,	 ‘Yet,	 such	 is	 the	 ill-judging	 or	 careless	 determination	 of	 the	 world,	 that	
without	making	any	allowances	for	circumstances,	it	censures	all	indiscriminately	
alike’.47		
	 Haywood’s	 interest	 in	 circumstances	 constitutes	her	 interest	 in	 judgment.	
As	 Vivasvan	 Soni	 puts	 it,	 ‘[J]udgment	 is	 how	 cognition	 comes	 to	 terms	 with	
particularity’,	especially	in	the	absence	of	 ‘rules,	norms,	and	concepts’	that	would	
lead	to	a	determined	judgment.48	Although	Haywood	and	her	characters	certainly	
operate	 in	 realms	 with	 existing	 ‘rules,	 norms,	 and	 concepts’,	 there	 are	 several	
instabilities	in	Haywood’s	texts	that	challenge	such	rules.	First	is	the	anxiety	in	the	
eighteenth	 century	 about	 the	 increasing	 tendency	 to	 locate	 authority	 with	











norms.49	Second	 is	 the	 increasing	 attention	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 and	 eighteenth	
centuries	 to	 induction	 and	 empiricism.	 Third,	 and	 perhaps	 most	 importantly,	 is	
Haywood’s	 resistance	 to	 gender	 norms	 or,	 at	 least,	 her	 inconsistent	 response	 to	





particularities	 of	 the	 situation—make	 her	 actions	 not	 only	 permissible	 but	 even	
charming.		
	 A	notable	tension	about	precepts	also	can	be	found	between	The	Distress’d	
Orphan	 (1726)	 and	 The	 Double	 Marriage	 (1726).	 In	 The	 Distress’d	 Orphan,	 the	
heroine	Annilia	is	falsely	imprisoned	by	her	guardian	after	she	resists	marrying	his	
son	who	is	also	her	first	cousin.	When	her	guardian	first	suggests	that	the	time	for	

























marry.	 Nevertheless,	 she	 says,	 ‘[O]f	 this	 I	 am	 very	 certain,	 that	 to	whatever	 you	
think	for	my	good,	I	shall	submit	with	readiness,	having	learnt	thus	much	from	my	
Studies,	that	I	shall	never	be	able	to	know	so	well	what	is	best	for	me,	as	those	do,	
from	whom	 I	 received	 that	 Knowledge	which	 I	 have’.51		 In	 short,	 she	 pledges	 to	
follow	his	guidance	and	authority.	However,	when	he	proposes	that	she	marry	his	
son,	 she	questions	 the	match	on	 the	grounds	of	 their	 close	kinship.	He	 responds	
that	no	law	prevents	the	marriage,	and	he	says	that	he	hopes	‘the	Precepts	which	I	
have	 always	 endeavour’d	 to	 instill	 in	 your	 Mind,	 are	 such	 as	 will	 give	 you	 no	
ground	 to	 think	 I	 would	 persuade	 you	 to	 an	 Act	 either	 unwarrantable	 or	
disadvantageous’.52	At	first,	she	agrees	to	consider	his	proposition	‘in	obedience	to	
[his]	Desires’,	but	as	he	begins	to	strip	her	of	‘liberty’	by	refusing	to	let	her	manage	
her	 own	 correspondence,	 she	 resolves	 to	 no	 longer	 ‘consult	 him	 in	 any	Affair’.53	
Even	 before	 he	 eventually	 forces	 her	 into	 an	 insane	 asylum,	 she	 reaches	 the	
conclusion	 that	 her	 autonomy	 is	 being	 threatened	 unjustly,	 and	 she	 abandons	
obedience	 and	 precepts	 of	 his	 authority.	 It	 becomes	 clear	 to	 her	 that	 her	 own	
judgment	 is	 better	 than	 her	 guardian’s	 or	 even	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 that	 gives	 him	
authority	over	her.	 In	 the	 end,	 she	 escapes	 the	 asylum	with	 the	help	of	 her	 true	
love,	and	they	publically	expose	her	guardian’s	villainy.		
	 In	 contrast,	 in	The	Double	Marriage,	 Bellcour’s	 disobedience	 of	 his	 father	
results	 in	 the	 double	 suicide	 of	 himself	 and	 his	 abandoned	 wife.	 Although	 his	













out	 to	 be	 right.54	When	Bellcour	 first	 sees	Mirtamene,	 the	woman	 his	 father	 has	

















become	 permanently	 suspect	 and	 the	 traditional	 locations	 of	 authority	 are	
undermined.	This	ultimately	leaves	everyone	to	be	his	(or,	significantly,	her)	own	










she	 clearly	 does	 not	 rest	 easy	 with	 it	 as	 is	 made	 clear	 by	 her	 focus	 on	 the	
difficulties	of	effectively	employing	such	authority.		
	 Haywood’s	 casuistry	 can	 also	 been	 seen	 in	 later	 courtship	 texts	 like	 The	
History	of	Betsy	Thoughtless	 (1751).	 Although	 the	 novel	 has	 been	 interpreted	 by	
some	as	instructive	in	precepts	of	virtue,	others	have	pointed	out	its	subversion.55	
Jane	 Spencer,	 for	 example,	 points	 out	 that	 Betsy	 must	 abandon	 conventional	
precepts	about	a	wife’s	duties,	precepts	that	have	been	reinforced	by	Lady	Trusty	
on	 Betsy’s	 wedding	 day	 as	 she	 instructs	 Betsy	 to,	 as	 Spencer	 says,	 ‘give	 [her	
husband]	his	 rights,	and	always	yield	 to	him	 in	disputes’.56	But	as	Spencer	notes,	
after	Betsy’s	marriage,	 she	begins	 to	 realize	 that	Lady	Trusty’s	advice	 ‘cannot	be	
followed	 with	 any	 dignity’.57	As	 the	 narrator	 of	 the	 novel	 puts	 it,	 ‘How	 utterly	
impossible	 was	 it	 for	 her	 now	 to	 observe	 the	 rules	 laid	 down	 to	 her	 by	 Lady	
Trusty!’58	In	 this	 case,	 circumstances	 demand	 that	 Betsy	 violate	 the	 rules	 that	
establish	her	husband’s	authority,	and	thus	Betsy	must	make	reflective	judgments,	
which,	 consequently,	 invite	 and,	more	 importantly,	 require	 her	 to	 think	 and	 act	























	 The	 location	 of	 authority	 is	 significant	 when	 one	 uses	 pre-determined	
precepts	 because	 those	 precepts	 must	 be	 legitimate	 ones.	 However,	 authority	
becomes	more	 complicated	and	 contested	 in	 the	 face	of	 reflective	 judgment	 that	
considers	 circumstance	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis.	 These	 ideas	 of	 complicated	 and	
contested	authority	are	in	keeping	with	the	late	seventeenth-	and	early	eighteenth-
century	challenges	to	traditional	sources	of	authority.	Scholars	have	examined	the	
increasing	 authority	 assigned	 to	 women	 writers	 (or	 perceived	 to	 be	 allowed	 to	
women	writers),	 especially	 those	 writers	 who	 positioned	 themselves	 as	 writing	


















means	 of	 its	 legitimation’,	 which	 led	 to	 ‘a	 larger	 cultural	 movement	 towards	
locating	moral	value,	law	and	order	in	the	individual’.60		
	 Spencer	 and	 Ballaster,	 for	 example,	 were	 early	 scholars	 of	 Aphra	 Behn’s	
authority	and	the	challenges	she	asserted	to	those	who	doubted	or	dismissed	her	
authority,	along	with	how	Behn’s	various	narrative	forms	established	authority	for	
her	narrators	and	herself	 as	author,	both	of	whom	Ballaster	 suggests	are	 closely	
aligned.61	Behn	 aligns	 author	 and	 narrator,	 establishing	 authority	 by	 claims	 of	
‘being	 there’,	 even	 as	 she	 experiments	with	narrative	 omniscience	 and	narrative	
intrusion	 in	 works	 such	 as	 Love-Letters	 from	 a	 Nobleman	 to	 His	 Sister	 (1684-
1687).62	Delarivier	 Manley	 uses	 the	 feminine	 authority	 of	 amatory	 fiction	 as	 a	
method	 of	 extending	 her	 authority	 into	 the	 realm	of	 politics.	However,	Manley’s	
establishment	of	authority	 is	different	 from	Haywood’s	because	Manley	does	not	
complicate	her	authority	 through	her	narrative	strategies.	Ballaster	notes	 that	 in	
Manley’s	 New	 Atalantis,	 ‘Interpretation	 or	 judgment’	 is	 left	 to	 the	 reader,	 but	
Ballaster	 also	 admits	 that	 Manley’s	 text	 is	 ‘ideologically	 over-determined	 and	
politically	 partisan’,	 so	 while	 the	 reader	 might	 face	 challenges	 of	 aligning	 the	
scandal	 fiction	with	the	political	reality,	 the	reader	does	not	struggle	to	 interpret	
the	narrator	or	author’s	meaning.	Although	Manley	and	Behn’s	narratives	are	not	
simplistic,	 their	 political	 loyalties	 are	 clear.	 In	 contrast,	 Haywood	 not	 only	












	 While	 I	 recognize	 that	 Eliza	 Haywood	 sought	 authority	 for	 herself	 as	 an	





reliability	 that	 invite	 judgments	 from	readers—judgments	 that	can	be	difficult	 to	
make.	As	a	result,	readers	are	presented	with	a	complicated	interpretive	challenge.	






studies	 and	 in	 studies	 of	 eighteenth-century	 fictionality,	 in	 general.	 Although	
scholars	have	noted	Haywood’s	invitation	to	readers	to	make	judgments	and	reach	
for	 interpretations,63	they	 have	 not	 thoroughly	 considered	 the	 degree	 to	 which	
Haywood’s	 texts	 demonstrate	 concern	 and	 even	 anxiety	 about	 the	 nature	 of	















comes	 with	 subsequent	 burdens.	 Many	 of	 Haywood’s	 plots	 demonstrate	 this	
anxiety	 about	 authority,	 and	 they	 frequently	 employ	 narrative	 strategies	 that	
perform	these	anxieties	by	shifting	them	onto	the	reader.	It	is	not	until	Haywood’s	
later	 texts,	 especially	The	History	 of	 Jemmy	and	 Jenny	 Jessamy,	 that	 she	 explores	
tentative	solutions	to	her	anxiety	and	extreme	scepticism.	When	these	answers	do	
arrive,	they	come,	rather	surprisingly,	in	the	form	of	the	imagination,	which	allows	







large,	 complicated	 oeuvre.	 Rather,	 I	 seek	 to	 study	 those	 tensions	 in	 several	 key	
texts	 as	 they	 reflect	 a	 crisis	 of	 judgment	 for	 the	 characters.	 These	 tensions	 also	
create	 a	 crisis	 of	 judgment	 for	 readers	 who	 find	 that	 such	 texts	 resist	
interpretation,	 especially	 an	 interpretation	 based	 on	 predetermined	 concepts	 or	
ideas	 about	 Haywood.	 In	 other	 words,	 readers	 cannot	 rely	 on	 established	
generalizations	to	determine	the	meaning	of	Haywood’s	texts;	they	are	not	able	to	
know	ahead	of	 time	what	kind	of	politics	or	moral	values	 they	will	 find.	Readers	
cannot	 approach	 a	 Haywood	 text	 with	 the	 certainty	 that	 it	 will	 be	 either	
conservative	or	progressive,	that	it	will	privilege	one	position	over	another.	Thus	
readers	 are	 put	 into	 the	 same	 situations	 as	 the	 characters	 who	 must	 focus	 on	






that	 ‘[a]ttention	 to	 the	 problems	 of	 judgment	 allows	 us	 to	 understand	 better	






many	works	 that	did	not	have	her	name	on	 the	 title	pages,	but	also	because	her	
biography	 is	 so	uncertain.	Leah	Orr	has	argued	 that	we	cannot	safely	attribute	A	
Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer	 and	 The	 History	 of	 Jemmy	 and	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 to	 Eliza	
Haywood.	 She	 bases	 her	 argument	 on	 the	 lack	 of	 external	 evidence	 that	 goes	
beyond	 internal	 stylistic	 evidence.	 Of	 the	 texts	 I	 study	 in	 this	 thesis,	 she	 is	
particularly	doubtful	that	Eliza	Haywood	wrote	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer,	pointing	
out	 that	 there	 is	 little	 evidence	 that	Haywood	wrote	 it	 other	 that	George	Frisbie	
Whicher’s	speculation	that	it	matches	Haywood’s	style.65	Regarding	The	History	of	
Jemmy	and	 Jenny	 Jessamy,	 Orr	 notes	 that	 the	 only	 evidence	 of	 authorship	 comes	
from	 Haywood’s	 obituary,	 and,	 therefore,	 she	 deems	 the	 attribution	 merely	
‘possible’.66	Orr	 raises	 good	 questions,	 and	 her	 caution	 is	 not	 unwarranted.	 She	
argues	 that	 Patrick	 Spedding,	 in	 his	 bibliography	 often	 rests	 his	 claims	 on	
speculation	 or	 unreliable	 stylistic	 assessments	 rather	 than	 external	 evidence.	











stronger	 argument	 and,	 perhaps	 a	 proposed	 alternative	 attribution,	 needs	 to	 be	
made	 if	 we	 are	 to	 de-attribute	 these	 texts.	 I	 find	 this	 is	 especially	 true	 for	 The	
History	of	Jemmy	and	Jenny	Jessamy	since	external	evidence	does	exist.	Therefore,	









the	 narrator’s	 credibility	 and	 her	 subject,	 Duncan	 Campbell.	 These	 doubts	 draw	
attention	to	the	narrator’s	failure	to	employ	the	method	of	doubt	that	she	pretends	
to	 practise.	 In	 addition,	 I	 show	 how	 this	 text	 is	 in	 conversation	 with	 texts	 by	
William	 Bond	 and	 other	 early	 eighteenth-century	 male	 writers	 who	 address	
problems	 of	 scepticism	 and	 credulity.	 With	 Spy,	 Haywood	 participates	 in	 a	
dialogue	 dominated	 by	 men	 while	 also	 expanding	 and	 complicating	 the	
conversation	 as	 she	 addresses	 epistemological	 concerns	 for	 women.	 I	 conclude	
that	 the	 narrative	 approach	 to	 A	 Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer	 contributes	 to	 the	











in	 The	 Adventures	 of	 Eovaai	 (1736)	 and	 how	 that	 scepticism	 is	 connected	 to	
scholarly	 traditions	 of	 historical	 discourse	 and	 its	 inherent	 and	 troublesome	
reliance	 on	 testimony.	 Scholars	 have	 offered	 widely	 different	 readings	 of	
Haywood’s	 political	 partisanship	 in	 Eovaai,	 and	 I	 suggest	 it	 is	 Haywood’s	
scepticism	that	undermines	our	ability	to	reach	a	finalized	conclusion	about	such	
alliances.	Therefore,	instead	of	drawing	a	conclusion	about	her	political	alliance,	I	
argue	 instead	 that	Eovaai	 demonstrates	 the	 difficulties	 of	 liberal	 political	 theory	
and	 the	 instability	 of	 the	 social	 contract.	 	 However,	 I	 also	 assert	 that,	 unlike	
traditional	 political	 sceptics,	 Haywood	 does	 not	 advocate	wilful	 subjection	 to	 an	
absolute	 sovereign	 and	 that	 this	 move	 distinguishes	 her	 from	 the	 masculine	
tradition	 of	 scepticism.	 In	 fact,	 I	 argue	 that,	 in	Eovaai,	 Haywood	 does	 not	 really	
offer	a	solution	to	the	instabilities	she	highlights.	Rather,	she	remains	in	an	uneasy	
sceptical	posture	that	serves	to	make	visible	the	crisis	of	judgment	and	autonomy	
that	 is	 inevitable	 in	 a	 liberal	 government.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 this	 polyphonic	
novel,	through	her	focus	on	autonomy,	Haywood	again	shifts	interpretive	authority	
to	her	readers,	putting	the	reader	in	the	same	difficult	position	as	Eovaai.		
In	 chapter	 three,	 I	 continue	 my	 focus	 on	 the	 location	 of	 authority,	
demonstrating	 how	 it	 manifests	 in	 Haywood’s	 periodical,	 The	 Female	 Spectator	
(1744-46).	 Like	 other	 scholars,	 I	 point	 to	 the	 conventions	 that	Haywood	uses	 to	
establish	the	authority	of	her	eidolon,	but	I	then	complicate	these	readings	of	her	
authority	 by	 analysing	 how	 Haywood,	 once	 she	 has	 established	 that	 authority,	
proceeds	to	deconstruct	it	in	order	to	shift	it	onto	the	reader.	This	deconstruction	
occurs	as	she	 includes	several	 travel	narratives,	which	were	common	flashpoints	





narratives	 traditionally	 dominated	 and	 directed	 by	 men.	 In	 this	 periodical	
Haywood	 does,	 however,	 begin	 to	 demonstrate	 possible	 solutions	 to	 her	
scepticism	 through	 an	 ‘enlarged	 mentality’	 that	 is	 developed	 as	 the	 Female	




In	my	 final	 chapter,	 I	 look	 at	 how	Haywood,	 in	The	History	of	 Jemmy	and	
Jenny	Jessamy	 (1753),	 deviates	 from	 the	methods	of	her	previous	works	 in	ways	
that	 mitigate	 her	 earlier	 philosophical	 scepticism.	 This	 novel,	 which	 shares	 the	
themes	 of	 her	 early	 amatory	 fiction,	 differs	 from	 that	 fiction	 in	 that	 her	 main	
character,	Jenny	Jessamy,	has	nearly	perfect	judgment.	With	this	unusual	character	
who	 so	 effectively	 exercises	 her	 autonomy	 and	 authority,	 Haywood	 models	 a	
solution	 to	 the	 extreme	 scepticism	 of	 her	 earlier	 work.	 This	 solution	 comes	
specifically	 through	 Jenny’s	 ability	 to	 practise	 what	 Kant	 would	 later	 call	 an	
‘enlarged	mentality’,	what	Hannah	Arendt	called	‘going	visiting’,	and	what	current	
cognitive	 theorists	refer	 to	as	 ‘theory	of	mind’.68	In	 this	novel,	Haywood	suggests	
that	 effective	 autonomous	 judgment	 might	 be	 reached	 through	 sociable	
intersubjectivity	 that	 can	 offer	 a	 better	 standard	 of	 judgment	 than	 Lockean	
sensory	experience	or	even	Cartesian	self-reliant	rationalism.	Haywood’s	solutions	
























Duncan	Campbell,	 commonly	known	by	 the	Name	of	 the	Deaf	and	Dumb	Man;	and	
the	astonishing	Penetration	and	Event	of	his	Predictions.1	The	text	features	Duncan	
Campbell,	 the	 famous,	 real-life	 ‘deaf	 and	 dumb’	 fortune-teller,	 who	 lived	 and	
worked	 in	 London	 in	 the	 early	 eighteenth	 century.2	The	 narrator,	 called	 Justicia,	
says	that	she	wants	to	convince	her	reader	(an	unnamed	lord	to	whom	the	text	is	
dedicated)	that	Campbell	 is	 legitimate—that	he	 is	not	a	 fraud.	Few	scholars	have	
studied	this	text,	and	those	who	have,	have	interpreted	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer	as	
a	 hack	 propaganda	 piece	meant	 to	 support	 Campbell’s	 business	 and	 reputation,	
suggesting	 that	 Haywood,	 herself,	 believed	 in	 him	 as	 a	 fortune-teller	 who	 had	























the	 text	 offers	 a	 single,	 straightforward,	 finalized	 interpretation	 of	 Haywood’s	
purpose.	 In	 contrast,	 I	 argue	 that	 while	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 narrator	 	 admires	
Campbell,	 there	 are	 numerous	 rhetorical	 and	 structural	 elements	 that	 suggest	 a	
distance	 between	 Haywood	 (the	 author)	 and	 Justicia	 (the	 narrator)—a	 distance	
that	 suggests	 tension	 between	 Justicia’s	 claims	 about	 Campbell	 and	 what	 the	
reader	 should,	 in	 the	 end,	 believe	 about	 him.	 Ultimately,	 this	 tension,	 combined	
with	 repeated	 examples	 in	 the	 narrative	 of	 failed	 sensory	 perception,	 privileges	
doubt	 as	 the	proper	method	of	 inquiry	 for	 the	narrator	 and	 for	 the	 readers.	Not	
only	 does	 the	 text	 privilege	 a	 position	 of	 doubt,	 but	 it	 demonstrates	 an	 extreme	
scepticism	 about	 knowledge	 that	 puts	 the	 text	 in	 conversation	 with	 other	
writers—mostly	male—who	are	part	of	the	sceptical	tradition.	
	 Many	 eighteenth-century	 texts	 were	 more	 than	 (or	 different	 from)	 what	
they	seemed	to	be	on	the	surface,	and	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer	 is	such	a	text.	The	
stated	purpose	of	Justicia,	the	narrator,	is	to	entertain	the	unnamed	lord	while	also	
proving	Campbell’s	 legitimacy.	Within	 the	 framework	of	 this	 stated	purpose,	 the	
text	 is	essentially	episodic—the	 first	 three	quarters	are	 Justicia’s	observations	of	
Campbell’s	interactions	with	his	various	clients,	and	the	last	quarter	is	a	collection	
of	letters	addressed	to	Campbell	from	his	clients.	Those	who	seek	Campbell’s	help	
usually	want	 to	 find	out	whom	 they	will	 (or	 should)	marry,	 and	 in	 this	way,	 the	
text	 shares	 the	 themes	of	 love,	 courtship,	and	betrayal	 that	dominate	Haywood’s	
amatory	 fiction.	 These	 themes	 also	 add	 a	 sense	 of	 urgency	 to	 the	 text’s	









of	 the	 epistemological	 debates	 dominated	 by	 natural	 philosophers,	 Haywood	
expands	 the	debates	 to	 include	questions	 that	directly	affect	 the	 lives	of	women.	
This	 epistemological	 tension	 and	 scepticism,	 along	with	 her	 narrative	 structure,	
subverts	 the	 more	 authoritative	 writings	 of	 natural	 philosophers	 (even	 as	 it	
engages	 with	 them)	 and	 creates	 a	 gendered,	 novelistic	 aesthetic	 that	 requires	
evaluation	and	interpretation	from	its	readers.	
	 In	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	 chapter,	 I	 demonstrate	 the	 narrator’s	 failures	 in	
judgment,	 showing	 how	 these	 failures	 invite	 and	 require	 doubt	 from	 the	 reader	
about	 the	 narrator’s	 capacity	 to	 judge	 well.	 In	 addition,	 I	 demonstrate	 how	
Haywood’s	text	foregrounds	failures	of	sensory	perception,	thereby	enlarging	the	
foundation	on	which	her	scepticism	rests.	These	failures	of	sensory	perception	are	
exemplified	 throughout	 the	 text,	 and	 Duncan	 Campbell,	 as	 a	 deaf	 and	 dumb	
fortune-teller	serves	as	a	foil	to	those	who	rely	on	their	senses.	Finally,	I	show	how	
A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer’s	subject	matter	(Campbell),	its	scepticism,	and	its	generic	





and	 trust	 in	 an	 authoritative	 narrator,	 Haywood	 challenges	 such	 credulity	 and	
narrative	 authority	 by	 creating	 an	 unreliable	 first-person	 narrator	 who	 invites	





knowledge.5	This	 invitation	 shifts	 authority	 to	 the	 reader,	 and	 the	 fictional	 first-





who	 fails	 to	 doubt	 and	 who	 too	 quickly	 assents	 to	 belief	 without	 sufficient	
certainty.	Although	she	claims	to	practise	a	method	of	doubt,	she	fails	to	do	so.	She	
believes	 in	 Campbell	 and	 his	 talents	 (or	 at	 least	 claims	 to),	 and	 she	 works	 to	
persuade	 many	 others—including	 her	 intended	 reader,	 the	 unnamed	 lord—to	
believe	 in	 him	 as	well.	 To	 do	 so,	 she	 reports	 various	 incidents	 in	which	 visitors	
seek	Campbell’s	 advice	based	on	his	 ‘second	 sight,’	 showing	how	his	predictions	
invariably	come	true.	However,	despite	the	fact	that	she	says	she	wants	to	lead	her	
reader	 to	 a	 state	 of	 belief,	 throughout	 the	 text	 she	 continually	 discusses	 the	
problems	 that	 arise	 when	 people	 are	 not	 sufficiently	 sceptical,	 and	 she	 mocks	
others	 for	 their	 credulity.6	There	 is	 some	 irony,	 then,	 that	 Justicia,	 herself,	 is	 not	
more	 sceptical.	 At	 one	 point,	 she	 is	 even	 chastised	 by	 Duncan	 Campbell	 for	 the	
poor	 judgment	 that	runs	 in	her	 family	when	he	says	 they	all	are	easily	duped	by	
flattery	 (130).	 His	 criticism	 of	 Justicia’s	 judgment	 and	 her	 lack	 of	 scepticism	
compound	the	reader’s	uncertainty.	If	readers	are	to	believe	Justicia	when	she	says	
that	Campbell	has	great	‘penetration’	of	others,	then	readers	should	trust	Campbell	












about	 Campbell),	 which	 therefore	 suggests	 that	 maybe	 Campbell	 should	 not	 be	
believed	when	he	 says	 that	 Justicia	 does	not	 always	 reason	well.	 In	 this	 circular	
consideration	of	credibility	and	credulity,	the	reliability	of	narrators	becomes	like	
a	 snake	swallowing	 its	own	 tail	 (or	 ‘tale,’	 as	 the	 case	may	be),	 and	although	 it	 is	
unclear	 who	 can	 be	 believed,	 challenges	 about	 belief	 and	 judgment	 are	
unquestionably	in	play.	If	the	first-person	narrator	is	unreliable,	one	must	consider	
the	possible	irony	and	satire	at	work	in	the	text	and	the	likelihood	that	Haywood’s	
authorial	 purpose	 (and	 attitude	 towards	 Campbell)	 should	 not	 be	 equated	 with	
Justicia’s	narrative	one.		
At	 another	 point,	 Justicia	 attempts	 to	 assure	 her	 reader	 (the	 anonymous	
lord)	 that	he	can	 trust	her	 judgment.	This	assurance	 is	complicated,	however,	by	
the	fact	that	he,	 in	the	past,	has	accused	her	of	bias,	and	it	 is	also	complicated	by	
the	 earlier	 claims	 made	 by	 Justicia,	 herself,	 acknowledging	 that	 she	 does	 not	
always	 trust	her	own	 judgment	and	 that,	 in	general,	women	 lack	good	 judgment	
because	 they	 do	 not	 have	 access	 to	 the	 same	 education	 as	 men.	 Nevertheless,	
Justicia	says,		
I	hope	your	Lordship	will	not	believe	me	guilty	of	the	least	Partiallity	
or	 Bigottry,	 (as	 you	 once	 told	 me)	 since	 I	 faithfully	 assure	 you,	 I	
neither	have,	nor	will,	 in	 the	Course	of	 these	Memoirs,	 avouch	any	
thing	without	 consulting	my	 Judgment,	 and	 first	 answering	within	
my	self,	all	the	Objections	that	can	possibly	be	made	against	it.	(41)	
The	last	sentence	of	this	passage	suggests	that	Justicia	is	claiming	a	commitment	to	
the	 kind	 of	 Cartesian,	 methodical	 doubt	 that	 requires	 one	 to	 suspend	 judgment	





demonstrates	 a	 keen	 awareness	 of	 the	 value	 of	 such	 doubt	 when	 trying	 to	
ascertain	 and	 report	 truth.	Her	 claim	 is	 particularly	 interesting	when,	 just	 a	 few	
lines	 later	 (on	 the	 very	 same	page),	 she	 challenges	 one	 of	 Campbell’s	 customers	
who	expresses	doubt	about	a	prediction	that	Campbell	has	written	down	for	her:	
‘Why,	Madam,	said	 I,	 as	 soon	as	 I	had	read	 [the	prediction],	 should	you	question	
the	Truth	of	what	is	here	set	down?’	(42).	With	this	challenge,	Justicia	suggests	that	
the	 customer's	 doubt	 about	 Campbell’s	 prediction	 is	 unreasonable.	 Justicia’s	
question	seems	like	a	strange	one	to	ask	of	a	woman	who	is	approaching	fortune-
telling	 with	 what	 might	 be	 considered	 reasonable	 scepticism,	 especially	 after	
Justicia	has	previously	acknowledged	 the	necessity	 for	 thoroughly	doubting	such	
claims	and	pursuing	‘all	the	objections’	that	could	be	made	against	those	claims.	In	




his	 words	 whom	 she	 finds	 to	 be	 ‘blinded’,	 suggesting	 it	 is	 they,	 rather	 than	
Campbell,	who	have	 flawed	or	 limited	sensory	perception.	 Justicia’s	expectations	




She	 claims	 to	 engage	 in	 sufficient	 doubt	 before	 assenting	 to	 a	 belief,	 yet	 the	
evidence	of	her	narrative	suggests	otherwise.		
	 In	 his	 Discourse	 on	 Method	 (1631)	 and	 Meditations	 on	 First	 Philosophy	








other	 beliefs	 might	 he	 hold	 true	 that	 also	 will	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 false?	 Granted,	
Descartes’s	ultimate	goal	was	to	overcome	the	problems	of	scepticism,	but,	 to	do	
so,	 he	 first	 extended	 scepticism	 to	 its	most	 extreme	 conclusion,	what	was	 called	
the	 crise	pyrrhonise:	 the	 belief	 that	we	 can	 know	nothing	 at	 all	 about	 anything.8	
About	 the	 senses,	 Descartes	 says	 in	 Meditations	 on	 First	 Philosophy,	 ‘Surely,	
whatever	I	had	admitted	until	now	as	most	true	I	received	either	from	the	senses	
or	 through	 the	 senses.	 However,	 I	 have	 noticed	 that	 the	 senses	 are	 sometimes	
deceptive;	and	it	is	a	mark	of	prudence	never	to	place	our	complete	trust	in	those	
who	have	deceived	us	even	once’.9	In	order	to	ensure	that	he	only	believes	those	
things	 about	which	he	 is	 certain,	 he	 employs	 the	 ‘dream	argument’	 and	 the	 ‘Evil	
Genius’	 argument	 (also	 called	 the	 ‘Evil	 Demon’	 argument)	 to	 pull	 the	
epistemological	 foundation	 out	 from	 under	 all	 of	 his	 sensory	 perceptions,	


















to	what	 is	 false,	 lest	 this	deceiver,	however	powerful,	however	clever	he	may	be,	
have	any	effect	on	me’.10		
	 Ultimately,	 although	Descartes	 eventually	must	 overcome	 the	 Evil	 Genius	
argument	if	he	is	ever	to	believe	anything	again,	he	holds	on	to	his	commitment	to	
doubting	what	he	perceives	and	 to	withholding	 ‘assent’	 to	an	 idea	before	he	has	
done	his	best	to	determine	whether	the	idea	is	true	or	false.	In	this	way,	Descartes	
makes	a	clear	distinction	between	perception	(the	ideas	we	have	about	what	seems	
to	 be	 true)	 and	 the	will,	 or	volition	 (our	 act	 of	 affirming	 or	 denying	 the	 truth	 of	
those	 ideas).	With	such	affirmation	or	denial,	one	moves	beyond	perception	 into	
the	realm	of	 judgment.	Error	occurs,	Descartes	says,	when	we	affirm	or	deny	the	
truth	 of	 something	 before	 ensuring	 that	 we	 have	 the	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	
understanding	to	affirm	or	deny	that	truth:		
What	then	is	the	source	of	my	errors?	They	are	owing	simply	to	the	
fact	 that,	 since	 the	will	 extends	 further	 than	 the	 intellect,	 I	 do	 not	
contain	the	will	within	the	same	boundaries;	rather,	I	also	extend	it	
to	 things	 I	 do	 not	 understand.	 Because	 the	 will	 is	 indifferent	 in	














The	 proper	 thing	 to	 do	 when	 certain	 knowledge	 is	 lacking	 is	 to	
refrain	 from	 judging	 and	 choosing;	 this	 is	 how	 error	 is	 avoided.	
Whenever	we	judge	or	choose	in	the	absence	of	certain	knowledge,	
we	err;	either	we	make	the	wrong	judgment	or	choice,	or	we	make	






Like	Descartes,	Haywood	suggests	 that	we	are,	 to	a	great	degree,	 responsible	 for	
our	errors,	even	in	the	face	of	deception,	and	that	many	of	our	errors	do,	 indeed,	
stem	from	‘judging	or	choosing	in	the	absence	of	certain	knowledge’.13	Increasing	
the	 epistemic	 pressure	 even	 further,	 Haywood	 creates	 what	 one	 might	 call	 a	
‘double	 bind’	 for	 her	 characters	 as	 they	 pursue	 knowledge.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	
Haywood	 shows	 the	 difficulty—if	 not	 the	 near	 impossibility—of	 gaining	 true,	
certain	knowledge,	she,	like	Descartes,	also	suggests	that	everyone	must	still	carry	
this	 burden	 of	 knowing,	 and	 that,	 when	 one	 fails	 to	 know,	 even	 when	 one	 is	












Upon	 the	 Conjurer,	 as	 in	 other	 Haywood	 texts,	 characters	 that	 are	 deceived	 or	




heart,	 a	 pragmatist	 and	 that	 her	 texts	 are,	 essentially,	 guides	 for	 survival,	 but	 I	
build	 on	 her	 argument	 by	 showing	 that	 this	 survival	 is	 contingent	 upon	 the	
epistemological	problems	that	Haywood’s	characters	 face	and	who	has	epistemic	
power	over	whom.14	By	highlighting	these	conflicting	realities—both	the	problem	





in	 which	 access	 to	 truth	 can	 be	 impeded:	 one	 can	 be	 biased	 or	 ‘partial’	 and	
therefore	move	all	too	readily	from	perception	to	volition—a	willed	assent	to	the	
truth	about	that	which	is	perceived.	Descartes	and	the	natural	philosophers	(and,	
later,	 philosophers	 like	 Adam	 Smith	 and	 Immanuel	 Kant)	 were	 commonly	














	 Haywood	 raises	 further	 questions	 of	 ‘knowing’	 and	 partiality	 in	 Justicia’s	
reasoning	when	Justicia	writes	the	following	to	her	friend,	the	lord:	
I	do	not	think	any	thing	can	be	more	provoking,	than	to	hear	People	
deny	 a	 known	Truth,	 only	because	 they	 cannot	 comprehend.	 Some	
fancy	 themselves	 very	 wise,	 in	 affecting	 to	 ridicule	 all	 Kinds	 of	
Fortune-telling,	 and	 tho’	 they	 do	 happen	 (which	 I	 confess	 is	 a	
Wonder)	to	meet	with	one	really	skilful	in	the	Art,	yet	because	they	
cannot	imagine	by	what	Means	he	came	to	be	so,	are	willing	to	run	
him	down	as	 the	most	 ignorant	 of	 the	Pretenders.—How	should	he	
know—and—how	is	 it	possible	he	can	tell	us?	 are	Words	 commonly	
us’d,	 even	 by	 those	 who	 are	 convinc’d	 by	 Experience	 that	 he	 can.	
(44)16		
In	 this	 passage,	 Justicia	 expresses	 exasperation	 with	 those	 who	 ‘deny	 a	 known	
Truth,	 only	 because	 they	 cannot	 comprehend’	 that	 truth,	 and	 she	 echoes	 anti-
sceptical	 writers	 of	 the	 apparition	 narratives	 (whom	 I	 will	 discuss	 below)	 that	
criticize	 the	 incredulous	 ‘freethinkers’.	 However,	 because	 of	 Justicia’s	
demonstrated	failings,	these	echoes	do	not	serve	her	cause	but	rather	highlight	her	
hypocrisy.	 And	 by	 highlighting	 Justicia’s	 hypocrisy,	 Haywood	 privileges	 the	
sceptical	position	over	Justicia’s	credulous	one.	











hearing	of	his	 success,	 seeing	his	predictions	 come	 true)	 convinces	 them	 that	he	
does,	indeed,	have	knowledge	of	the	future.	However,	Justicia's	statement	takes	for	
granted	 that	 we	 should	 trust	 isolated	 experiences	 completely,	 without	
consideration	of	context	or	competing	knowledge,	and	that	such	experiences	serve	
as	 concrete	 evidence	 of	 truth,	 regardless	 of	 the	 functions	 of	 our	 reasoning	 and	
regardless	 of	 the	 probability	 of	 truth.	 It	 denies	 pre-existing	 doubts	 about	
Campbell’s	legitimacy	and	ignores	scepticism	that	might	be	based	on	his	deafness:	
their	question	implies	‘how	should	he—of	all	people—know?’.	This	trust	in	isolated	
experiences	 is	 problematic	 for	 two	 main	 reasons.	 First,	 it	 presumes	 that	 our	
experiences	 are	 reliable,	 which	 rests	 on	 the	 expectation	 that	 our	 sensory	
perception	is	reliable,	but	throughout	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer,	Haywood,	through	
Justicia,	 offers	 multiple	 examples	 that	 contradict	 this	 assumption	 (as	 I	 also	 will	
discuss	below).	Second,	as	Descartes	suggests,	when	we	move	towards	belief,	there	
are	 two	 components:	 perception	 and	 volition.17	Justicia	 is	 suggesting,	 in	 this	
passage,	that	even	if	our	understanding	is	incomplete,	and	even	if	doubt	is	still	in	
place,	we	 should,	nevertheless,	will	 ourselves	 to	 a	 state	of	belief.	 Such	a	practice	
not	 only	 goes	 against	 the	 commitment	 to	 doubt	 that	 Justicia	 has	 claimed	 to	




they	 have	 no	 ‘clear	 and	 distinct	 ideas’.18	And	 he	 admits	 that,	 in	 those	 cases,	 we	



















reasonable.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Campbell,	 the	 demonstrated	 evidence	 and	 the	
probability	of	 truth	are	 in	 clear	 conflict—conflict	 that	 Justicia	wilfully	 ignores	 as	
she	condemns	the	reasonable	scepticism	held	by	others.	Therefore,	when	Justicia	
accuses	these	sceptics	of	having	unjustified	doubt,	she	is	ignoring	the	fact	that,	in	
the	 world	 of	 fortune-telling,	 rampant	 deception	 begs	 for	 a	 position	 of	 doubt—a	





















maintain	 that	 commitment	 thus	 manifests	 as	 blatant	 hypocrisy,	 suggesting	 that	
Haywood	is	emphasizing	the	importance	of	the	doubt	that	Justicia	has	abandoned.		





constitute	 knowledge	 until	 the	 process	 could	 be	 replicated	 and	 the	 conclusions	
reached	by	other	selves’.21	Philosopher	William	Harvey,	for	example,	demonstrates	
his	respect	for	the	modest	witness	when	he	writes	in	a	preface	to	On	the	Motion	of	
the	Heart	and	Blood	 in	Animals	 (1628),	which	 is	 addressed	 to	 the	 president	 and	
members	 of	 the	Royal	 College	of	 Physicians,	 ‘I	was	 greatly	 afraid	 lest	 I	might	 be	
charged	with	presumption	 .	 .	 .	unless	I	had	first	proposed	the	subject	to	you,	had	
confirmed	its	conclusions	by	ocular	demonstrations	in	your	presence,	had	replied	
to	 your	 doubts	 and	 objections,	 and	 secured	 the	 assent	 and	 support	 of	 our	





Haywood’s	 narrative	 structure	 and	 use	 of	 the	 second	 person,	 the	 readers	 are	









in	 general,	 accurate	 judgment	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 achieve.	 Not	 only	 is	 judgment	




	 Justicia	 is	 not	 the	 only	 poor	 judge	 in	 A	 Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer.	 Almost	
invariably,	 Campbell’s	 clients	 demonstrate	 poor	 judgment	 about	 other	 people.	
Rarely	is	anyone	what	he	or	she	seems,	and,	almost	to	a	person,	none	of	Campbell’s	
clients	 are	 able	 to	 discern	 the	 truth,	 or	 the	 reality,	 that	 exists	 behind	 or	 beyond	
appearances.	 Nevertheless,	 Justicia	 relies	 on	 appearances,	 using	 the	 language	 of	
the	 ‘new	science’	 to	enhance	her	credibility	and	her	claims	to	empiricism.	 In	 this	
way,	 she	 co-opts	 the	 language	 and	 conventions	 of	 authentication	 used	 by	 the	
sceptic—citing	 sensory	 evidence	 for	 her	 claims,	 quoting	 supposedly	 credible	
sources,	 admitting	 areas	 of	 uncertainty—even	 though	 her	 position	 is	 anti-
sceptical.23	As	a	 former	doubter	of	Campbell’s	powers,	and	as	someone	who	once	
laughed	at	 the	gullibility	of	 the	people	who	consulted	him,	 Justicia	argues	 that	 it	
was	empirical	evidence,	specifically	‘ocular	Demonstration’,	that	changed	her	mind	
and	convinced	her	of	‘the	Reality’.	She	says,	
	[W]henever	 any	 of	 my	 Acquaintance	 told	 me	 of	 the	 surprizing	
Solutions	 which	 Mr.	 Campbell	 had	 given	 to	 the	 most	 intricate	
Questions	 propounded	 to	 him	 and	 his	 amazing	 Art	 of	 writing	 the	
Names	of	People	at	first	Sight,	with	that	of	those	they	either	had,	or	
should	be	married	to,	I	could	not	forbear	laughing	in	my	Sleeve,	and	








in	 it,	 that	 nothing	 but	 ocular	 Demonstration,	 ought	 to	 convince	 a	
Person	of	Understanding,	of	the	Reality.	(2)		
In	this	passage,	Justicia	acknowledges	her	previous	doubt	and	even	concedes	that	
Campbell’s	powers	are	very	mysterious.	Nevertheless,	 she	 says	 that	 she	grounds	
her	 new-found	 belief—what	 she	 takes	 to	 be	 knowledge	 of	 ‘the	 reality’—in	 the	
empirical	evidence	of	 	 ‘ocular	Demonstration’,	a	phrase,	along	with	‘ocular	proof’,	
that	 although	 not	 unique	 to	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 (one	 thinks,	 perhaps,	 of	
Othello),	 gained	 increasing	 significance	 as	 it	 was	 used	 often	 by	 natural	
philosophers	and	 fictions	writers	 like	Delarivier	Manley.24	Royal	Society	member	
Robert	Hooke	uses	 it,	 for	 example,	 in	Micrographia	 (1665),	 a	 book	 that	 contains	
detailed	 drawings	 of	 images	 that	 Hooke	 observed	 through	 various	 microscopic	
lenses.25	The	phrase	was	emphasized	as	early	as	1628	in	William	Harvey’s	On	the	
Motion	 of	 the	Heart	 and	 Blood	 in	 Animals.26	By	 using	 this	 diction,	 Haywood	 also	
echoes	William	 Bond	who,	 in	 his	 own	 biography	 of	 Duncan	 Campbell,	 says	 that	





















the	 results	 of	 experimentation	 as	well	 as	methods	of	 enhanced	perception	using	
telescopic	 lenses,	 both	of	which	were	employed	 to	 create	 ‘watchfulness	over	 the	
failings	 and	 an	 inlargement	 of	 the	 dominion,	of	 the	 Senses’.28	In	A	 Spy	Upon	 the	
Conjurer,	 ‘ocular	 Demonstration’	 refers	 to	 unaided	 sense	 experience,	 something	
which,	elsewhere	in	the	text,	Haywood	suggests	is	an	entirely	unreliable	method	of	
discerning	what	is	real.	
	 The	 insufficiency	 of	 sensory	 perceptions,	 and	 ‘ocular	 Demonstration’	 in	
particular,	is	suggested	by	an	anecdote	that,	somewhat	ironically,	Justicia	offers	as	
solid	evidence	of	Campbell’s	true	abilities	as	a	fortune-teller.	Before	reviewing	the	







Justicia’s	 language	 is	striking	 in	several	ways.	First,	she	begins	with	 the	phrase	 ‘I	
don’t	 know’,	 suggesting	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 of	 how	 the	 lord	might	 perceive	 or	
consider	the	evidence.	This	language	highlights	the	fact	that	two	people	are	likely	

















unnamed	 lord	 tend	 to	question	 the	quality	of	 Justicia’s	 judgment.	 Justicia	 follows	
‘in	 my	 Judgment’,	 with	 the	 qualifier,	 ‘to	 me	 it	 appears’.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	
‘appearance’	 often	 served	 as	 evidence	 for	 natural	 philosophers	 and	 other	
empiricists,	 Justicia’s	 language	 here	 (because	 of	 its	 qualifiers	 and	 context,	 and	
because	 of	 her	 questionable	 credibility)	 further	 adds	 to	 the	 sense	 that	 the	
judgment	 is	 subjective	 and	 relative.	 The	 word	 ‘appears’	 also	 highlights	 the	
epistemological	 problem	 that	 what	 ‘appears’	 to	 be	 so	 may	 actually	 be	 only	
appearance	 after	 all—not	 reality.	 Still,	 regardless	 of	 these	 many	 qualifications,	
Justicia	 concludes	 that	 the	 argument	 ‘appears	 so	 strong	 and	 undeniable	 .	 .	 .	 that	
there	needs	no	more	than	to	believe	it	to	convince	you	there	is	a	Power	in	that	Man	
of	 foreseeing	 the	most	hid	Events’.	With	 this	conclusion,	we	see	 that,	once	again,	
Justicia	has	not	fully	engaged	in	a	method	of	doubt.	In	fact,	she	has	not	even	come	
close.	Although	the	 language	suggests	 that	 the	evidence	 is	not	absolute	and	 is,	 in	
fact,	highly	dubitable,	 Justicia	chooses,	or	wills,	 the	belief	 in	spite	of	 that	doubt,	a	
practice	 that,	 in	 this	 Haywood	 text	 as	well	 as	 in	 others,	 inevitably	 leads	 to	 self-
deception	 and	many	 practical	 problems.	 Justicia’s	 conclusion	 is	 ultimately	 quite	
circular	 when	 she	 claims	 one	 need	 only	 to	 believe	 in	 order	 to	 be	 convinced.	 In	
addition,	 she	 is	 saying	 that	 the	 lord	 should	 believe	 it	 based	 on	 her	 testimony,	
something	that	the	reader	and	Justicia	already	know	that	he	does	not	trust.	With	












are,	 in	 fact,	 significant	because	 they	beg	us	 to	be	sceptical	of	 sensory	evidence—
‘ocular’	 or	 otherwise.	 Justicia	 spends	quite	 a	bit	 of	 time	on	 this	 story	 in	which	 a	
young	woman	of	15	visits	Campbell	 to	 find	out	 ‘when	she	shou’d	get	a	Husband’	
(88).	 Justicia	 gives	 a	 lengthy,	 entertaining	 account	 that	 includes	 the	 young	
woman’s	 first	 meeting	 with	 Campbell,	 along	 with	 accounts	 of	 subsequent	
information-gathering	 (‘spying’)	 that	 allow	 Justicia	 to	 be	 privy	 to	 the	 events	 as	
they	unfold.		
	 Justicia	 has	 pursued	 information	 about	 the	 young	 woman,	 from	 both	
curiosity	and	her	intent	to	defend	Campbell,	and,	in	doing	so,	she	learns	that	all	has	
come	 to	 pass	 exactly	 as	 Campbell	 predicted	 it	 would.	 Specifically,	 the	 young	
woman	got	married,	but	she	is	suing	for	a	separation	because	her	husband	treats	
her	 poorly	 and	 because	 he	 behaved	 strangely	 in	 bed	 on	 their	wedding	 night.	 In	
response	to	the	suit,	the	husband	agrees	to	divorce	his	wife	under	one	condition:	
that	 she	never	again	associates	with	her	previous	 suitor,	Mr.	E	—	d	M	—	n.	The	









and	 consequently	 unfit	 for	 such	 an	 Encounter	 as	 the	 other	
demanded.	 	 ---	 Having	 pluck’d	 off	 her	 Perriwig,	 all	 the	 Company	
knew	her	to	be	a	Lady	who	had	long	been	courted	by	Mr.	E	---	d	M	---	
n;	but	the	other’s	Fortune	being	greater,	had	alienated	his	Affections	
to	 her:	 On	 which	 she	 had	 dress’d	 herself	 in	 Mens	 Clothes,	 and	
contriv’d	this	Strategem	to	disappoint	his	hopes.	(93-94)	
In	short,	a	jilted	woman	has	retaliated	against	the	man	who	rejected	her	by	posing	
as	 a	 man	 and	 stealing	 his	 preferred	 beloved.	 Justicia	 explains	 that	 no	 one	
begrudged	 the	Lady	 for	her	 cross-dressing	 trick,	 and	 that	 all	 praised	her	 for	her	
‘ingenuity’.	 Even	 the	 deceived	 young	 woman	 was	 grateful	 to	 this	 trickster	 who	
prevented	her	marriage	 to	Mr.	M	 ---	n,	who	was	clearly	a	man	of	 inconstant	and	
selfish	affections.	
	 It	 certainly	 is	 striking	 that	 the	 deceived	 woman	 found	 the	 deception	 all	
quite	 understandable	 and	 forgivable,	 but	 even	 more	 striking,	 especially	 to	 the	
purpose	 of	 my	 argument,	 is	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 deception	 and	 the	 degree	 to	
which	the	lady’s	direct	sensory	impressions	failed	to	sufficiently	inform	her	of	the	
real	 sex	 of	 her	 spouse	 and	 how	 that	 reality	 differed	 from	 appearances.	 Granted,	
one	might	imagine	ways	in	which,	during	this	time	period,	such	a	deception	before	
marriage	 might	 be	 achieved,	 and	 the	 young	 woman	 did	 find	 her	 husband’s	
bedroom	behaviour	to	be	‘very	different	from	what	might	be	expected’	(91).	I	also	
grant	 that	 such	 disguises	 are	 a	 common	 plot	 device	 in	 Haywood’s	 texts	 and	 in	







The	 New	 Atalantis	 in	 1709,	 Defoe’s	 Moll	 Flanders	 in	 1722,	 and	 Fielding’s	 The	
Female	 Husband	 in	 1746).29	Nevertheless,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 foregrounded	
questions	 that	 pervade	 this	 text—question	 of	 belief,	 doubt,	 and	 the	 reliability	 of	
evidence—this	 incident	 suggests	 that,	 at	 times,	 our	 senses	 can	 be	 fooled	 even	
about	what	appears	to	be	the	simplest	questions	of	reality,	such	as	the	sex	of	one’s	
lover.	 	 As	 Justicia,	 herself,	 has	 acknowledged	 earlier	 in	 the	 text,	 ‘Things	 are	
frequently	 very	 different	 in	 Reality	 from	 what	 they	 appear	 to	 the	 World	 or	
sometimes	even	to	their	greatest	Intimates’	(44-45).		
	 Even	 Justicia’s	 initial	 introduction	 to	 Campbell	 includes	 problems	 of	
deceptive	appearances.	 Justicia	first	meets	Campbell	at	Mrs.	Bulweir’s	house,	 just	
after	Justicia	and	another	guest	have	been	accusing	Campbell	of	being	an	imposter.	






















	 Readers	 regularly	 come	 across	 examples	 of	 deception	 when	 Campbell’s	
customers	 disguise	 their	 appearance	 and	 class,	 and	 there	 is	 more	 than	 one	
successful	 cross-dresser	 in	 the	 text. 30 	Unfortunately	 for	 his	 clients	 (and,	 by	
implication,	 for	 Haywood’s	 readers),	 Campbell	 is	 the	 only	 one	 who	 can	 truly	
distinguish	between	appearance	and	reality.	The	five	senses	of	his	customers	are	
not	sufficient,	thereby	implying	that	only	by	extra-sensory	perception	can	truth	be	








the	 question-at-issue,	 namely	 Campbell’s	 legitimacy.	 While	 the	 question	 about	
Campbell,	himself,	might	not	seem	particularly	urgent,	 it	 is	only	the	most	explicit	
question	 in	 the	 text.	There	are	many	other	questions	 that	are	equally	difficult	 to	
answer,	 namely	 those	 asked	 by	 all	 of	 Campbell’s	 clients,	 questions	 which	 the	
clients,	 themselves,	 cannot	 sufficiently	 answer	 even	 when	 they	 are	 in	 the	










These	 questions	 of	 judgment	 are	 further	 complicated	 by	 Campbell’s	
deafness	and	claims	to	second	sight,	because	1)	he	claims	to	have	knowledge	that	
others	 with	 all	 five	 senses	 do	 not,	 	 2)	 his	 deafness	 cannot	 be	 proven	 through	
‘ocular	 demonstration’	 or	 experimentation,	 and	 3)	 testimony	 about	 Campbell’s	
deafness	 and/or	 second	 sight	 is	 typically	 deemed	 insufficient	 without	
corroborating	evidence.	Therefore,	doubts	about	Campbell	took	several	forms:	His	
sceptics	 doubted	 not	 only	 whether	 or	 not	 he	 had	 the	 ‘second	 sight’,	 but	 also	































together	 with	 testimonial	 letters	 from	 admirers’.33	Conrad	 and	 Weiskrantz	 also	
point	out	that	Campbell	 is	said	to	have	played	the	violin	and	to	have	tuned	it	 ‘by	
putting	the	neck	of	the	violin	between	his	teeth’,	which	they	say	suggests	that	he	
possessed	 ‘bone	 conduction	 of	 sound’.34 	Finally,	 they	 suggest	 that	 Campbell,	




is	 not	 truly	 important.	What	matters	 is	 the	 debate	 itself	 and	 that	 he	 serves	 as	 a	
signifier	for	these	epistemological	questions	that	seem	impossible	to	answer.	It	is	
this	 signification	 that	 makes	 him	 such	 an	 ideal	 subject	 for	 the	 themes	 about	
judgment	that	dominate	Haywood’s	text.		
It	 is	 not	 surprising,	 then,	 that	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 debates	 about	













science’	 or	 natural	 philosophy,	which	 often	 focused	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 bodies	 and	
‘unnatural’	 or	 ‘monstrous’	 manifestations	 of	 those	 bodies,	 the	 latter	 of	 which	
threatened	 ‘empirical	 certainty’. 36 	And	 although	 Nicholas	 Mirzoeff	 resists,	 of	
course,	 framing	 the	 deaf	 as	 ‘monstrous	 or	 even	 disabled’,	 they	 were,	 indeed,	 a	
curiosity	 for	 scientists,	 philosophers,	 and	 lay	 people	 in	 the	 late	 seventeenth	 and	
early	eighteenth	centuries.37	Conrad	and	Weiskrantz	say,	 ‘The	deaf-mute	 too	was	
an	 object	 of	 this	 intense	 curiosity,	 sometimes	 morbid,	 sometimes	 prurient,	 and	
increasingly	involving	genuine	speculation	concerning	the	nature	of	deafness’.38	In	
A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer,	for	example,	one	of	Campbell’s	customers	(a	woman)	asks	
Campbell’s	wife	 ‘[h]ow	so	 fine	a	woman	as	 she	could	venture	on	a	Monster.’	The	
customer	also	asks,	‘How	did	he	make	love?’	and	says	‘Lord!	I	wonder	whether	he	
can	 feel	 or	 not?’	(154).39	She	 is	 then	 shocked	 to	meet	 Campbell	 and	 find	 that	 he	
looks	no	different	from	other	men.40	Such	assumptions	were	not	uncommon,	and,	
as	 Mirzoeff	 says,	 ‘Many	 Enlightenment	 thinkers	 regarded	 the	 deaf	 as	 machines,	
incapable	of	independent	thought.	One	of	Kant’s	less	celebrated	universals	was	the	





















significant	 interest	 in	deafness—often	holding	more	generous	theories	 than	Kant	
did—writing	books	about	deaf	people,	causes	of	deafness,	and	efforts	to	teach	the	
deaf	 to	 read,	write,	 and	 speak.	 Lennard	 Davis	 argues	 that	 ‘deafness	was	 for	 the	
eighteenth	 century	 an	 area	 of	 a	 cultural	 fascination	 and	 a	 compelling	 focus	 for	
philosophical	 reflection’,	 and	 that	 it	 was	 ‘perhaps	 one	 its	 central	 areas	 of	
concern’.42	It	 seems,	 then,	 that	 Haywood’s	 texts	 about	 Campbell,	 deafness,	 and	
second	 sight	 should	 be	 read	 in	 the	 context	 of	 these	 philosophical	 debates	 about	
empiricism	 and	 problems	 of	 certainty—a	 context	 that	 suggests	 Haywood’s	 text	




	 A	Spy	Upon	 the	Conjurer	 is	 not	 the	 only	 text	 about	Duncan	 Campbell,	 and	



















both	 a	 biography	 (of	 sorts)	 and	 an	 apology	 for	 Campbell.	 Bond,	 as	 part	 of	 the	
Hillarian	 Circle	 (a	 literary	 group	with	 Aaron	Hill	 at	 its	 centre	 that	 also	 included	
Haywood,	Martha	 Fowke	 Sansom,	 and	 Richard	 Savage,	 among	 others),	 co-wrote	
The	Plain	Dealer	 with	 Aaron	Hill	 and,	 co-wrote	The	Epistles	 of	 Clio	and	Strephon	
(1720)	and	The	Epistles	and	Poems	of	Clio	and	Strephon	(1729)	with	Martha	Fowke	
Sansom.44	Bond	would	have	had	contact	with	Haywood,	who	was	still	part	of	 the	
Hillarian	Circle	 in	1720;	however,	 by	 the	 time	Haywood	published	her	narrative	
about	Duncan	Campbell,	she	was	estranged	from	Martha	Fowke	and	others	in	Hill’s	

































comparison	 of	 Bond	 and	 Haywood’s	 Campbell	 texts	 is	 illustrative	 of	 this	
divergence.		




at	 first	 glance,	 one	 might	 think	 the	 apparition	 story	 has	 been	 inserted	 into	 the	
edition	by	mistake.	But	 it	 soon	becomes	clear	 that,	 for	Bond,	any	story	affirming	
the	 legitimacy	of	 supernatural	 or	 ‘preternatural’	 events	 (e.g.,	 apparitions,	 second	
sight,	or	witchcraft)	is	relevant	fodder	for	his	defence	of	Campbell	and	his	gifts.	To	
support	Campbell’s	 legitimacy,	 the	narrator	 (who,	 in	 the	 text,	 is	unnamed	and	 is	
not	 distinguished	 from	 the	 anonymous	 author)	 first	 attempts	 to	 persuade	 the	
reader	 that	 supernatural	 or	 preternatural	 phenomena	 are	 real.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	
narrator	 invokes	 stories	 of	 supernatural	 experiences	 from	 famous,	 respectable	
sources,	 such	 as	 notable	 political	 figures	 and	 philosophers.	 He	 then	 gives	 an	
account	of	Campbell’s	gifts	(along	with	accounts	of	how	Campbell	learned	to	write	




all	 the	 force	 of	 logic	 to	 bear	 upon	 his	 argument.	 There	 are	 no	 rhetorical	 cues	





Bond’s	 authority	 are	 those	 he	 anticipates	 from	 freethinking	 naysayers.	 Unlike	
Haywood’s	narrator,	Bond’s	is	not	a	‘spy’.46	
	 Michael	 McKeon,	 in	 Origins	 of	 the	 English	 Novel:	 1600-1740,	 specifically	





of	 the	 perceived	 experiences.	 In	 other	 words,	 when	 so	 much	 depends	 on	
perception,	 as	 it	does	 in	empiricism,	 the	 reliability	of	 those	sense	perceptions	as	
evidence	 often	 depends	 on	 who	 is	 doing	 the	 perceiving—the	 ‘relator’	 of	 the	
evidence.	McKeon	 quotes	 Joseph	Glanvill,	who,	writing	 about	witchcraft	 in	 1681	
says,	‘Now	the	credit	of	matters	of	Fact	depends	much	upon	the	Relatours,	who,	if	
they	cannot	be	deceived	themselves	nor	supposed	any	ways	interested	to	impose	
upon	 others,	 ought	 to	 be	 credited’.48	Therefore,	 the	 apparition	 narratives	 focus	
heavily	 on	 the	 authority	 and	 credibility	 of	 those	 who	 tell	 the	 stories	 about	
apparitions	and	other	preternatural	events	and	entities	 involving	such	 figures	as	
genies	 and	 witches.	 This	 is	 why	 Bond’s	 narrator	 takes	 steps	 to	 establish	 his	
credibility	and	authority	as	a	 ‘relator’,	and	it	 is	also	what	makes	Justicia’s	failings	
so	noteworthy.	
	 Although	 Glanvill	 is	 part	 of	 the	 tradition	 that	 valued	 empiricism	 and	
experimentation	 (he	 was	 a	 major	 defender	 of	 the	 Royal	 Society	 and	 the	 ‘new	










to	 atheism.	 Instead,	 Glanvill	 aligned	 himself	 with	 ‘mitigated’	 or	 ‘constructive’	
scepticism	(what	Troy	Boone	calls	a	 ‘middle	way’),	which	suggests	 that	although	
we	might	not	be	able	to	gain	certain	types	of	knowledge,	such	as	divine	knowledge,	
we	 can	 in	 fact,	 know	 some	 things	 about	 appearances	 in	 the	 world	 through	
scientific	 observation.49 	Surprisingly,	 he	 extended	 his	 trust	 in	 observation	 to	




and	morph	 into	 animal	 form’.51		 In	 general,	McKeon	 characterizes	 the	 apparition	
narratives	written	by	Glanvill	and	others	as	a	genre	 that	challenged	 the	sceptics,	
and	 Troy	 Boone	 echoes	 McKeon	 when	 he	 claims,	 ‘The	 apparition	 narratives	 of	
Glanvill	 and	 his	 most	 popular	 successor,	 Daniel	 Defoe,	 respond	 to	 and	 criticize	
rationalistic	 deprivileging	 of	 the	 supernatural’. 52 	They	 do	 so	 by	 privileging	
appearance	and	relying	heavily	on	testimony	that	they	deem	credible.	Haywood’s	
text,	in	turn,	challenges	the	reliability	of	appearance	by	taking	a	more	rationalistic	






















Glanvill	 and	Richard	Baxter,	 both	 of	whom	McKeon	discusses	 as	writers	 of	 anti-
sceptical	 apparition	 narratives. 53 	Like	 Glanvill	 and	 Baxter,	 Bond	 challenges	
incredulous	 ‘free-thinkers’	who	doubt	supernatural	reports,	suggesting	they	have	
no	 reason	 for	 scepticism	 other	 than	 their	 own	 incredulity	 (80).54	He	 also	 uses	
rhetoric	 like	Glanvill’s	 and	Baxter’s	 in	which	he	 suggests	 that	 such	 scepticism	of	
reputable	 sources	 potentially	 (and	 perhaps	 ironically	 or	 even	 paradoxically)	
undermines	 the	 Enlightenment	 projects	 of	 empiricism	 and	 documentation	
altogether.	 Anticipating	 naysayers	 who	 reject	 testimony	 of	 those	 who	 claim	 to	
have	had	supernatural	experiences,	Bond	says,	‘In	a	word,	if	People	will	be	led	by	
Suspicions	 and	 remote	 Possibilities	 of	 Fraud	 and	 Contrivance	 of	 such	 Men,	 all	
Historical	Truth	shall	be	ended,	when	it	consists	not	with	a	Man’s	private	Humour	




These	 Things	 are	 true,	 and	 I	 know	 them	 to	 be	 so	 with	 as	 much	
certainty	as	Eyes	and	Ears	can	give	me,	and	until	I	can	be	perswaded	
[sic]	that	my	Senses	do	deceive	me	about	their	proper	object	and	by	














with	 ‘Eyes	 and	 Ears’—various	 spirits	 and	 apparitions.	 And,	 like	 the	 apparition	
narratives	 analysed	 by	 McKeon,	 Bond’s	 text	 also	 focuses	 on	 the	 sources	 of	 his	
evidence	and	tales,	citing	such	specific	cases	as	those	related	by	Socrates,	Aristotle,	
King	James,	John	Donne,	and	the	Italian	poet	Tasso,	saying,	
Men,	who	will	not	believe	such	Things	as	 these,	 so	well	attested	 to	
us,	and	given	us	by	such	Authorities,	because	they	did	not	see	them	
themselves,	nor	any	Thing	of	the	like	Nature,	ought	not	only	to	deny	
the	Demon	 of	 Socrates;	 but	 that	 there	was	 such	 a	Man	 as	 Socrates	
himself.	They	should	not	dispute	the	Genij	of	Caesar,	Cicero,	Brutus,	
Marc	 Anthony;	 but	 avow,	 that	 there	 were	 never	 any	 such	 Men	
existing	 upon	 the	 Earth,	 and	 overthrow	 all	 credible	 History	
whatsoever.	Mean	while,	all	Men,	but	those	who	run	such	Lengths	in	
their	 fantastical	 Incredulity,	 will	 from	 the	 Facts	 above-mentioned,	
rest	satisfied,	that	there	are	such	Things	as	Evil	and	Good	Genij;	and	
that	Men	have	sometimes	a	Commerce	with	them	by	all	their	Senses,	
particularly	 those	 of	Seeing	 and	Hearing;	 and	will	 not	 therefore	 be	
startled	at	 the	 strange	Fragments	of	Histories,	which	 I	 am	going	 to	
relate	of	our	young	Duncan	Campbell	.	.	.	.	(101)55	
In	this	passage,	Bond	suggests	that	if	we	cannot	accept	testimony	as	evidence,	we	








emphasizes	 the	 importance	of	sensory	perceptions.	At	 times,	Bond	seems	almost	
to	 elide	 ‘testimony	 of	 experience’	 with	 experience	 itself.	 But	 writers	 of	 the	
apparition	 narratives	 considered	 testimony	 from	 respectable	 people	 to	 be	 as	
reliable	 as	 a	 scientific	 experiment	 or	 a	 report	 about	 the	 existence	 of	 another	
continent.	 Glanvill,	 for	 example,	 suggested	 that	 testimony	 about	 witches	 from	 a	
reliable	 source	was	 no	 different	 from	 testimony	 provided	 by	 someone	who	 had	
seen	 Boyle’s	 air	 pump.56 	Being	 of	 a	 similar	 mind,	 Bond,	 after	 providing	 his	
authority-based	 evidence,	 says	 that	 ‘free-thinkers’	 and	 ‘unbelieving	 Gentlemen’	
should	 just	 ‘lay	 down	 [his]	 Book’	 and	 not	 ‘read	 one	Tittle	 further’	 (121).	 Robert	
Boyle	 himself	 engaged	 with	 Glanvill	 in	 his	 fight	 to	 prove	 witchcraft	 was	 real,	
writing	to	Glanvill	in	1762	with	a	‘detailed	report	of	an	alleged	Irish	witch	whose	
powers	he	had	personally	verified’.57	John	Waller	also	notes	that	Boyle	‘discoursed	
at	length	on	the	alleged	phenomena	of	“second	sight”.	 .	 .	 .’58	Bond’s	text,	then,	is	a	
part	of	a	genre	that	speaks	directly	to	empirical	questions,	but	his	text	privileges	
sensory	perception	and	testimony,	both	of	which,	 for	Haywood,	 invite	doubt	and	
scepticism.	 He	 also	 demonstrates	 the	 concern	 that	 free-thinkers	 and	 sceptics	
undermine	 society	 by	 rejecting	what	 should	 be	 common	 standards	 of	 judgment.	
Haywood	questions	these	standards.	
	 Although	 McKeon	 does	 not	 mention	 the	 Life	 and	 Adventure	 of	 Duncan	
Campbell	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 apparition	 narratives,	 it	 clearly	 reflects	 the	 same	
elements	and	conventions	employed	by	the	authors	that	McKeon	cites—elements	










and/or	 its	 relationship	 to	 Haywood’s.	 Two	 exceptions	 are	 Rebecca	 Bullard	 and	
Riccardo	 Capoferro.	 Bullard	wisely	 notes	 that	Haywood’s	 text	 should	 be	 studied	
against	Bond’s,	but	Bullard	does	not	focus	on	problems	of	scepticism	but	rather	the	
texts’	opposing	approaches	to	curiosity.59	Capoferro,	 in	a	discussion	of	scepticism	
and	 apparition	 narratives	 mentions	 both	 texts	 and	 says	 that,	 like	 apparition	
narratives,	 the	Duncan	 Campbell	 narratives	 ‘bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 empiricism	
and	the	beliefs	it	implicitly	calls	into	question’.60	Capoferro	admits	that	A	Spy	Upon	






stages	 her	 first	 encounter	 with	 Duncan’.61	Capoferro’s	 discussion	 of	 Haywood’s	
text	 is	 brief,	 and	 it	 ignores	 the	 ongoing	 challenges	 to	 Campbell’s	 legitimacy	 that	
thread	throughout	Haywood’s	text	all	the	way	to	the	very	last	page.	He	ignores	the	
questionable	 reliability	 of	 the	 narrator	 along	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 her	 intended	
audience,	 the	 unnamed	 lord,	 is	 identified	 as	 a	 sceptic	 who	 doubts	 Campbell’s	
powers	 and	 who	 does	 not	 believe	 in	 the	 supernatural.62	Essentially	 Capoferro	
overlooks	 or	 dismisses	 the	 engagement	 with	 ‘epistemological	 problems’	 that,	 I	
argue,	 dominate	 the	 text.	 In	 fact,	 not	 only	 does	 Haywood	 engage	 with	




















of	 Bond’s,	 in	 actuality	 the	work	 effectively	 subverts	 the	 role	 of	 the	 authoritative	
and	 trustworthy	 ‘relator’	 and,	 instead,	 is	 told	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 an	
unreliable	 narrator.	Whereas	 Bond’s	 narrator	 presents	 himself	 as	 an	 authorized	
biographer	who	is	writing	to	a	 large	audience,	Haywood’s	narrator,	 Justicia,	 is	an	
unauthorized	 ‘spy’	 whose	 argument	 purportedly	 is	 directed	 in	 letters	 to	 an	
audience	 of	 one:	 her	 friend,	 the	 unnamed	 lord.63	In	 addition,	 although	Bond	 (or,	
one	 might	 say,	 his	 narrator)	 consistently	 asserts	 narrative	 authority	 and	
credibility,	 Haywood’s	 narrator	 regularly	 interjects	 details	 that	 likely	 will	
encourage	readers	to	question	her	authority	and	credibility.	For	example,	early	in	
the	 text,	 Justicia	 suggests	 that	 one	of	 her	 reasons	 for	presenting	her	 tales	 to	 the	
lord	is	that	she,	as	a	woman,	is	not	fit	to	judge:		
As	I	communicate	my	Thoughts	of	this	Affair	only	to	one	whose	good	
Nature	 and	 Friendship	 I	 am	 secure	 of,	 I	 deal	with	 that	 Confidence	








ours	 those	 Advantages	 of	 Education,	 which	 alone	 can	make	 either	




In	 this	 passage,	 Justicia	 says	 that	 she	 is	 sharing	 her	 testimony	 with	 the	 lord	
because	she	trusts	that	he	will	not	respond	mockingly	to	her	arguments.	She	also	
suggests	 that	 she	 is	 submitting	 her	 thoughts	 to	 him	 so	 that	 he	 can	 offer	 a	 final	
judgment	because	she,	like	all	women,	is	denied	the	‘Advantages	of	Education’,	and	
is,	 therefore,	 not	 truly	 ‘capable	 of	 judging’.	 Also,	 later	 in	 the	 text,	 Justicia	 admits	





(260).	 Although	 he	 acknowledges	 that	 his	 readers	 will	 function	 as	 a	 ‘jury’,	 he,	
unlike	 Justicia,	 confidently	 claims	 the	 role	 of	 judge	 and	he	never	 offers	 evidence	
that	would	contradict	his	credibility.	Although	Justicia	tells	her	reader	she	cannot	
fully	function	as	judge,	her	name	suggests	she	embodies	judgment	and	justice,	and	
this	 irony	 creates	 tension.	As	a	 result,	Haywood’s	 readers	 truly	are	 invited	 to	be	
the	judges	and	the	jury	of	Justicia’s	claims.	Because	of	the	questionable	reliability	
of	 the	narrator	 (and	because	of	 the	use	of	 the	second	person	 ‘you’	as	she	speaks	
directly	 to	 the	 her	 audience	 throughout	 the	 narrative)	 the	 position	 of	 ‘reader	 as	






	 Although	 Justicia	 does	not	 have	 all	 of	 the	 qualities	 of	 a	 twentieth-century	
unreliable	narrator,	she	does	have	the	kind	of	questionable	reliability	one	sees	in	
other	early	eighteenth-century	texts.	Tracing	the	history	of	the	unreliable	narrator,	




with	 dubious	 reliability	 that	 required	 evaluation	 from	 the	 readers.	 For	 example,	
Karen	Bloom	Gevirtz	points	out	that,	in	part	three	of	Love-Letters	from	a	Nobleman	
to	 His	 Sister,	 ‘Behn	 complicates	 the	 situation	 further	 by	 using	 the	 seemingly	
reliable	 narrator	 to	 explore	 how	 people	 deceive	 not	 only	 each	 other,	 but	 also	
themselves’. 65 	Although	 Behn’s	 narrative	 structure	 in	 Love-Letters	 is	 much	
different	from	the	consistent	first-person	point-of-view	one	finds	in	A	Spy	Upon	the	
Conjurer,	the	questions	of	authority	and	self-deception	apply.	Justicia	implies	that	
she	 is	 a	 reliable	 ‘relator’,	 especially	 as	 she	 invokes	 the	 language	 of	 natural	
philosophers,	 but	 she	 undercuts	 that	 implied	 authority	 with	 interjections	 about	

















	[Defoe’s	 reader]	 is	 invited	 to	 work	 with	 the	 agreement	 or	
disagreement	between	H.F.’s	testimony	and	that	of	other	witnesses,	
whom	 he	 also	 hears.	 [The	 reader]	 is	 required	 to	 use	 ‘diligence,	
attention,	and	exactness’	in	determining	how	far	H.F.’s	evaluation	of	
the	testimonies	of	witnesses	is	true	to	the	reality	of	things	and	how	
far	H.F.	 is	himself	a	reliable	witness;	and	he	 is	asked	to	 ‘proportion	
consent	to	the	different	probabilities’.67	
Just	 as	 Defoe’s	 readers	must	 evaluate	 H.F.’s	 testimony,	 Haywood’s	 readers	must	
evaluate	Justicia’s	reasoning	and	determine	if	her	testimony	is	 ‘true	to	the	reality	
of	 things’.	With	Spy,	 Haywood	 creates	 a	 text	 that	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 biography	 like	
Bond’s,	 but	by	using	narrative	 strategies	 from	 fiction	 (including	amatory	 fiction)	






A	 Spy	Upon	 the	 Conjurer	 began	 as	 a	 piece	 of	 hack	 work,	 a	 kind	 of	
infomercial,	 if	 you	will,	 intended	 to	 plug	Duncan	 Campbell,	 a	 deaf-
mute	fortune-teller,	quack	doctor,	and	by	the	1720s,	member	of	Eliza	
Haywood’s	 literary	 set.	 .	 .	 .	 Haywood,	 in	 1724	 already	 a	 seasoned	
professional,	 set	out,	 it	would	seem,	 to	crank	out	a	straightforward	
promotional	 piece—the	 plan	 apparently	 was	 to	 string	 together	







somewhere	along	 the	way	she	seems	 to	have	become	 interested	 in	
Campbell	as	a	brother	of	the	pen.68	
Although	 I	 do	 not	 dispute	 Haywood’s	 potential	 interest	 in	 Campbell	 as	 a	
marginalized	figure	or	the	 fact	 that	Haywood	recognized	the	market	value	of	her	
narrative,	 I	would	 suggest	 that	 the	 tensions	 in	 the	 text	 suggest	 there	 is	more	 at	
work	than	one	would	find	in	a	‘straightforward	promotional	piece’.		In	addition,	in	
King’s	political	biography	of	Haywood,	which	only	gives	a	few	sentences	to	A	Spy	
Upon	 the	 Conjurer,	 she	 calls	 the	 text	 a	 ‘fascinating	 variant	 on	 the	 scandal	
chronicle’.69Although,	 to	 some	 extent,	 this	 is	 true	 (the	 text	 does,	 like	Haywood’s	
other	 scandal	 narratives,	 include	 references	 to	 various	 people	 in	 and	 out	 of	 her	
circle),	 the	 text	 reflects	 the	conventions	of	 the	biography	more	 than	 those	of	 the	
scandal	narrative.	However,	Haywood’s	narrative	frame,	along	with	her	unreliable,	




the	 consideration	 of	 the	 development	 of	 eighteenth-century	 fictionality	 and	 the	
novel.	 Philip	 Stewart	 argues	 that	 in	 this	 time,	 ‘narrators	 began	 reaching	 inside	
themselves	 and	 putting	 into	 play	 their	 own	 perceptions	 or	 judgments.	 Once	 the	
novel	 starts	 making	 the	 narrator’s	 inner	 being	 one	 if	 its	 principal	 subjects,	 its	



















science’	 or	 natural	 philosophy,	 one	 finds	 a	 ‘gendering’	 of	 these	 problems	 in	 her	
work	 as	 she	 places	 these	 problems	 within	 contexts	 of	 intersubjectivity	 and	
interiority.	 The	 noted	 founders	 and	 practitioners	 of	 natural	 philosophy	 were	
mostly	men,	and	they	typically	applied	their	empiricism	or	scepticism	to	questions	
of	nature	and	God.	Haywood	engages	with	conventional	elements	of	empiricism—
such	 as	 experience,	 perception,	 and	 judgment—but	 her	 questions	 tend	 to	 focus	





the	 Conjurer,	 like	 other	 Haywood	 texts,	 highlights	 a	 problem	 about	 people:	 it	 is	
extremely	 difficult	 to	 gain	 knowledge	 about	 other	 people	 (and	 ourselves)	 even	
though	 such	 knowledge	 is	 necessary	 for,	 and	 can	 have	 significant	 consequences	
for,	our	daily	lives.	As	Haywood	shifts	the	epistemological	conversation	to	topics	of	
people	 and	 relationships,	 she	 inserts	women	 into	 the	 dialogue.	 As	 Karen	 Bloom	





individual	 (the	man)’	 and,	 therefore,	 ‘the	 individual	who	 could	 not	 or	 ought	 not	
exist	 as	 an	 isolated	 entity	 (the	 woman)	 was	 removed	 from	 the	 systems	 of	
knowledge	production’.72	In	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer,	Haywood	engages	with	and	
challenges	 systems	 of	 knowledge,	 migrating	 conventional	 epistemological	
questions	and	problems	to	 the	realm	of	 individuals’	daily	 lives	and	relationships.	




more	 so—than	 questions	 about	 nature	 and	God.	 Knowledge	 about	 people	 is	 not	
only	 thwarted	 by	 flawed	 perception	 and	 biased	 judgment,	 but	 by	 the	 fact	 that	
other	 people	 are	 often	 wilfully	 deceptive—a	 problem	 that	 Haywood	 features	 in	




more	than	her	other	 texts,	 focus	on	 ‘how	love	can	be	 faked	to	delude	and	entrap	
the	 unwary’.74	I	 would	 add	 that	 other	 Haywood	 texts	 from	 the	 1720s,	 such	 as	
Memoirs	 of	 Certain	 Island	 Adjacent	 to	 Utopia,	 The	 City	 Jilt,	 and	 Fantomina—also	
address	these	problems	of	knowing	whether	another’s	emotions	are	real	or	 fake.	
In	 fact,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 identify	 a	 Haywood	 text	 that	 does	 not	 investigate	 the	










thereof).	 Furthermore,	 in	 her	 texts,	 deception	 is	 almost	 impossible	 to	 penetrate,	
and	often	 the	person	being	deceived	 can	only	 learn	 the	 truth	when	 the	deceiver	
chooses	 to	 reveal	 him-	 or	 herself,	 or	 when	 the	 deceived	 person	 engages	 in	
deception	of	his	or	her	own	 in	order	 to	gain	or	regain	epistemic	privilege.	These	
efforts	often	come	in	the	form	of	‘spying’,	as	we	see	in	the	case	of	Justicia.		
	 For	 Haywood,	 deception	 often	 presents	 itself	 as	 a	 problem	 of	 sensory	
perception—one	 of	 appearance	 versus	 reality—a	 problem	 that	 dominated	
philosophical	 discussions	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 and	 eighteenth	 centuries	 about	 the	
inability	 to	 see	 beyond	 the	 exteriors	 of	 nature—beyond	 appearance.	 How	much	
more	 difficult	 is	 it	 to	 see	 beyond	 the	 exterior	 of	 people	 to	 their	 ‘inaccessible	
interior’?75	Perhaps	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 then	 that	 in	 A	 Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer,	
Justicia	says	that	it	is	Campbell’s	knowledge	of	interiority	that	is	most	startling:		
[T]ho	 I	 had	 often	 been	 surprised	 at	 the	 wonderful	 Effects	 of	 his	
Predictions,	yet	nothing	ever	was	so	alarming,	 as	his	writing	down	
immediately	what	was	 the	 Intentions	 of	 the	 Person	 before	 him.	 In	
other	Things,	his	Art	 seem’d	 to	 consist	 in	 the	Knowledge	of	Deeds;	
but	 here	 he	 dived	 into	 Thoughts,	 made	 it	 appear	 that	 he	 was	
acquainted	with	the	most	secret	Recesses	of	the	Soul,	and	saw	each	
rising	 immature	Desire	 long	 before	 Time	 could	 ripen	 it	 for	 Action.	
(22)	
At	several	points	in	the	text,	Justicia	and	other	customers	comment	on	Campbell’s	
ability	 to	 know	a	 person’s	 ‘disposition’	 (137,	 161).	 In	 this	way,	 Campbell	 has	 an	













	 The	 special	 significance	 of	 epistemological	 power	 for	 women	 also	 is	
addressed	 by	 Jennifer	 Locke	 in	 ‘Dangerous	 Fortune-telling	 in	 Frances	 Burney’s	
Camilla’,	in	which	she	notes	that	fortune-telling,	in	the	eighteenth	century,	offered	
a	 potential	 way	 of	 knowing	 that	 ‘surpassed	 and	 went	 beyond	 scientific	
observation’,	a	way	of	knowing	that	was	particularly	valued	by	women.76	She	says,	
‘The	 majority	 of	 eighteenth-century	 texts	 advertised	 themselves	 as	 containing	
exotic,	ancient,	or	occult	knowledge	that	could	provide	information	different	from	
what	was	provided	by	conventional	epistemologies’.77	In	fact,	one	of	the	last	letters	
in	 A	 Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer	 is	 from	 someone	 asking	 Campbell	 about	 ‘Sir	 Isaac	
Newton’s	System	of	Philosophy’	 and	 ‘how	near	 it	 comes	 to	Truth’	 (247).	Duncan	




reliably	 through	 the	 five	 senses.	 As	 Jennifer	 Locke	 points	 out,	 such	 knowledge	
would	be	of	particular	interest	to	women:	‘The	strong	connection	between	women	
and	 fortune-telling	 in	 the	 period	 can	 in	 part	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 relative	










understood	 as	 difficult	 or	 even	 impossible	 to	 forecast	 and,	 therefore,	 were	 the	
most	 in	 need	 of	 an	 alternative	 form	 of	 projection’.79	Campbell’s	 clients,	 who	 are	
mostly	women,	 have	 questions	 about	whom	 they	will	marry,	whom	 they	 should	
marry,	who	 is	 lying	 to	 them,	and	so	on.	They	see	deception	all	 around	 them	and	
they	recognize	that	their	perceptions	and	experiences	often	are	insufficient.	They	
seek	 Campbell’s	 preternatural	 answers	 to	 these	 questions	 because	 appearances	






also	engaging	with	 the	epistemological	problems	and	 issues	of	 the	 ‘supernatural’	
that	 are	 addressed	 by	 male	 philosophers.	 However,	 Haywood	 offers	 a	 sceptical	






is	 limited	 to	 four	 senses,	 yet	 who,	 somehow,	 possesses	 more	 knowledge	 than	
anyone	who	uses	all	five.	The	fact	that	Campbell	knows	what	others—who	are	in	
full	 possession	 of	 their	 senses—do	 not,	 suggests	 both	 the	 limits	 of	 sensory	







occult	 knowledge)	 would	 be	 required	 for	 the	 attainment	 of	 certainty.	 Most	 of	
Campbell’s	 clients	 learn	 from	 him	 that	 they	 are	 in	 danger	 of	 ruin	 or	 that	 their	
fortunes	 are	 about	 to	 change	 for	 better	 or	 for	 worse.	 When	 they	 ignore	 his	
knowledge	and	related	advice,	they	suffer.	When	they	attend	to	his	knowledge	and	
advice,	they	prosper.	The	apparent	inability	of	any	of	the	characters	to	determine	
truth	without	 occult	 knowledge	 such	 as	 Campbell’s—along	with	 all	 of	 the	 other	
elements	 of	 sensory	 deception	 at	 play	 in	 the	 text—is	 the	 foundation	 for	 my	
argument	that,	in	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer,	Eliza	Haywood	takes	a	sceptical	position	
toward	 Campbell	 and	 the	 acquisition	 of	 knowledge	 in	 general,	 by	which	 I	mean	
that	 Haywood	 suggests	 that	 knowledge,	 if	 not	 impossible,	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	
acquire	 and	 that,	 therefore,	 one	 ought	 to	 privilege	 doubt	 and	move	 less	 quickly	
from	perception	to	belief	or	volition.	
	 Felicity	 Nussbaum	 says,	 ‘Unquestionably,	 Campbell’s	 station	 as	 a	 hot	
commercial	 property	motivated	Haywood’s	 opportunistic	 desire	 to	 capitalize	 on	




market	 potential	 of	 Campbell’s	 story,	 and	 she	 also	 might	 have	 seen	 similarities	
between	 her	 struggles	 and	 his,	 but	 it	 is	 important	 not	 to	 overlook	 the	
epistemological	 concerns	 of	Haywood’s	 text,	 along	with	 the	degree	 to	which	her	
text	enters	a	pre-existing	conversation	perpetuated	by	men	such	as	Glanvill,	Defoe,	










also	 focuses	on	his	 clients’	weaknesses—their	wishful	 thinking,	 poor	perception,	
and	 bad	 judgments—all	 of	 which	 contribute	 to	 their	 ‘blindness’.	 Through	 these	
weaknesses—weaknesses	that	her	narrator,	Justicia,	shares—Haywood	privileges	
a	position	of	doubt,	a	doctrine	of	suspension,	over	a	disposition	towards	credulity.	
With	 this	move,	 she	 enters	 the	 territory	 of	 philosophical	 scepticism,	 challenging	
the	 work	 of	 Glanvill	 and	 Bond.	 Although	 A	 Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer	 consistently	
suggests	 that	 characters	 must	 accept	 the	 epistemological	 burdens	 of	 securing	
knowledge	and	determining	truth—if	for	no	other	reason	than	self-preservation—




also	 the	 narrator	 (and	 the	 narrated	 events)	 imply	 that	 even	 the	most	 assiduous	
empirical	 investigation	 is	no	guarantee	against	error	and	deception.	At	 the	 same	
time,	 the	 narrator,	 herself,	 is	 presented	 as	 flawed	 and	unreliable.	 Through	 these	
narrative	elements,	Haywood	demonstrates	that	truth	is	elusive	at	the	same	time	
that	she	charges	her	characters	and	her	readers	with	epistemic	responsibility.	This	
double	 bind	 of	 scepticism	 and	 responsibility	 leaves	 the	 characters—and,	
necessarily,	 the	readers—in	crisis,	and	 it	demonstrates	a	central	challenge	of	 the	
modern	individual.		
	 In	addition,	by	shifting	her	empirical	 concerns	 to	 the	 realm	of	people	and	







true	 resolution	 to	 the	 empirical	 crisis	 and,	 instead,	 privileges	 scepticism	 and	
doubt—a	 position	 that	 engages	 with	 and	 opposes	 the	 position	 presented	 by	
William	Bond	and	other	early	eighteenth-century	writers	about	Campbell	and	the	
supernatural.	 However,	 even	 though	 her	 text	 is	 in	 dialogue	 with	 them,	 it	 also,	












her	 scepticism	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 politics	 where	 one	 finds	 that	 problems	 of	
knowledge	and	judgment	can	be	even	more	urgent	and	complicated	than	they	are	
in	 the	 private	 sphere.	 In	 politics,	 threats	 can	 arise	 suddenly,	 and	 plots	 typically	
involve	multiple	parties,	alliances,	and	motives.	Most	importantly,	Haywood’s	text	
demonstrates	how	these	threats	can	undermine	the	autonomy	of	the	individual	as	
both	 a	private	person	and	a	member	of	 the	body	politic.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	
that	Eovaai	is	a	tightly-woven	text	in	which	each	narrative	thread	works	with	and	
against	the	others	in	order	to	interrogate	the	stability	of	the	social	contract	and	the	
role	 of	 individual	 autonomy	 within	 liberal	 government.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
complex	narrative	structure	of	Eovaai	develops	the	interpretive	sophistication	and	
judgment	of	its	readers	by	inviting	readers	to	suspend	‘disbelief’	of	the	story	itself	
while,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 ensuring	 that	 the	 reader’s	 judgment	 is	 engaged	 and	
required	 in	order	 to	 interpret	meaning.	As	 in	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer,	Haywood	
demonstrates	 scepticism	 about	 sensory	 perception	 and	 the	 power	 of	 reasoning,	
but	 in	 Eovaai,	 she	 complicates	 these	 problems	 by	 increasing	 the	 magnitude	 of	
deception	and	the	number	of	voices	that	threaten	the	autonomy	of	her	characters	
as	 well	 as	 the	 judgment	 of	 her	 readers.	 These	 threats	 mimic	 those	 faced	 by	
individual	political	 subjects	and	sovereigns	and	reflect	Haywood’s	 interest	 in	 the	








have	 overlooked	 the	 degree	 to	which,	 in	Eovaai,	 Haywood	 is	 in	 dialogue	with	 ‘a	
male	 tradition	 of	 erudition’	 related	 to	 history	 and	 philosophy.	1	In	 his	 book	 on	
scepticism	 in	 the	 eighteenth-century	 literature,	 Fred	 Parker	 explores	 the	
paradoxical	power	of	 scepticism	to	 lead	 to	greater	understanding,	and	he	argues	
that	this	power	is	observable	in	the	work	of	Pope,	Sterne,	and	others.2	Parker	sets	
the	 context	 for	 these	 writers	 by	 recognising	 the	 sceptical	 tradition	 in	 the	 early	
modern	period	that	was	seen	in	philosophers	such	as	Montaigne,	Bayle,	Locke,	and	
Hume.	 But	 he	 also	 notes	 that	 each	 of	 these	 thinkers	 suggests	 a	 solution	 to	 the	
scepticism	 caused	 by	 uncertainty	 or	 the	 insufficiency	 or	 reason:	 For	 Locke,	 it	 is	
experience;	for	Bayle,	it	is	the	Gospel;	for	Montaigne,	it	is	self-reflection	combined	
with	obedience;	and	 for	Hume,	 it	 is	backgammon.3	These	philosophers’	 ‘answers’	
to	scepticism	relate	primarily	to	existential	uncertainties	about	God	and	questions	
of	 philosophy.	 However,	 their	 ‘answers’	 raise	 questions	 about	 how	 scepticism	
might	manifest—both	thematically	and	aesthetically—in	texts	written	by	women,	
especially	since	pyrrhonian	sceptics,	in	the	face	of	their	scepticism,	assert	that	the	
best	 course	 of	 action	 is	 to	 follow	 custom.4	However,	 this	 default	 position	 can	 be	
problematic	 for	 women.	 In	 addition	 Haywood’s	 scepticism	 does	 not	 result	 from	
religious	or	ontological	threads	that	have	been	teased	until	they	tangle;	rather,	her	













such	as,	 ‘Does	he	really	love	me?’,	 ‘Does	he	want	to	steal	all	my	money?’,	 ‘What	is	
the	 best	 system	of	 government?’,	 and	 ‘To	whom	 (and	 to	what)	 should	 I	 give	my	
consent?’.	These	questions	 inherently	assume	 the	need	 for	 individuals	 (including	
women)	to	exercise	their	autonomous	judgment	rather	than	following	the	precepts	
or	dictates	of	men.	Haywood’s	scepticism	takes	a	different	shape	than	that	which	
dominates	 the	 debates	 among	 male	 philosophers	 and	 literary	 writers,	 and	
therefore	it	deserves	greater	attention	than	it	has	received.	Haywood’s	texts	make	
clear	that	 the	 imbalances	of	power	often	 lead	women	to	be	sceptical	about	those	
who	 establish	 custom,	 and	 her	 texts	 explore	 the	 consequences	 for	 women	 who	
resist	 custom.	 Haywood	 complicates	 traditional	 responses	 to	 scepticism	 even	
further	in	Eovaai	because	her	central	characters	are	not	only	female,	but	also	they	
are	 monarchs.	 They	 must	 rule;	 they	 must	 decide.	 They	 cannot	 permanently	
suspend	 judgment.	 But	 in	 an	 environment	 in	 which	 the	 ‘custom’	 of	 absolute	
monarchies	 has	 been	 abolished,	 and	 in	 which	 the	 ‘custom’	 is	 for	 men	 to	 have	
power	 over	 women,	 there	 are	 no	 established	 customs	 for	 these	 monarchs	 to	
follow.	Their	personal	fates	and	the	fates	of	their	kingdoms	rely	on	their	judgment	
and	 their	 ability	 to	 effectively	 exercise	 their	 autonomy.	 Entire	 kingdoms	depend	
upon	 their	 judgments,	 and	 the	 level	 of	 anxiety,	 especially	 for	 Princess	 Eovaai,	 is	
high.	Recognising	this	thread	in	Eovaai	can	help	us	understand	the	degree	to	which	
Haywood	is	engaging	with	the	other	voices	and	multiple	genres	of	the	eighteenth	
century	 that	 influenced	 fiction	 and	 the	 novel.	 To	 this	 end,	 after	 first	 providing	
context	and	demonstrating	the	need	for	my	analysis,	I	will	demonstrate	the	text’s	












struggling	 for	 sovereignty	 of	 her	 kingdom	 while	 also	 being	 exposed	 to	 the	
arguments	 and	 seductions	 of	 multiple	 types	 of	 government,	 including	 absolute	
monarchy,	 constitutional	 monarchy,	 and	 republicanism.	 When	 the	 story	 begins,	
the	King	of	Ijaveo	has	died,	leaving	his	kingdom	to	his	daughter,	Eovaai,	whom	he	
has	 educated	 in	 Lockean	 ‘precepts	 of	 government’.	 In	 addition	 to	 her	 education,	




















again,	 to	 see	 reality	 as	 it	 truly	 is.	 She	 manages	 to	 escape	 Hypotofa	 and,	 after	
wandering,	finds	herself	in	a	republican	land	where	she	engages	in	debates	about	
monarchy	and	listens	to	a	harangue	meant	to	inspire	revolution	against	Ochihatou.	








a	 significant	 development	 in	 complexity	 from	 A	 Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer.	 The	
multiple	 voices	 of	 the	 novel	 include	 a	 translator	 (who	 provides	 a	 preface	 and	
multiple	footnotes),	a	narrator,	and	the	many	additional	voices	that	the	translator	
cites	 in	 the	 footnotes,	 which	 include	 a	 commentator,	 a	 cabal,	 and	 various	
historians.	Many	critics	have	commented	on	the	text’s	experimental	qualities.	For	
example,	 Earla	 Wilputte	 has	 discussed	 the	 way	 its	 ‘argumentative	 machinery’	
invites	readers	to	‘formulate	their	own	conclusions	on	the	fictional	action	and,	by	
extension,	 their	 real	 society'.6	The	 text	 also	 reflects	 a	 kind	 of	 generic	 instability.	
Wilputte	calls	it	a	 ‘wild	blend	of	genres	including	‘a	woman’s	romance,	imaginary	
voyage,	oriental	 fantasy,	and	erotic	novel’,	and	Kathryn	King	notes	that	the	novel	









‘mock-romance’,8	and	 points	 out	 that	 ‘[n]either	 the	 word	 “romance”	 nor	 “novel”	
features	 in	 its	 first	 title	 page,	 which	 mentions	 only	 “adventures”	 and	
“occurrences”’.9	In	her	analysis	of	the	title	page	of	the	1736	edition,	Ballaster	does	
not,	however,	mention	that	the	text	is	also	called	a	‘history’;	she	only	mentions	this	
detail	 when	 she	 observes	 that	 the	 frontispiece	 of	 the	 1741	 reprint	 edition	
‘abandoned	 the	 generic	 term	 “history”’.10	I	 argue,	 however,	 that	 that	 Haywood’s	
usage	of	‘history’	on	the	1736	title	page	is	not	so	‘generic’	as	Ballaster	suggests	and	
that	mock-history	 should	 be	 added	 to	 the	 list	 of	 genres	 that	 have	 already	 been	
attached	 to	 the	 text.	 In	Eovaai,	Haywood’s	 content	and	 formal	apparatus	 suggest	
that	 she	 is	 not	 only	 in	 dialogue	with	 other	 poets	 and	 fiction	writers	who	wrote	
about	 politics,	 but	 also	 that	 she	 is	 in	 dialogue	with	 historians	 and	 philosophers	
about	some	of	the	central	epistemological	problems	that	trouble	their	work.		
	 Eovaai	 is,	 I	 will	 show,	 influenced	 by	 debates	 related	 to	 history,	 natural	
philosophy,	and	political	theory,	all	of	which	I	will	discuss	in	detail	below,	but	its	
central	 plot	 about	 Princess	 Eovaai	 is	 influenced	 by	 the	 seduction	 narrative	 that	
constitutes	 	 amatory	 fiction.	 Haywood	 uses	many	 tropes	 of	 amatory	 fiction,	 and	
she	 uses	 ‘narratives	 of	 sexual	 seduction	 and	 betrayal	 as	 vehicles	 for	 the	
representation	of	political	seduction	and	betrayal’.11	In	Eovaai,	as	in	the	seduction	













fiction,	 in	 which	 men	 typically	 have	 a	 ‘physical	 and	 cultural	 advantage’	 over	
women.12	In	 this	 way,	 the	 text	 complicates	 the	 sexual	 politics	 of	 what	 Wilputte	
calls	 the	 ‘power	 granted	 to	 a	 monarch,	 a	 husband,	 a	 lover,	 or	 a	 Minister’.13	
Although	 men	 in	 Eovaai	 do	 have	 physical	 power	 over	 women,	 the	 novel	 also	
focuses	 on	 the	 inequalities	 of	 political	 and	 epistemological	 power	 that	 extend	
beyond	 gender,	 even	 though	 they	 are	 complicated	 by	 it.	 Haywood	 emphasizes	
these	 factors	 as	 she	 subverts	 a	 common	 trope	 of	 amatory	 fiction—one	 that	
features	men	 of	 higher	 status	 over	women	 of	 lower	 status—by	 featuring	 female	
protagonists	 who	 are	 sovereign	 monarchs.	 By	 putting	 women	 in	 sovereign	
positions,	Haywood	exploits	 the	 seduction	narrative	 in	new	ways	 to	 connect	 the	
‘siege’	 of	 seduction	 to	 the	 potential	 ways	 that	 political	 power—even	 that	 of	 a	
monarch—can	be	taken	by	force	or	fraud.	These	complications	and	subversions	of	
the	 seduction	 narrative	 serve	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 multiple	 threats	 to	 the	 social	
contract	that	can	come	from	either	above	or	below.	
	 The	Adventures	of	Eovaai	 is	Haywood’s	most	 explicitly	 political	 novel,	 and	
scholars	agree	that	the	novel	satirizes	Robert	Walpole,	the	controversial	minister	
who	 served	 George	 I	 and	 George	 II	 of	 England.14	By	 1736,	 the	 year	 Eovaai	 was	
published,	Walpole	was	a	common	target	of	satire,	and	 Jerry	Beasley	argues	 that	
The	 Adventures	 of	 Eovaai	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 ‘vicious’	 and	 ‘complex’	 narrative	













to	 establish	 Haywood’s	 political	 alliances	 are	 certainly	 warranted	 since	 ‘a	




her	 important	political	biography	of	Haywood,	 claims	 that	Eovaai	 is	a	 satire	 that	
functions	 as	 propaganda	 for	 Henry	 St.	 John,	 Viscount	 Bolingbroke,	 a	 Tory	 who,	
along	with	Whigs	 opposed	 to	Walpole,	 led	 a	 Patriot	 Opposition.17	Marta	 Kvande	
also	provides	a	Tory	reading,	but	struggles	to	resolve	the	 ‘puzzle’	of	why	the	text	
sometimes	 presents	 Whiggish	 or	 republican	 ideas	 as	 positive. 18 	Similarly,	
Elizabeth	 Kubek	 offers	 a	 Patriot	 Whig	 reading	 that	 also	 suggests	 Haywood’s	
alignment	with	Bolingbroke.19	In	contrast,	however,	Suzan	Last	claims	that	Eovaai	
is	a	meta-satire	 that	mocks	both	Robert	Walpole	and	 the	 literature	of	 the	Patriot	
opposition.20	Focusing	 more	 on	 political	 systems	 than	 individual	 alliances,	 Ros	
Ballaster	 concludes	 that	 the	 text	 ultimately	 privileges	 constitutional	 monarchy,	
saying,	 ‘Where	 Haywood	 is	 distinctive	 as	 an	 opposition	 writer	 is	 in	 her	 critical	




















“feminocentric”,	 if	 not	 “feminist”,	 argument	 for	 constitutional	 monarchy’. 21	
However,	 in	 contrast	 to	 Ballaster,	 Earla	Wilputte	 argues	 that	Eovaai	 does	 not	 in	
fact	 privilege	 a	 constitutional	 monarchy,	 but	 rather	 republicanism,	 and	 she	




problems	 and	 the	 belittlement	 they	 suffer	 would	 not	 exist	 in	 a	 Republican	
commonwealth’.22	Like	 Wilputte,	 Christopher	 Loar	 offers	 a	 republican	 reading,	
saying	 that	 the	 novel	 is	 a	 ‘gendered	 critique	 of	 constitutional	 monarchy’	 that	
‘point[s]	 to	 the	 limitations	of	constitutional	monarchy	as	a	 framework	 for	 liberty	
for	women’.23	Recently,	 Jennifer	Hargrave	 has	 gone	 in	 an	 entirely	 new	direction,	
arguing	 that	 in	Eovaai,	 Haywood	 ‘advocates	 a	 precise	model	 of	 political	 reform’	
that	 ‘couples	 Locke’s	 liberal	 theory	 with	 Chinese—specifically	 Confucian—
morality’.24	
	 Haywood’s	 ‘slippery	 political	 alliances’,	 as	 Catherine	 Ingrassia	 calls	 them,	
have	been	noted,	of	course,	but	Toni	Bowers	argues	that	even	though	‘it	may	finally	
prove	impossible	to	pin	down	Haywood’s	partisanship	in	a	monolithic	or	definitive	


















single	 ‘moment’	 of	 Eovaai,	 the	 ‘ideological	 implications’	 are	 difficult	 to	 classify	
according	 to	 any	 singular	 political	 end.	 Therefore,	 in	 this	 chapter,	 I	 resist	 the	
temptation	 to	 pin	 down	Haywood’s	 party	 politics	 in	Eovaai,	 despite	 the	 political	
nature	of	the	text.	I	do	not	mean	to	say	that	such	pursuits	are	not	worthwhile	but	
rather	 that	 I	 am	more	 interested	 in	what	 can	 be	 gleaned	 from	 the	 slipperiness,	
itself.	 Recognition	 of	 Haywood’s	 political	 scepticism	 and	 her	 uncertain	 alliances	
can,	 rather	 than	 obscuring	 Eovaai’s	 place	 in	 literary	 history,	 enhance	 our	
understanding	of	the	text’s	 literary	significance	by	clarifying	its	engagement	with	
contemporary	 conversations.	 Ultimately,	 both	 the	 political	 scepticism	 and	 the	
formal	 structures	 of	 Haywood’s	 text	 serve	 to	 continue	 her	 project	 of	 shifting	
authority	from	the	narrator	to	the	autonomous	reader—a	shift	that	is	important	to	
the	 development	 of	 the	 novel	 and	 its	 readers	 and	 also	 to	 the	 development	 of	
political	 agency	 among	 the	 members	 of	 the	 British	 body	 politic.	 The	 shift	 of	
authority	to	the	readers	is	not,	however,	designed	to	be	a	comfortable	one.	Rather,	
it	puts	the	reader	in	a	position	of	anxiety	because	of	the	threats	to	good	judgment	




	 One	 factor	 that	 Eovaai	 shares	 with	 amatory	 fiction	 and	 other	 early	










undermine	 one’s	 search	 for	 truth.	 Regarding	 amatory	 fiction,	 one	 thinks	 of	 the	
many	disguises	and	deceptions	in	Haywood’s	novels	and	novellas,	as	well	as	those	
in	works	 such	 as	 Aphra	 Behn’s	 Love	Letters	Between	a	Noble-man	and	His	 Sister	
(1684-1687)	 and	 Delarivier	 Manley’s	 New	 Atalantis	 (1709),	 as	 well	 as	 Daniel	
Defoe’s	 Moll	 Flanders	 (1722)	 and	 Roxana	 (1724),	 just	 to	 name	 a	 few.26 		 Of	
particular	 significance	 in	 Eovaai,	 however,	 is	 Haywood’s	 focus	 on	 collective	
delusion.	 Haywood’s	 amatory	 fiction	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 the	 deception	 and	
manipulation	 of	 individuals.	 In	 Haywood’s	 political	 writing,	 however,	 plot	 lines	
often	turn	on	the	deception	and	manipulation	of	entire	kingdoms.	In	Eovaai,	and	in	
her	 scandal	 narrative	Memoirs	 of	 an	 Certain	 Island	 Adjacent	 to	 the	 Kingdom	 of	
Utopia	 (1725),	Haywood	presents	 ‘monstrous’	politicians,	 characterizing	 them	as	
magicians	 or,	 more	 specifically	 ‘necromancers’	 who	 delude	 the	 masses	 by	
summoning	 spirits	 or	 demons	 in	 order	 to	 pursue	 hidden	 knowledge	 and	 wield	
power.	 Haywood’s	 necromancers	 typically	 seek	 power	 by	 both	 acquiring	 occult	
knowledge	 (thereby	 gaining	 epistemic	 privilege)	 and	 by	 using	 their	 magic	 to	





and	 more	 choices	 about	 religion,	 marriage,	 and	 politics,	 the	 ability	 to	 acquire	
knowledge,	 identify	 truth,	 and	 use	 reason	 were	 increasingly	 important.27	It	 is	









monstrosity.	 As	 I	 stated	 in	 chapter	 one,	 people	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 were	
curious	 about	 that	 which	 was	 unnatural	 and	 monstrous,	 but,	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Ochihatou,	that	monstrosity	is	invisible.	This	invisibility,	rather	than	triggering	the	
pleasure	 of	 curiosity,	 suggests	 instead	 the	 anxiety	 and	 difficulty	 of	 knowing.	 	 In	
Haywood’s	work,	 there	 is	 a	 distinction	 between	 curiosity,	which	 is	 the	 desire	 of	
knowledge	 for	 pleasure,	 and	 another	 kind	 of	 knowing,	 which	 is	 the	 need	 for	
knowledge	in	order	to	function	as	a	private	individual	and	as	a	public	citizen.	This	
distinction	has	 typically	gone	unremarked	 in	 studies	of	Haywood’s	work.	 In	 fact,	
the	blurring	of	 this	distinction	has	 led	 to	 readings	of	Haywood	 that	overlook	 the	
threats	to	autonomy	that	are	generated	when	individuals	are	oppressed	because	of	
their	 lack	 of	 epistemic	 power.	 Barbara	 Benedict	 makes	 a	 distinction	 between	
‘legitimate	and	illegitimate	curiosity’,	the	former	being	for	‘moral	instruction’	and	
the	 latter	 for	 ‘amoral—even	 immoral—delight’,	 but	 even	 though	 she	 recognises	
the	cultural	power	of	knowledge,	when	analysing	Haywood	she	 focuses	more	on	
the	pleasurable	transgression	of	curiosity	than	the	epistemic	oppression	or	anxiety	
that	 comes	with	 from	 lack	of	 (or	 confusion	 about)	 knowledge.28	Rebecca	Bullard	
also	focuses	on	the	pleasure	of	curiosity	when	she	argues	that	‘the	pleasure	of	the	
chase,	rather	than	attainment	of	the	object	of	curiosity,	is	the	main	attraction	of	a	












discover	 truth.	 In	 her	 amatory	 fiction,	 the	 stakes	 of	 these	 threats	 are	 high;	 in	
Eovaai,	they	are	even	higher.		





island	 from	 Cupid,	 himself,	 who	 serves	 as	 an	 omniscient	 narrator,	 detailing	 and	
lamenting	these	events	to	a	lone	traveller,	‘a	stranger,’	who	has	recently	arrived	on	
the	island.	Cupid	is	grief-stricken	and	angry	because	the	island	inhabitants,	instead	
of	 worshipping	 him	 as	 they	 used	 to,	 now	 idolize	 the	 fiend	 Lucitario,	 a	 famous	
necromancer,	who	has	 committed	 identity	 theft.	He	has	 stolen	Cupid’s	name,	his	
face,	 and	 his	 voice,	 and	 has	 turned	 the	 people	 toward	wild	 ‘desires’	 rather	 than	
virtuous	love.	Lucitario’s	purpose	is	to	get	rich,	and	he	has	erected	two	statues,	‘the	
one	 of	 Fortune,	 the	 other	 of	 Pecunia,	 and	 in	 a	 little	 time,	 by	 the	 help	 of	 his	
pernicious	Art,	wrought	so	far	on	the	Minds	of	the	deluded	Multitude,	as	to	make	it	
























and	 together	 they	 mount	 a	 ferocious	 attack	 on	 the	 greed,	 corruption,	 collective	
delusion	 and	social	 injustice	 that	 flourished	 in	 the	new	credit-driven	and	money-
obsessed	 economic	 order’.32	Haywood	 portrays	 a	 similar	 attack	 on	 the	 ‘deluded	
Multitude’	 in	The	Adventures	of	Eovaai.	 	This	attention	 to	 the	 ‘deluded	Multitude’	
makes	 visible	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 lives	 of	 individual	 subjects	 are	 inherently	
political,	and	it	emphasizes	the	connection	between	the	private	and	public	spheres	
as	well	as	the	epistemological	problems	that	plague	them	both.		




under	Ochihatou’s	power	when	he	speaks	 the	proper	 incantations	 (62).	Through	









Eovaai	 first	 sees	Ochihatou	after	she	has	 lost	 the	protection	of	 the	 jewel	of	Aiou,	
the	narrator	says,	
She	knew	the	Accents	to	be	the	same	she	had	often	heard	from	the	
Mouth	 of	 Ochihatou,	 when	 he	 had	 sollicited	 her	 for	 Marriage	 in	
Ijaveo,	 and	 who,	 at	 that	 time,	 had	 so	 disagreeable	 a	 Form,	 as	 to	
render	 all	 the	 fine	 things	 he	 said	 to	 her	 scarce	 to	 be	 endured.	 She	









Anti-Pamela	 (1741),	 writes,	 ‘Far	 from	 being	 a	 simple	 tale	 about	 the	 superficial	
dangers	 of	 being	 taken	 in	 by	 appearances,	 the	 novel	 demonstrates	 Haywood’s	
familiarity	 with	 contemporary	 scientific	 thought	 (à	 la	Locke,	 Berkeley,	 Newton)	
and	its	popular	currency’.33		
	 Haywood’s	 interest	 in	 optics	 is	 reflected	 in	 Ochihatou’s	 methods	 of	
deception	and	delusion	 since	Ochihatou	affects	what	people	 see	by	 changing	 the	
appearance	 of	 the	 objects	 themselves;	 the	 image	 and	 light	 of	 the	 magically	








Eovaai,	 however,	 is	 thwarted	when	Halafamai,	 a	 good	 Genii	who	 is	 the	 sister	 of	
Aiou,	 presents	 Eovaai	 with	 a	 magical	 ‘sacred	 telescope’	 that	 allows	 her	 to	 see	
things	as	they	truly	are.	Halafamai	appears	when	Eovaai	is	alone	and	still	aroused	
by	 the	 passion	 that	 nearly	 led	 to	 her	 complete	 seduction.	 Giving	 Eovaai	 the	
telescope,	Halafamai	says,		
All	Delusions	of	 the	Ypres	vanish	before	 this	 sacred	Telescope,	nor	
can	 even	 they	 themselves,	 invisible	 as	 they	 are	 to	 human	 Sight,	





says	 that	 all	 delusions	 ‘vanish’	when	one	 looks	 through	 it.	 Second,	when	 looking	
through	 the	 telescope,	 one	 can	 actually	 see	 the	 Ypres,	 which	 are	 normally	
unobserved	by	the	human	eye.	Third,	the	telescope	increases	the	light	surrounding	
the	 ‘visual	Ray’	so	that	the	rays	of	the	 images	can	be	seen	as	 if	 in	daylight.	When	
Eovaai	looks	through	the	telescope	at	Ochihatou	and	the	kingdom	of	Hypotofa,	she	
sees	 a	 disgusting,	 deformed	man	 ‘encompassed	with	 a	 thousand	 hideous	 Forms’	
and	a	land	that	is,	in	truth,	barren	rather	than	fruitful	and	luxurious.		
	 Significantly,	 in	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 story,	 Eovaai’s	 father’s	 ghost	 advises	
her,	 ‘Doubt	of	 all	 you	 see’,	 and	his	words	 seem	relevant	not	only	 for	Eovaai,	 but	
also	for	all	members	of	the	body	politic.	As	I	noted	in	my	analysis	of	A	Spy	Upon	the	
Conjurer,	 natural	 philosophers	 worried	 about	 the	 reliability	 of	 unaided	 sensory	






perceptions	 and	 the	 mind’s	 productions,	 an	 embracing	 of	 technology	 such	 as	
microscopes	and	air	pumps	as	a	way	of	remedying	these	flaws	of	the	self,	and	an	
interest	in	reconstructing	epistemology	and	communities	in	which	knowledge	was	
produced	 and	 validated’.34	For	 example,	 in	 the	 preface	 to	Micrographia	 (1665),	
Robert	 Hooke	 expresses	 concern	 about	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 senses,	 and	 he	
emphasizes	 the	 power	 of	 instruments—telescopes,	 microscopes,	 and	 other	
lenses—to	 rectify	 sensory	 failings.	 Joseph	Glanvill	 echoes	Hooke	 that	 same	 year,	
saying	about	telescopes,	 ‘What	success	and	informations	we	may	expect	from	the	
Advancements	 of	 this	 Instrument,	 it	 would	 perhaps	 appear	 Romantick	 and	
ridiculous	 to	 say;	 As,	 no	 doubt,	 to	 have	 talk’d	 of	 the	 spots	 on	 the	 Sun,	 and	 vast	
inequalities	 in	 the	 surface	 of	 the	Moon,	 and	 those	 other	 Telescopical	 certainties,	
before	 the	 Invention	 of	 that	 Glass	 would	 have	 been	 though	 phantastick	 and	
absurd’.35	There	 were	 some,	 however,	 like	 physicist	 Henry	 Stubbe,	 who	 were	
antagonists	 to	 the	 Royal	 Society	 and	 thought	 that	 such	 instrumentation	 and	
experimentation	undermined	our	God-given	senses	and	would	 lead	 ‘scientists’	 to	
believe	 ‘legends’	 and	 ‘falsehoods’,	 just	 as	 novels	 and	 romances	 do.36	Christopher	
Loar	 finds	 political	 significance	 in	 Eovaai’s	 telescope,	 saying	 that	 the	 ‘quasi-














Eovaai,	 making	 her	 worthy	 of	 rational	 citizenship’.37	Although	 I	 recognise	 the	
telescope’s	 potential	 political	 significance,	 my	 interest	 is	 more	 focused	 on	 its	
epistemological	power.	As	a	tool,	it	shows	Eovaai	the	truth.	In	fact,	in	the	entirety	
of	Eovaai,	 it	seems	to	be	the	only	reliable	method	for	discerning	truth.	One	might	
read	 the	 telescope	 as	 a	 figure	 of	 science	 and	 natural	 philosophy,	 thereby	
concluding	 that	 science	 is	 the	 solution	 to	 deception	 and	 epistemological	
challenges.	However,	the	fact	that	is	it	available	only	to	Eovaai	suggests	that	it	does	
not	represent	a	tool	or	method	that	can	help	the	citizenry	at	large.	In	fact,	in	some	
ways,	 the	 telescope	 potentially	 enhances	 scepticism	 by	making	more	 visible	 the	




	 Another	 central	 concern	 in	Eovaai	 relates	 to	 testimony	 and	 the	degree	 to	
which	one	can	trust	 the	words,	claims,	or	opinions	of	someone	else.	Eovaai	 faces	
this	 problem	 as	 soon	 as	 she	 is	with	Ochihatou,	who	 tries	 to	 convince	 her	 of	 the	
merits	 of	 libertinism	 and	 absolute	 sovereignty,	 both	 of	 which	 are	 concepts	 that	
compete	with	what	her	 father	has	 always	 taught	her.	 The	problem	 is	 intensified	
when	 she	 escapes	 from	 Ochihatou.	 After	 Halafamai	 gives	 Eovaai	 the	 magic	
telescope,	 she	 takes	Eovaai	away	 from	the	castle	 in	a	winged	chariot,	 setting	her	
down	in	a	barren	plain,	which	previously	had	appeared	to	Eovaai	as	a	lush,	green	
land	because	of	Ochihatou’s	spell.	On	the	barren	plain,	Eovaai	is	left	in	solitude	and	











had	 so	 readily	 imbibed	 from	 the	Mouth	 of	 Ochihatou’,	 and	 she	 laments	 that	 the	




statues	 and	 busts	 of	 ‘true	 Patriots’	 that	 she	 sees	 around	 her,	 while	 also	
immediately	 engaging	 her	 in	 a	 debate	 about	 the	 corruption	 of	monarchs,	 saying	
that	‘it	was	the	Business	of	True	Patriots	to	humble	the	Pride	of	Crowns,	not	wear	
them’	 (97).38 	As	 a	 queen,	 Eovaai	 defends	 monarchs	 who	 seek	 to	 secure	 the	
happiness	of	their	subjects:	‘I	always	thought,	said	she,	that	a	good	Prince	was	the	






castle	because	he	 is	not	 sure	 she	will	be	 fully	protected	 from	Ochihatou’s	magic.	












It	 would	 have	 been	 impossible	 for	 me,	 replied	 he,	 by	 any	 human	
Wisdom,	 to	 have	 escaped	 the	 many	 snares	 laid	 for	 my	 Life	 and	
Reputation,	 by	 that	 wicked	 Politician;	 but,	 from	 my	 youth,	 I	 have	
bent	my	whole	Application	to	the	Study	of	that	kind	of	Magick	which	




against	 the	corrupting	 forces	of	Ochihatou’s	magic,	and	they	 ‘avoid	the	Vices	and	
Follies	of	the	Times’	(101).	In	this	passage,	one	sees	further	signs	of	the	scepticism	









will	 have	 sufficient	 Occasion	 to	 make	 use	 of	 it,	 with	 People	 of	 all	
Professions	and	Degrees:	By	this	alone	you	can	be	able	to	distinguish	






Coward	 from	 the	 Brave,	 or	 the	 Foe	 from	 the	 pretended	 Friend.	By	
this	 alone	 you	 can	 be	 preserv’d	 from	 falling	 the	 Victim	 of	 Deceit,	
which	waits	 in	every	Shape,	and	every	State,	 to	 lure	 the	Unwary	to	
Perdition.	(95)40	
Both	 Halafamai	 and	 Alhahuza	 say	 that	 the	 only	 defence	 against	 deceit	 is	 good	




Halafamai	 and	 Alhahuza	 suggest	 that	 human	 wisdom	 is	 entirely	 insufficient	 for	
such	a	defence,	and	Eovaai’s	personal	experience	seems	to	suggest	the	same—that	
deception	 and	 delusion	 are	 inevitable	 and	 unpreventable.	 What	 is	 particularly	
striking	about	the	telescope,	as	Halafamai	describes	it,	is	that	it	not	only	prevents	
deception	of	 the	 senses;	 it	 also	prevents	against	deception	of	 the	mind.	 It	 allows	
one	 to	 distinguish	 between	 truth	 and	 falsehood	 of	 testimony.	 However,	 what	 it	
cannot	 do	 is	 make	 judgments.	 Regardless	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 one	 has	 accurate	
information	 or	 knows	 the	 honesty	 of	 someone’s	 testimony,	 even	 then,	 judgment	
can	be	difficult.	A	case	 in	point	 is	Eovaai’s	debate	with	 the	old	servant	about	 the	
merits	of	monarchy.	Even	without	deception,	such	debates	are	difficult	to	resolve.	
	 Haywood	makes	 a	 useful	 distinction	 between	perception,	 knowledge,	 and	
judgment	 in	 Book	 17	 of	 The	 Female	 Spectator,	 in	 which	 she	 also	 writes	 about	
Telescopes	 and	 ‘glasses’.	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 discusses	 the	 invention	 of	 such	
lenses,	along	with	the	gratitude	we	should	have	towards	Galileo,	Gassendi,	Newton,	







Earth	 to	 tread	 the	 starry	 regions,	 to	 become,	 as	 it	were,	 Inhabitants	 of	 the	 blue	
Expanse,	and	 travel	 through	an	 Infinity	of	Worlds,	 till	 then,	unknown,	unguessed	
at’.41	She	makes	 these	 comments	during	a	 conversation	about	 the	possibilities	of	
life	on	other	worlds,	while	on	a	group	outing	to	look	at	the	moon.	In	this	context,	
the	telescope	shows	them	things	‘unknown,	unguessed	at’,	but	what	they	see	raises	








this	 last	 statement,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 notes	 that	 even	 when	 sensory	
perceptions	are	accurate,	good	reasoning	and	 judgment	do	not	often	derive	 from	
them,	 and	Haywood	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 judgment	 is	 something	 other	 than	mere	
sensory	perception.	
	 Throughout	 her	 adventures,	 Eovaai	 is	 a	 faced	with	 competing	 arguments	
and	testimony,	and	she	must	determine	which	of	them	is	right,	which	one	carries	
the	 most	 authority.	 She	 has	 her	 father’s	 precepts,	 she	 has	 Ochihatou’s	 libertine	












Alhahuza’s	 call	 for	 forceful	 revolution.	 The	 problems	 she	 experiences	 of	
determining	whom	to	 trust,	whom	to	believe,	 and	which	system	 to	 follow	 is	one	
inherent	 to	 the	 public	 sphere.	 As	 Benjamin	 McMyler	 notes,	 testimony	 is	 a	 very	
social	form	of	knowledge-making;	it	requires	both	belief	in	what	someone	is	telling	
us,	 along	with	a	belief	 ‘in’	 the	person	doing	 the	 telling.43	In	order	 to	 rule,	Eovaai	
must	decide	what	to	believe	and	whom	to	believe	in.	Even	with	the	telescope,	her	
task	is	difficult.	Without	it,	the	task	is	nearly	impossible.		
	 The	 novel’s	 polyphonic	 framework	 invites	 (or	 coerces)	 the	 reader	 into	 a	
position	 similar	 to	 Eovaai’s,	 and	 the	 problem	 of	 testimony	 for	 the	 reader	 is	
significant.	Eovaai	begins	with	a	preface	 from	a	 fictional	Translator	who	gives	an	
account	of	 the	narrative,	 explaining	 that	 the	 ‘history’	 he	 is	 translating	 is	 a	 found	
text	from	a	civilization	and	language	that	existed	before	Adam,	and	as	he	gives	the	
account,	he	 focuses	heavily	on	questions	of	 testimony,	knowledge,	 and	 credulity,	
making	a	pre-emptive	effort	to	defend	against	readers’	likely	scepticism	about	the	
story.	 The	 Translator	 claims	 that	 the	 history	 has	 been	 translated	 from	 the	
‘Language	of	Nature’	 to	Chinese,	and	now,	he,	a	Chinese	man	 living	 in	London,	 is	
translating	it	into	English.	As	part	of	the	fiction,	footnotes	appear	on	almost	every	
page	 of	 the	 text,	 and	 in	 these	 notes	 the	 reader	 receives	 various	 types	 of	
commentary,	including	factual	and	editorial	notes	from	the	Translator,	references	
to	 interpretive	 disputes	 within	 the	 ‘Cabal’	 (the	 group	 of	 70	 philosophers	 who	
originally	translated	the	narrative	into	Chinese),	attitudes	of	the	rather	misogynist	
Commentator	 who	 annotated	 the	 Chinese	 edition,	 references	 to	 additional	








In	 short,	 the	 narrative	 is	 presented	 as	 being	 twice	 removed	 from	 an	 original	
language	 that	no	 longer	 exists	 and	about	which	 there	 is	much	dispute	 regarding	
meaning.	 The	 multiple	 voices	 in	 the	 text	 speak	 over	 each	 other	 and	 serve,	
paradoxically,	 both	 to	 inform	and	confuse	 the	 reader.	Earla	Wilputte	 argues	 that	
‘the	 notes	 become	 argumentative,	 contradictory,	 and	 lacking	 in	 authority’. 44	
Although	 I	 agree	 that	 the	 notes	 are	 contradictory	 and	 argumentative,	 I	 would	
revise	 her	 assessment	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 voices	 can	 be	 better	 described	 as	
competing	 in	authority	rather	than	‘lacking’	in	authority.	Consequently,	instead	of	
merely	 dismissing	 the	 voices,	 the	 reader	must	weigh	 and	 evaluate	 them.	 In	 this	
way,	the	footnotes	contribute	to	the	formation	of	the	novel	reader	and	the	process	
of	 interpretation	 that	 such	 reading	 requires,	 and	 they	also	mirror	 the	 competing	
political	voices	faced	by	Eovaai	or	any	individual,	whether	sovereign	or	subject.		
An	 example	 of	 the	 competing	 testimonies	 for	 readers	 can	 be	 found	 by	
juxtaposing	 the	 notes	 from	 the	 Translator	with	 the	 comments	 of	 the	misogynist	
Commentator.	 Of	 all	 of	 the	 voices,	 the	most	 scathing	 critiques	 of	 Eovaai,	 and	 of	




The	 Commentator	 will	 needs	 have	 it,	 that	 these	 Words	 imply	 a	
Vanity,	or	kind	of	Self-sufficiency	in	Eovaai;	and	infers	from	thence,	
that	 it’s	 an	 Error	 to	 trust	Women	with	 too	much	 Learning;	 as	 the	
Brain	in	that	Sex	being	of	a	very	delicate	Texture,	renders	them,	for	







the	 little	 they	 can	 possibly	 arrive	 at	 the	 knowledge	 of,	 with	 the	
Infinity	of	what	is	beyond	their	reach.	But	as	an	old	Man,	and	as	rigid	
a	Philosopher	as	he	was,	I	am	apt	to	think,	he	wou’d	have	spared	this	
Part	 of	 his	 Adnimadversions	 had	 he	 been	 honour’d	 with	 the	
Acquaintance	of	some	European	Ladies.	(57)	
In	 this	 note,	 which	 raises	 issues	 of	 gender,	 knowledge,	 and	 autonomy,	 the	
Translator	both	paraphrases	and	challenges	the	Commentator’s	notes	to	the	text.	
The	 juxtaposition	of	 the	 two	attitudes—along	with	 the	potential	 irony	of	 the	 last	




vanity	 and	 libertinism.	 In	 this	 instance,	 the	 Translator	 again	 paraphrases	 the	
Commentator,	 saying	 that	 the	 relevant	 passage	 from	 the	 text	 ‘gives	 the	
Commentator	 an	 Opportunity	 of	 exerting	 his	 usual	 Severity:	 He	 makes	 a	 long	
Dissertation,	 to	 prove	 Vanity	 is	 so	much	 a	 part	 of	Woman,	 that	 tho’	 Precepts	 of	
Education	may	prevent	its	Appearance	for	a	long	time,	it	will	sooner	or	later	burst	
into	 a	 Blaze;	 and	 often,	 on	 the	 most	 trifling	 Encouragement’	 (73).	 This	 time,	
however,	 the	 Translator	 makes	 no	 challenge	 to	 the	 Commentator’s	 claims.	 He	
merely	 follows	 this	 first	 note	 with	 an	 additional	 footnote	 admitting	 that	 the	
passage	is	fairly	damning,	and	that	he	might	have	excluded	it	 if	such	an	omission	
would	not	deem	him	‘unfair’.	With	this,	the	Translator	tries	to	assert	himself	as	a	
fair-minded	 source	 and,	 therefore,	 a	 credible	 authority,	 but	 he	 also	 leaves	 the	






voice,	 but	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 the	 instability	 of	 the	 text	 itself	 overwhelms	 the	
chance	for	his	voice	to	finalize	the	reader’s	interpretation.45	Therefore,	the	space	of	
interpretive	possibility	invites	the	reader	be	a	final	judge.	Wilputte	has	noted	this	
position	 of	 the	 reader,	 stating	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 novel	 ‘makes	 the	 reader	
suspicious	 of	 the	 Authorities’	 and	 that	 ‘[w]ithout	 any	 final	 authority	 figure	 to	
interpret	the	events	and	editorial	comments	for	her,	the	reader	is	left	to	form	her	
own	 opinions	 rather	 than	 accept	 the	 representations	 offered	 by	 these	 men,	
authors,	and	politicians’.46		She	says	that,	in	fact,	 ‘it	is	the	reader,	the	final	voyeur,	
who	 possesses	 the	 real	 power,	 being	 in	 a	 position	 to	 view	 all	 of	 the	 action’.47	
Although	 I	 agree	 that	 Haywood’s	 novel	 places	 interpretive	 authority	 with	 the	
reader,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 Wilputte’s	 conclusion	 overstates	 the	 power	 of	 the	
reader	and	understates	the	burden	and	anxiety	that	is	placed	upon	her.	Essentially,	
the	text	is	performing	for	the	reader	the	same	kind	of	heteroglossia	experienced	by	
Eovaai.	To	say	 that	 the	reader	 is	 the	 ‘final	voyeur	who	possesses	 the	real	power’	
neglects	the	crisis	of	judgment	that	creates	anxiety	for	both	Eovaai	and	the	reader.		
	 Sarah	 Tindal	 Kareem’s	 Eighteenth-Century	 Fiction	 and	 the	 Reinvention	 of	
Wonder	 explores	 ‘the	 interplay	 between	 credulity	 and	 skepticism’	 in	 eighteenth-
century	 fiction,	 but	 she,	 too,	 gives	 little	 attention	 to	 the	 anxiety	 created	 by	 this	
‘interplay’;	instead,	she	focuses	on	the	‘cognitive	uncertainty’	(or	‘indeterminacy’)	














degree	 of	 epistemological	 anxiety	 because	 of	 the	 uncertainty	
regarding	 fiction’s	 protocols,	 and	 yet	 each	 work	 models	 ways	 in	





(who	 is	 not	 studied	 by	 Kareem)	 contributes	 significantly	 to	 that	 aesthetic.	




to	 make	 meaning.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 quite	 important	 that	 suspension	 of	 disbelief	 and	




are	 to	make	meaning	 from	 the	 text.	 In	 Kareem’s	 attention	 to	 the	 suspension	 of	
disbelief,	 she	 neglects	 the	 anxiety	 that	 readers	 experience	 from	 an	 inability	 to	
judge	 even	 when	 they	 must	 do	 so.	 Kareem	 suggests	 that	 uncertainty	 creates	







however,	 that	 in	 genre-blending	 work	 like	 Haywood’s,	 the	 two	 are	 not	 always	
mutually	 exclusive.	 Although	 there	 is	 certainly	 pleasure	 related	 to	 the	




Grafton,	 in	 his	 book,	 The	 Footnote:	 A	 Curious	 History,	 writes	 about	 how	 the	
footnote,	as	it	was	used	in	texts	by	Enlightenment	authors	(especially	those	writing	
about	 history	 and	 philosophy),	 captured	 the	 difficulty	 of	 determining	 truth,	
particularly	in	relationship	to	testimony	and	knowledge.	He	says,	
All	 authors	 who	 addressed	 controversial	 questions	 in	 the	 years	
around	 1700	 knew	 that	 they	 were	 entering	 minefields:	 footnotes	
naturally	 appealed	 to	 many	 of	 those	 who	 discussed	 historical	 and	
philological	 topics	 as	 the	 best	 way	 to	 protect	 themselves	 against	
hidden	and	overt	attack.	But	other	social	and	cultural	conditions	also	
helped	 to	 make	 intellectuals	 self-conscious	 about	 the	 problems	 of	




implausible?	 Any	 intellectual	 of	 the	 late	 seventeenth	 century	





authority—and	 had	 to	 devise	 protocols	 for	 providing	 assurances	
that	could	quell	the	doubts	of	skeptical	readers.50	
The	Translator	in	Eovaai,	in	his	Preface	and	throughout	the	text,	demonstrates	the	
same	kind	of	 self-conscious	authority	 that	Grafton	describes,	 and	 the	polyphonic	
footnotes,	 for	 Haywood’s	 readers,	 raise	 the	 same	 questions	 of	 authority	 that	
Grafton	poses	in	the	passage	above.	By	making	this	observation,	I	aim	to	connect	
Eovaai	 to	the	Enlightenment	genres,	especially	history,	 from	which	it	borrows	its	
apparatus.	 To	 do	 so	 usefully	 complicates	 the	 genre	 of	 Eovaai	 even	 further	 by	
reading	it	as	a	mock-history.	Haywood’s	interest	in	the	epistemology	of	history	is	
also	 supported	Rivka	 Swenson’s	 essay	 about	Haywood’s	 ‘secret	history’	 of	Mary,	
Queen	of	Scots,	a	text	that	Swenson	claims	is	‘partly	an	epistemological	critique	of	
[the]	historical	discourse	it	deconstructs’.51			
	 Of	 course,	 historical	 and	 philosophical	 texts	were	 not	 the	 only	 ones	with	
footnotes.	 In	 fact,	Grafton	says	 that	 footnotes	 ‘spread	rapidly’	 among	eighteenth-
century	 historiographers	 in	 part	 because	 they	were	 already	 ‘trendy	 in	 fiction’.52	
Alexander	 Pope’s	 Dunciad	 Variorum	 (1729)	 is	 full	 of	 footnotes,	 and	 Henry	
Fielding’s	Tragedy	of	Tragedies	 (1731),	 later	 adapted	 in	 1733	 by	 Eliza	Haywood	
and	William	Hatchett	 into	the	Opera	of	Operas,	contains	margin	notes	throughout	














‘Haywood’s	 sophisticated	 metafictional	 use	 of	 [footnotes]	 at	 least	 matches	 and	
perhaps	 exceeds	 the	 skills	 of	 her	 rivals,	 providing	 actual	 literary	 criticism	 in	 a	
fictionalized	 form	 rather	 than	 sinking	 to	 the	 level	 of	 petulant	 name-calling	 and	
personal	 attacks’.53	I	 would	 extend	 Last’s	 claim	 to	 conclude	 that	 not	 only	 do	




France	 to	 a	 Protestant	 family.	 After	 a	 conversion	 to	 Catholicism	 and	 then	 a	 re-
conversion	back	to	Protestantism,	he	eventually	went	to	Holland,	where	he	served	
as	a	lecturer	and	pursued	his	scholarship	in	Rotterdam.	In	1697,	he	published	his	





more	 lengthy	 than	 the	entries	 themselves,	 and	which	explore	and	attack	various	
theories	and	stories	 from	every	possible	angle	and	direction.	For	example,	 in	his	
entry	 on	 the	 biblical	 David,	 Bayle	 tells	 the	 story	 of	 David	 and	 summarizes	 the	












citation	after	engaging	 in	 sustained	 reflection	and	debate.	Footnotes	mattered	 to	




facts—and	 have	 interpreted	 the	 swarming	 irreverencies	 of	 his	 footnotes	 as	 a	
massive	 effort	 to	 subvert	 all	 certainties’.57	In	her	 study	on	 scepticism,	Eve	Tavor	
Bannet	 notes	 that	 the	 eighteenth-century	 novel	 shared	 structures	 and	 narrative	
strategies	 with	 sceptical	 non-fiction	 histories	 like	 Bayle’s	 and	 like	 Mandeville’s	
Fable	of	the	Bees.	Although	Haywood’s	references	to	Mandeville	have	been	noted,	
the	potential	influence	of	Bayle	has	gone	unremarked.58	
	 Haywood	was	 familiar	 with	 Bayle’s	Dictionary,	 which	was	 republished	 in	
the	few	years	just	before	Eovaai.	In	Book	15	of	The	Female	Spectator	(1744-46),	as	
the	 periodical’s	 eidolon	 recommends	 valuable	 reading	 for	 ladies,	 she	 refers	 to	
Bayle’s	Dictionary,	calling	it	a	 ‘Library	in	 itself’,	and	saying,	 ‘Those	who	read	only	
this	cannot	be	call’d	 Ignorant’,	and	she	makes	a	similar	reference	 in	The	Invisible	
Spy. 59 	Haywood’s	 knowledge	 of	 Bayle’s	 Dictionary,	 combined	 with	 the	 mock-
historical	framework	of	Eovaai,	suggests	that	that	her	footnotes	might	have	a	more	














genre—are	 connected	 to	 scholarship,	 history,	 and	 questions	 about	 reliability	 of	
evidence.	As	a	result,	even	before	Haywood’s	readers	actually	read	her	narrative,	




Lettres	 d’une	 Peruvienne	 (1747). 60 	Published	 later	 than	 Haywood’s	 Eovaai,	
Graffigny’s	 fictional	 work	 is	 clearly	 not	 an	 influence	 on	 Haywood’s	 Eovaai,	 but	
Wolfgang’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 scholarly	 framework	 in	 Graffigny’s	 Lettres	 highlights	
elements	of	Haywood’s	work	 that	have	not	been	sufficiently	examined.	Wolfgang	
writes,	
By	 inscribing	 the	genre	of	 scholarly	annotation	 into	her	 fiction,	 the	
author	links	her	work	to	a	specifically	male	tradition	of	erudition	.	.	.	.	
The	 prominence	 of	 Graffigny’s	 textual	 references	 strongly	 suggests	
that	 the	 author	 wished	 to	 situate	 her	 novel	 within	 a	 tradition	 of	
literature	and	philosophical	thinking	as	well	as	within	a	tradition	of	
amorous	discourse.61	
Like	Graffigny’s	Lettres,	Eovaai	 echoes	 a	 ‘male	 tradition	of	 erudition’,	 one	 that	 is	
concerned	 with	 reliability	 of	 testimony	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 authority	 that	 often	
manifests	in	the	type	of	scholarly	apparatus	used	in	Eovaai.	Haywood’s	use	of	this	
apparatus	 should	 lead	 us	 to	 ‘situate’	 	 Haywood’s	 text	 within	 the	 traditions	 of	














to	 place	 blame	 squarely	 on	 their	 shoulders.	 	 For	 example,	 shortly	 after	 Eovaai’s	
conversation	 with	 Alhahuza,	 she	 is	 allowed	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 audience	 at	 ‘The	
Harangue	of	Alhahuza	to	the	Populace	of	Hypotofa’—a	speech	in	which	Alhahuza	
encourages	 a	 crowd	 of	 Hypotofan	 citizens	 to	 forcefully	 rebel	 against	 Ochihatou.	
But	before	he	provokes	action,	he	chastises	the	citizens	for	their	own	failings:	
Examine	yourselves.	–	Look	back	on	your	past	Conduct,	and	attone	
for	 it	 by	 the	 future.	 –Your	 Oppressors	 laugh	 at	 your	 Misery,	 and	
when	 you	 ask	 redress,	 are	 not	 ashamed	 to	 tell	 you,	 that	 if	 you	are	
undone	 it	 is	 by	 your	 own	 Act	 and	 Deed;	 they	 tell	 ye	 Truth,	 Oh	
Hypotofans!	 For	 which	 of	 you	 has	 not,	 for	 a	 shew	 of	 private	
Advantage,	consented	to	give	up	Publick-Good?	–	Which	of	you	has	
not	 been	 a	 Factor	 for	 his	 own	 Slavery,	 and	 that	 of	 his	 Posterity?	 –
Which	 of	 you	 has	 not	 been	 corrupted	 by	 the	 Gold	 of	 Ochihatou?	
(104)62		
To	 this	 passage,	 the	 Translator	 adds	 a	 footnote,	 saying,	 ‘The	 Commentator	
observes	from	this,	that	the	Hypotofans	must	have	been	naturally	a	mean-spirited	
People,	 to	 brook	 so	bare-faced	 and	 impudent	 an	 Insult,	 as	 this	mention’d	by	 the	







Patriot	 (Alhahuza),	 but	 it	 is	 affirmed	 by	 him.	 He	 accuses	 his	 people	 of	 pursuing	
their	own	interests	at	 the	expense	of	 the	public	good.	 It	seems	strange,	however,	
that	this	 ‘insult’	comes	so	closely	on	the	heels	of	Alhahuza’s	claim	that	no	human	
wisdom	 could	 defend	 against	 Ochihatou	 and	 the	 oppressors.	 If	 delusion	 is	
inevitable,	how	can	the	victims	of	such	deception	be	blamed?	The	insult	is	similar	
to	 those	 that	 Cupid	 levels	 at	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 The	 Certain	 Island	 Adjacent	 to	
Utopia	who	are	also	deluded	by	a	necromancer.	
Haywood’s	 attack	 on	 collective	 delusion	 (along	with	Alhahuza’s	 attack	 on	
the	citizens	of	Hypotofa)	might	 seem	to	 impose	an	unfair	double	bind—deeming	
individuals	unable	 to	discern	 truth	and	resist	deception,	yet	also	suggesting	 they	
are	responsible	for	doing	so.	By	creating	this	double	bind,	Haywood	perseverates	
on	 the	 crisis	 of	 judgment	 faced	 by	 the	modern	 individual.	 Specifically,	 Haywood	
shines	 a	 light	 on	 the	 Cartesian	 elephant	 still	 lurking	 in	 the	 room	 of	
Enlightenment—that	 elephant	 being	 the	 role	 that	 deception	 plays	 in	 any	
epistemological	process.	In	fact,	Haywood’s	necromancers,	in	many	ways,	perform	
the	role	of	 the	Cartesian	Evil	Genius	or	Evil	Demon	who	 is,	as	Descartes	says,	 ‘as	
clever	 and	 deceitful	 as	 he	 is	 powerful,	 who	 has	 directed	 his	 entire	 effort	 to	
misleading	me’.63	This	is	why	Descartes	(as	I	noted	in	chapter	one)	argues	that	one	
must	be	hesitant	to	move	from	perception	to	belief	and	that,	when	we	err,	the	fault	
is	 our	 own.	 Haywood’s	 texts	 remind	 her	 readers	 that	 they	 are	 surrounded	 by	
deceptive	 monsters—political	 and	 otherwise—and,	 as	 such,	 they	 must	 increase	
their	defences	against	such	deception,	lest	they,	themselves,	become	monstrous.		
Alhahuza,	 then,	 along	with	Haywood,	 is	 addressing	 two	different	 kinds	 of	








Ochihatou’s	 deception	 is	 all	 the	 more	 effective	 because	 of	 the	 citizens’	 self-
deception	 that	 stems	 from	 their	 self-interest	 or	 ‘partiality’.	 The	 significance	 of	
partiality—and	 its	 opposite,	 impartiality—are	 made	 clear	 when	 Alhahuza	
recommends	that	Eovaai	seek	refuge	from	Ochihatou	in	a	republic	called	Oozoff,	a	
name	which,	 according	 to	 the	 Translator,	 ‘engag’d	 the	 Cabal	 in	 a	Dispute,	which	
took	 up	 five	 Moons.	 Some	 would	 have	 it	Wisdom,	 but	 the	 Majority	 were	 of	 the	
opinion	that	Impartiality	came	nearer	the	Meaning’	(108).	Alhahuza	says	that,	 ‘no	
wicked	 Magick	 was	 ever	 of	 any	 force	 against	 it’	 (108).	 This	 comment,	 when	
contrasted	with	 his	 earlier	 statement	 about	 the	 insufficiency	 of	 human	wisdom,	
suggests	that,	even	more	than	wisdom,	impartiality	is	the	greatest	defence	against	
deceptive	 political	 influence	 and,	 conversely,	 that	 self-interest	 leaves	 one	




Alhahuza	 suggests	 that	without	 impartiality,	 individuals	 engage	 in	 selfish,	
wishful	 thinking,	 and	 the	 events	 of	 Eovaai	 suggest	 the	 same.	 And	 when	 the	
narrator	 comments	 on	 the	 corruption	 of	 Eovaai’s	 reason,	 he	 says	 that	 ‘there	
requires	but	few	Arguments	to	convince	us	of	what	we	wish’	(77).	Falling	prey	to	
this	corruption	leads	to	what	is	often	called	‘false	consciousness’.	As	Kathryn	King	
says,	 ‘The	 seduction	 of	 Eovaai	 operates	 at	 many	 layers	 of	 implication:	 the	
seduction	of	a	woman,	of	a	monarch,	and	an	entire	people—a	country	brought,	or	







ministers	 and	 at	 the	 highest	 level,	 by	Walpole’.65	King	 grounds	 her	 discussion	 of	
‘false	 consciousness’	 in	 the	 work	 of	 J.	 G.	 A.	 Pocock,	 whose	 discussion	 of	 ‘false	
consciousness’	is,	to	a	large	degree,	grounded	in	themes	from	Cato’s	Letters	(1720-




it	 issues	 in	corruption.	Men	who	 live	by	 fantasies	are	manipulated	by	other	men	
who	 rule	 through	 them’.66	Trenchard	 and	 Gordon,	 who	 published	 Cato’s	 Letters	
between	 1720-1723,	 make	 it	 clear	 that	 self-interest	 or	 ‘self-love’	 is	 a	 common	
cause	 of	 such	 fantasies	 that	 lead	 to	 false	 consciousness	 or	 delusion.	 In	 letter	
number	six,	for	example,	they	say,	‘No	experience	or	sufferings	can	cure	the	world	
of	its	credulity.	.	.	.	Self-love	beguiles	men	into	false	hopes,	and	they	will	venture	to	
incur	 a	 hundred	 probable	 evils,	 to	 catch	 one	 possible	 good;	 nay,	 they	 run	
frequently	 into	 distracting	 pains	 and	 expences,	 to	 gain	 advantages	 which	 are	
purely	 imaginary,	and	utterly	 impossible’.67	And	 in	 letter	number	 thirty	 they	say,	
‘Of	all	 the	passions	which	belong	to	human	nature,	self-love	 is	 the	strongest,	and	
the	root	of	all	the	rest;	or,	rather,	all	the	different	passions	are	only	several	names	
for	 the	several	operations	of	self-love’.68	They	also	admit,	however,	 that	such	self	















people	would	 constantly	 be	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 truth	 and	 liberty,	were	 it	 not	 for	
external	delusion	and	external	force’.69	The	false	consciousness	of	the	Hypotofans	
is	 the	 result	 of	 both	 the	 external	 delusion	 by	 Ochihatou	 and	 the	 self-deceptive	
partiality	of	 the	citizens.	Thus,	Alhahuza	affirms	 that	 ‘it	 is	by	 [their]	own	act	and	
deed’	 that	 they	 are	 ‘undone’	 while,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 affirming	 that	 no	 human	




the	 entire	 project	 of	 the	 social	 contract.	 Essentially,	 Haywood	 is	 questioning	 all	
systems	of	 government—not	 just	 one	party	or	 another—and	none	of	 them	 truly	
survive	 her	 scepticism.	 How	 can	 they,	 when	 none	 of	 the	 systems	 eradicate	 the	
problems	 of	 perception,	 testimony,	 and	partiality	 that	 threaten	 both	monarchies	
and	 republics?	 Haywood	 suggests,	 then,	 that	 the	 individual’s	 commitment	 to	
impartiality	and	a	sceptical	position	is	the	only	defence	against	deception	from	self	
or	other,	thus	echoing	Pierre	Bayle	who	claimed	that,	in	his	work,	he	attempted	to	
‘compare	 the	arguments	 for	and	against	 something,	with	all	 the	 impartiality	of	 a	
















A	 passage	 from	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 is	 particularly	 indicative	 of	 the	
implications	of	collective	delusion	for	the	issues	of	autonomy	and	consent.	In	Book	
19	of	that	publication,	the	Female	Spectator	includes	a	letter	depicting	a	travel	tale	
about	 an	 island	 called	Topsy-Turvy.	This	 island,	we	are	 told,	 is	 	 ‘governed	by	 its	
own	Laws’	but	‘is	an	Appendix	to	a	great	Monarch	on	the	Continent’,	who	‘flatters	
[his	 subjects]	with	 a	 Shew	of	 Liberty’	 but	whom,	 if	 opposed,	would	 ‘come	down	
with	 Fire	 and	 Sword,	 and	 lay	 the	 whole	 Country	 to	 waste’.72	Supposedly,	 in	 the	
past,	the	islanders	would	rise	up	‘against	rulers	who	‘dar’d	to	exceed	the	Bounds	a	
good	 Magistrate	 ought	 to	 observe’,	 but	 that	 in	 recent	 times,	 a	 new	 Vice-Roy,	
Hiamack,	has	taken	over	the	island	and	‘infatuated’	its	people	by	inviting	them	all	
to	a	banquet	at	which	he	serves	magic	food.73	We	are	told	that	those	who	eat	at	the	
banquet—along	 with	 their	 descendants—‘should	 be	 deprived	 of	 all	 Power	 of	
judging	 for	 themselves;	 of	 distinguishing	 between	 what	 is	 in	 their	 Interest,	 and	
what	is	not;	and	in	fine,	from	that	Time	forward	become	dead	to	all	Sense	of	what	
they	were,	or	what	they	ought	to	be’.74		
When	 Haywood	 says	 that	 individuals	 who	 are	 deprived	 of	 the	 power	 of	
judgment	‘become	dead	to	all	Sense	of	what	they	were,	or	what	they	ought	to	be’,	
she	 raises	 questions	 about	 subjective	 agency	 and	 the	problem	of	 consent	within	
the	 body	 politic	 of	 a	 liberal	 government.	 If	 the	 people	 are	 ‘dead’,	 how	 can	 they	
serve	their	role	in	a	republic	or	even	in	a	constitutional	monarchy?	In	short,	they	
can’t.	 They	 become	 a	 ‘deluded	Multitude’	 under	 the	 power	 of	 their	master	 and,	









deludes	 them.	The	citizens	of	Hypotofa	have	been	stripped	of	 (or	have	 forfeited)	
their	 humanity	 in	 that	 they	 are	 unable	 to	 reason	 effectively.	Without	 reasoning	
minds,	 they	 cannot	 serve	 as	participatory,	 consenting	 subjects.	 In	his	 ‘harangue’,	
Alhahuza	says	that	the	people	of	Hypotofa	have	‘consented	to	give	up	Publick-Good’	
for	 the	 sake	 of	 private	 Advantage’,	 but	 his	 accusation	 raises	 a	 question	 about	
whether	 or	 not	 such	 consent	 truly	 can	 be	 offered	 by	 those	 who	 are	 deluded	
(104).75	
These	 problems	 of	 autonomy	 and	 consent	 in	 the	 face	 of	 deception	 and	
epistemological	oppression	have	 roots	 in	 amatory	 fiction	by	Haywood	and	other	
writers.	It	is	a	common	trope,	of	course,	for	desire	to	cloud	the	reason	of	lovers	in	
amatory	 fiction.	 In	Aphra	Behn’s	The	History	of	the	Nun;	or,	The	Fair	Vow-Breaker	
(1689),	 Isabella	 even	 wonders	 if	 her	 passion	 is	 the	 result	 of	 magic.	 About	 her	
lover’s	effects	on	her,	she	says,	‘[A]t	first,	I	thought	the	Youth	had	some	Magick	Art,	
to	make	one	faint	and	tremble	at	his	touches’,	and	later	in	the	text	love	is	compared	



















Fantomina	 and	 Beauplaisir.	 In	 fact,	 Beauplaisir	 is	 relieved	 of	 all	 contractual	
responsibility	 for	 his	 child	 because	 Fantomina’s	 mother	 concludes	 that	 because	
Fantomina	 disguised	 herself	whenever	 they	met,	 he	 did	 not	 knowingly	 have	 sex	
with	her	daughter.	
John	Kramnick	 takes	 up	 the	 problem	of	 consent	 as	 an	 element	 of	Love	 in	
Excess	 (1719)	 and	 of	 Fantomina	 (1725).	 His	 concern	 is	 the	 distinction	 between	
explicit	 consent	 and	 tacit	 consent,	 the	 latter	 of	which	 is	 often	 the	 kind	 given	 by	
subjects	of	a	government.	Kramnick	considers	tacit	consent	as	it	relates	to	‘theory	
of	 mind’—the	 process	 of	 interpreting	 internal	 states	 of	 mind	 from	 observing	
external	actions	and	statements.	Kramnick	states	 that	 ‘in	order	 to	know	whether	
someone	has	 consented,	 one	must	 understand	what	 someone	 is	 thinking,	 and	 in	
order	[to]	get	a	sense	of	what	someone	is	thinking,	one	needs	to	examine	closely	
what	 someone	 is	 doing’.78	Interestingly,	 although	 Haywood	 explores	 what	 we	
would	now	call	‘theory	of	mind’	in	many	of	her	texts	(along	with	its	connections	to	
knowledge	 and	 judgment,	 especially	 in	 private	 matters),	 inferences	 about	
cognitive	 states	 function	 differently	 in	 Eovaai	 than	 in	 most	 of	 her	 other	 fiction.	
Essentially,	 in	 Eovaai,	 the	 entire	 process	 of	 ‘theory	 of	 mind’	 is	 corrupted	 by	
Ochihatou.	Everyone	misinterprets	his	 intentions	 and	 the	meaning	of	his	 actions	
because	of	the	spells	he	casts.	Haywood	is	certainly	interested	in	the	intersection	
of	individual	‘theory	of	mind’	and	deceit	(as	I	will	discuss	in	detail	in	chapter	four),	
but	 in	Eovaai,	Haywood	seems	more	 interested	 in	 large	scale,	 collective	delusion	
and	 how	 it	 prohibits	 access	 to	 political	 knowledge	 and	 one’s	 own	 power	 of	














Letters	 and	Manley’s	New	Atalantis).	As	Kathryn	King	 says,	 ‘Eovaai	 continues	 the	
analysis	 of	 power-seeking	 that	 Haywood	 began	 in	 the	 seduction	 fictions	 of	 the	
twenties’	(83).	She	also	notes	that	 ‘Ochihatou	hopes	to	wrest	“full	consent”’	 from	
Eovaai79;	 however,	 such	 a	 desire	 seems	 paradoxical.	 To	 what	 degree	 can	 one	
‘wrest’	 full	 consent?	Haywood	 foregrounds	 that	question	 throughout	Eovaai	 as	 it	
relates	to	both	sexual	and	political	consent.		
	 Christopher	 Loar	 recognises	 Haywood’s	 concern	 for	 autonomy	 in	Eovaai,	
and	 he	 argues	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 Eovaai’s	 experiences	 is	 to	 help	 her	 become	
‘autonomous’	and	‘mature’.	He	notes	that,	at	the	beginning	of	the	narrative,	Eovaai	
is	neither	of	these	things	because,	though	she	has	been	educated,	her	education	is	
based	merely	 on	 precepts	 presented	 by	 her	 ‘father’s	 command’.80	Loar	 suggests	
that	her	 ‘extralegal’	period	 in	Hypotofa	 is	 ‘necessary	 for	her	eventual	 return	 to	a	
new	 constitutional	 order’,	 and	 that	 ‘Eovaai’s	 character,	 in	 order	 to	 become	
autonomous	 and	 not	merely	 obedient,	must	 first	 be	 shaped	 by	 outside	 forces’.	81	
Loar,	 however,	 does	 not	 sufficiently	 consider	 the	 difficulty	 of	 achieving	 the	














effective	 in	 practice,	 it	must	 not	 be	 impeded	by	 interfering	 conditions.	 Coercion,	
deception,	 and	manipulation	 by	 others	 are	 the	 paradigm	 examples	 of	 conditions	
that	interfere	with	the	practical	effectiveness	of	someone’s	self-reflection’.83	These	
interfering	conditions	are	all	at	work	in	Eovaai.	Ochihatou’s	magic	strips	Eovaai	of	
her	 ability	 to	 self-reflect	 and	 function	 autonomously,	 and	 it	 also	 strips	 the	
residents	 of	Hypotofa,	 including	 the	 king,	 of	 autonomy.	Without	 such	 autonomy,	
there	 can	 be	 no	 consent,	 and	 the	 social	 contract	 is	 destabilized	 if	 not	 totally	
undone.	




her	 self-command	 a	 ‘technology-enhanced	 rationality’.84	I	 would	 use	 different	
terms,	however.	It	is	not	so	much	Eovaai’s	rationality	that	has	been	enhanced.	The	
telescope	does	not	enhance	her	actual	powers	of	reasoning;	rather,	it	corrects	her	
perceptions,	 allowing	 her	 to	 see	 and	 know	 reality	 when	 it	 differs	 from	
appearances.	Once	those	perceptions	are	corrected,	however,	she	must	still	use	her	










telescope	 is	 not	 much	 help	 to	 her	 with	 such	 decisions,	 as	 is	 evident	 from	 her	
confusion	after	her	visit	with	Alhahuza.	Therefore,	one	might	say	that	the	telescope	
does	not,	as	Loar	says,	 ‘impart	 judgment’,	but	rather	 it	 imparts	knowledge.	These	
distinctions	might	seem	like	minor	semantic	points,	but	they	are	not.	By	failing	to	
make	 the	 distinction,	 Loar	 neglects	 the	 degree	 to	which	Haywood	 demonstrates	
the	difficulty	of	effective	self-reflection	and	proper	judgment,	and	he	short-circuits	
judgment	in	one	of	the	ways	that	Vivasvan	Soni	identifies.85	The	telescope	reveals	
the	 truth	 about	 Ochihatou,	 and	 the	 discovery	 of	 truth	 behind	 deception	 is	
necessary	for	self-determination	or	‘self-command’	as	Loar	terms	it,	but	it	certainly	
is	 not	 sufficient.	 Eovaai	must	 also	 find	 her	way	 through	 coercion,	manipulation,	
and	 other	 negative	 outside	 forces	 (including	 physical	 force,	 as	 one	 sees	 when	
Ochihatou	abducts	her	for	a	second	time).	In	addition,	Eovaai	must	figure	out	how	





	 Haywood	 also	 implies	 another	 threat	 to	 autonomy:	 the	 instability	 of	 the	
self.	 Friedman	 speaks	 at	 length	 about	 the	 fact	 that	 for	 autonomy	 to	 be	 present,	
there	 needs	 to	 be	 a	 self,86	but	 as	 Karen	 Bloom	Gevirtz	 notes,	 the	 concept	 of	 the	
fixed	 self	 was	 still	 developing	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 late	 seventeenth-	 and	 early	










finds	 significant	 evidence	 that	 selves	 are	 not	 always	 fixed	 and	 stable,	 and,	
therefore,	neither	are	kingdoms.		
	 Although	Eovaai	 is	 understandably	duped	by	 a	 powerful	magician—along	
with	the	king	and	his	other	subjects—one	cannot	say	that,	by	the	conclusion	of	the	
novel,	 Eovaai	 has	 reached	 the	 ‘maturity’	 that	 Loar	 says	 she	 is	meant	 to	 achieve.	




	 Earla	Wilputte	 claims	 that	Eovaai	 has	 a	 ‘blatantly	 artificial’	 happy	 ending	
saying	 that	 ‘such	 a	 conclusion	 is	 unrealistic	 and	Haywood	 knows	 that;	 however,	
[Haywood]	 also	 feels	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 make	 it	 real	 by	 challenging	 the	
authorities	and	their	empty	rhetoric’.89	I	would	argue,	however,	that	the	instability	
of	individuals	and	politics	in	the	text—the	‘multiguity’	of	the	text,	to	use	Eve	Tavor	
Bannet’s	 term—precludes	 such	 an	 interpretation.	 Bannet	 says	 that	 the	 sceptic’s	
‘method	 is	 basically	 pyrrhonic,	 polyphonic:	 he	 creates	 structures,	 situations,	
characters	 or	 arguments	 in	 which	 customary	 ideas	 show	 up	 each	 others’	















determine,	 multiple	 voices	 compete	 for	 authority,	 and	 the	 merits	 and	 flaws	 of	
republicanism	and	constitutional	monarchy	are	juxtaposed	in	debates	that	have	no	
clear	winner.	The	questionable	status	of	 the	ending	also	seems	confirmed	by	 the	
title	 page	 of	 the	 publication,	 which	 says	 the	 text	 is	 ‘[i]nterspersed	 with	 a	 great	
Number	 of	 remarkable	Occurrences,	which	 happened,	 and	may	again	happen,	 to	
several	 Empires,	 Kingdoms,	 Republicks,	 and	 particular	 Great	Men’	 (41).91	At	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 narrative,	 the	 kingdom	 of	 Ijaveo	 is	 stable,	 but	 it	 very	 quickly	
descends	into	civil	war.	Almost	as	quickly,	Eovaai	becomes	a	libertine	who	believes	
in	 the	 ‘arbitrary	 sway’	 of	 kings.	 The	 title	 page	 and	 the	 plot	 both	 suggest	 an	
instability	of	selves	and	politics.	Patricia	Springborg	notes	that	the	social	contract	
of	 the	 Enlightenment	 was	 a	 response	 to	 ‘the	 dynastic	 instability	 of	 hereditary	
monarchy	founded	on	patrilineality’.92	Haywood’s	text,	however,	suggests	that	the	
social	 contract	 of	 liberal	 government—because	 of	 various	 threats	 to	 autonomy,	
consent,	and	power—is	also	unstable.	This	instability	is	reflected	in	both	the	plot	
















force.	 Before	 Eovaai’s	 father	 dies,	 he	 urges	 her	 not	 to	 lose	 the	 amulet—to	 let	
‘neither	Force	nor	Fraud	 .	 .	 .	 deprive	 [her]	of	 this	 Sacred	Treasure’	 (56).	Despite	







nature	 of	 man.	 To	 do	 so,	 he	 tells	 the	 story	 of	 Yximilla,	 ‘a	 Lady	 of	 uncommon	
Perfections’,	 who	 is	 the	 ruler	 of	 a	 nation	 called	 Ginksy	 and	 who	 is	 beloved	 by	
Yamatalallabec,	 a	Prince	 in	whom	 ‘all	 the	manly	Graces	 seem’d	 to	 vye	with	 each	
other’	 (80).	 These	 two	 royals	 fall	 in	 love	 and	 want	 to	 get	 married;	 however,	
Yximilla	 is	 not	 allowed	 ‘to	 marry	 without	 the	 Consent	 of	 the	 People’,	 and	 the	
people—or,	 rather,	 some	 manipulative	 governors—withhold	 their	 consent.	
Although	the	people	of	Ginksy	have	only	the	greatest	respect	for	both	Yximilla	and	
Yamatalallabec,	 they	 are	 influenced	 by	 ambitious	 usurpers	 to	 deny	 the	 couple’s	
right	to	marry.	Therefore,	in	Yximilla’s	story,	like	Eovaai’s,	autonomy	and	consent	
are	 threatened,	 but	 for	 different	 reasons.	 Through	 Eovaai’s	 ‘history’,	 Haywood	
demonstrates	the	ways	in	which	politicians	can	use	fraud	and	delusion	to	corrupt	
the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 people’s	 consent	 and	 undermine	 their	 participation	 in	







consent	 of	 the	 body	 politic	 as	 a	 whole.	 Or,	 if	 that	 does	 not	 work,	 they	 can	 use	
physical	force	to	achieve	their	desired	ends.	





Meanwhile,	 the	 hateful	 and	 resentful	 Tygrinonniple,	 Queen	 of	 the	 Icindas,	 has	 a	
grudge	 against	 Yamatalallabec,	 so	 she	 is	 eager	 to	 take	 any	 action	 against	 him,	
including	blocking	the	personal	and	political	happiness	that	would	result	from	his	
marriage	to	Yximilla.	And	so,	 ‘before	Yximilla	had	any	warning	of	her	Danger,	the	
Forces	 of	 these	 two	 potent	 Princes	 [King	 Oudescar	 and	 Queen	 Tygrinonniple]	
poured	down	upon	her	Kingdom’	(81).	Although	Yamatalallabec	 tries	 to	mount	a	
defence,	he	has	insufficient	forces	and	an	uncommitted	ally,	and	so	the	Ginksyans	
begin	 to	 lose	ground	 to	Oudescar.	Although	 the	 treasonous	Ginksyan	Lords	 later	
regret	 their	 support	of	Oudescar,	 in	 the	moment	of	 the	crisis,	 they	see	no	choice	
but	to	align	themselves	with	him	in	order	to	preserve	their	own	safety	and	that	of	
their	 families.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Ginksyans	 lose	 their	 sovereignty,	 Yximilla	 is	
imprisoned	and	forced	to	marry	Broscomin,	and	Yamatalallabec	flees	into	exile.93		
The	‘history’	of	Yximilla	is	not	only	a	sudden	interruption	of	Eovaai’s	story,	
but	 it	 is	 also	 a	 distinctive	 narrative	 in	 terms	 of	 content	 and	 style.	 The	 first	
difference	 is	 that	 Yximilla’s	 story	 is	 not	 magical,	 a	 distinction	 that	 has	 gone	









desired	 way,	 often	 through	 flattery	 or	 bribery,	 or	 they	 are	 overcome	 by	 force.	
Yximilla’s	story	also	does	not	have	the	triumphant	ending	that	we	see	in	Eovaai’s	
tale.	 It	 ends	 tragically	 with	 a	 successful	 conquest	 over	 Yximilla.	 The	 narrative’s	
placement	 and	 its	 distinctions	 from	 Eovaai’s	 story	 have	 raised	 questions	 about	
how	it	functions	in	the	text	as	a	whole.	Suzan	Last	recognises	the	complexity	of	the	
Yximilla	 section,	 saying	 that	 it	 functions	 as	 another	Walpolean	 satire	 and	 that	 it	
provides	 another	 representation	 of	 ‘the	 plight	 of	 women	 under	 patriarchal	
government’.94	Earla	Wilputte	says	the	Yximilla	section	 ‘works	as	a	moral	rebuke	
to	Eovaai’s	desire	to	succumb	to	Ochihatou’s	seduction’	and	that	all	of	the	histories	
in	 the	 novel	 ‘reflect	 the	 vulnerability	 of	women	 and	 nations	 to	 the	 powerlust	 of	
their	 governors’.95	While	 I	 agree	with	 these	 arguments	 that	 the	 ‘vulnerability’	 of	
women	 and	 nations	 is	 reflected	 in	 Yximilla’s	 story,	 I	 would	 broaden	 the	




that	 when	 discussing	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 ‘nations	 to	 the	 powerlust	 of	 their	
governors’,	it	is	important	to	recognise	it	is	not	only	the	citizens	of	the	nations	who	
are	vulnerable	to	their	governors,	but	also	the	sovereigns	of	 the	nations	who	are	
vulnerable	 to	 those	 over	 whom	 they	 rule.	 With	 these	 multiple	 vulnerabilities,	









Another	 distinction	 between	 Yximilla’s	 tale	 and	 Eovaai’s	 lies	 in	 the	
characters,	themselves.	Unlike	Eovaai,	Yximilla	is	entirely	resolved	and	committed	
to	her	virtue	and	political	values,	and	at	no	point	does	Broscomin	or	anyone	else	
succeed	 in	 flattering	 her	 or	 manipulating	 her	 into	 a	 consensual	 relationship	 or	
alliance.	 Unlike	 Eovaai,	 Yximilla	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 stable	 self.	 When	 Broscomin	
threatens	her,	saying,	 ‘I	beseech	you,	to	resign	willingly	that	Hand	you	see	I	have	
the	 power	 to	 force’,	 Yximilla	 refuses	 to	 submit:	 ‘Nor	 Force,	 nor	 Fraud,	 cry’d	
Yximilla	.	.	.	has	power	to	move	a	Mind	disdainful	of	your	pretended	Passion,	as	of	
your	 experienc’d	 Barbarity’.	 At	 this	 Broscomin	 says	 that	 if	 he	 cannot	 attack	 her	
mind	through	fraud	or	coercion,	he	will	overpower	her	by	physical	force,	and	he	is	
true	to	his	word.	She	is	‘dragg’d’	to	the	Altar	where	she	eventually	faints,	and	she	is	
married	 to	Broscomin	while	she	 is	unconscious,	 in	 the	 ‘Absence	of	her	Senses’—
unable	 to	 give	 or	 deny	 consent	 (86	 and	 88).	 This	 military	 conquest	 of	 Yximilla	





she	knows	who	her	enemies	are,	 and	 she	 sees	what	 they	are	doing.	However,	 in	











points	 out	 that	 the	 phrase	 is	 repeated	 several	 times	 within	 Eovaai;	 however,	











has	 little	 to	 say	 about	 Eovaai,	 her	 claim	 that	 force	 and	 fraud	 are	 seen	 as	
‘interchangeable’	supports	my	claim	that	Yximilla’s	history	might	be	less	of	a	foil	to	





















Eovaai	 and	 the	 Hypotofans	 as	 they	 struggle	 with	 deception,	 interpretation,	 and	
other	 problems	 of	 judgment;	 however,	 readers	 should	 not	 fail	 to	 note	 that	 even	





the	 seduction	 narrative,	 but	 they	 diverge	 in	 that	 the	 women	 being	 seduced—
through	 force	 and	 fraud—are	 monarchs,	 and,	 as	 such,	 Haywood	 expands	 the	
political	 implications	 of	 such	 threats.	 	 Wilputte	 says	 that	 Yximilla’s	 tale	 is	 a	
‘benignly	 political	 romance’	 and	 that	 Yximilla	 is	 ‘just	 an	 elaborate	 footnote	 in	




In	 Eovaai,	 Haywood	 betrays	 a	 deep	 and	 extreme	 scepticism	 about	 our	
ability	to	know	truth.	She	also	suggests	that,	even	if	the	truth	is	known,	we	do	not	
always	 have	 the	 power	 to	 achieve	 a	 desired	 outcome.	 This	 is	 true	 between	 a	
woman	and	a	man,	and	also	between	subjects	and	their	governors.	In	both	public	









though	 a	 republican	 or	 constitutional	 monarchy—in	 concert	 with	 a	 wise	 and	
benevolent	sovereign—seems	to	offer	 the	most	 ‘checks	and	balances’,	 the	stories	
of	Eovaai	and	Yximilla	suggest	that	an	inevitable	instability	exists	in	even	the	most	
ideal	 political	 systems	 because	 of	 the	 problems	 of	 partiality	 and	 corruption—
especially	among	ministers	and	 lords—which	 lead	 to	deception	and	 the	abuse	of	
force.		




complicates	 any	 attempt	 to	 find	 a	 secure	 and	 interpretive	 center’.101	Similarly,	
Joanna	 Fowler	 suggests	 that	 critics	 err	when	 they	 seek	 ‘to	 establish	 a	 definitive	
answer	regarding	Haywood’s	personal	and	political	views’	and	‘that	the	key	point	
of	 a	 multivalent	 text	 is	 that	 it	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 applications	 and	
interpretations;	 therefore,	 a	 single	 meaning	 is	 not	 necessarily	 to	 be	 sought’.102	

















	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 that	 in	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 (1744-1746),	 Eliza	
Haywood	 employs	 rhetorical	 strategies	 that	 continue	 the	 work	 of	 shifting	 the	
authority	of	textual	interpretation	and	determination	away	from	the	author/editor	
and	into	the	hands—or	rather	the	minds—of	her	readers.	By	doing	this,	Haywood	
departs	 from	 the	 conventions	 of	 earlier,	 more	 authoritative	 periodicals	 and	




over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 periodical.	 	 In	 fact,	 I	 aim	 to	 show	 that	 important	 to	 the	






travel	narratives,	which,	 among	Haywood’s	 contemporaries,	 commonly	 triggered	
the	negotiation	between	scepticism	and	credulity.1	As	Steve	Shapin	puts	it,	‘Travel	
narratives	appeared	as	a	necessary	source	of	knowledge,	and	also	as	an	endemic	








and	 how	 could	 one	 know	 when	 it	 was	 secure?’2		 	 Therefore,	 in	 The	 Female	
Spectator,	 as	 in	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer	 and	The	Adventures	of	Eovaai,	 Haywood	
engages	 with	 a	 male	 tradition	 that	 foregrounds	 the	 problems	 of	 narrative	
credibility.	 However,	 in	 The	 Female	 Spectator,	 Haywood	 begins	 to	 mitigate	 the	
scepticism	of	her	earlier	texts.	Surprisingly,	and	perhaps	ironically,	this	mitigation	
occurs	 through	 the	 development	 of	 the	 reader’s	 imagination,	 which	 Haywood	
activates	 through	 the	 ‘experimental	 image’	 of	 the	 Female	 Spectator.	 As	 readers	
imagine	 the	 ideas	and	 judgments	of	another	 ‘mind’	 (in	 this	 case,	 the	mind	of	 the	
Female	 Spectator),	 they	 are	 led	 to	 extend	 their	 subjectivity	 to	 consider	multiple	
judgments	beyond	 their	own,	a	process	 that	 leads	 to	a	 type	of	dialogic	discourse	
and	 intersubjectivity	 that	 can	help	 them	create	better	 judgments	 than	 those	 that	
are	 based	 on	 only	 sensory	 experience	 or	 isolated	 reflection.	 This	 engagement	 of	
the	 imagination	connects	Haywood’s	periodical	 to	her	 fiction	as	 it	prefigures	 the	
kind	 of	 imaginative	 leaps	 and	 ‘theory	 of	 mind’	 that	 are	 significant	 in	 her	 later	
fiction,	such	as	The	History	of	Jemmy	and	Jenny	Jessamy	(1753).		
Scholars	 have	 disagreed	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 authority	 in	 The	 Female	
Spectator,	and	my	argument	aims	to	both	complicate	and,	to	some	degree,	resolve	
competing	 interpretations.	 Some	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 voice	 of	 the	 fictional	
persona	 or	 ‘eidolon’	 of	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 is	 an	 authoritative	 one.	 Ricardo	
Miguel-Alfonso,	 for	 example,	 says	 that	 Haywood	 (whom	 he	 problematically	
conflates	 with	 her	 fictional	 persona)	 asserts	 a	 ‘monological	 authority’	 and	 an	










connects	Haywood’s	 voice	with	 the	 voices	 of	 earlier	works	 such	 as	 the	Athenian	
Mercury	 (1690-1697),	 the	 Tatler	 (1709-1711),	 and	 the	 Spectator	 (1711-1712),	
whose	male	 editors	 (and/or	 personae)	 assumed	 ‘authoritative	 voices’	 that	were	
maintained,	 and	 even	 heightened,	 throughout	 the	 development	 of	 their	
periodicals.4	Kathryn	Shevelow	has	argued	that	despite	the	fact	 that	these	earlier	
periodicals	established	a	 ‘community’	of	readers	and	writers,	the	editors	of	these	
publications	 maintained	 their	 authoritative	 voices	 throughout	 their	 writings,	
leaving	little	room	for	ambiguity	and	reader	interpretation	within	the	established	
community	 of	 readers.5	Like	Miguel-Alfonso,	Manushag	 Powell	 suggests	 that	 the	
Female	 Spectator	 asserts	 authority	 over	 ‘readerly	 critiques’	 and	 that	 the	 eidolon	
reminds	readers	that	‘she	is	the	expert	on	both	writing	and	the	world’.6		
In	 contrast,	 other	 scholars	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 Female	 Spectator’s	
authority	 is	 qualified	 or	 de-centred.	 Shevelow,	 for	 example,	 argues	 that	 the	
editorial	voice	of	the	Female	Spectator	is	less	authoritative	than	the	male	voices	in	
the	 earlier	 essay-periodicals	 and	 that	 the	 narrative	 persona	 in	 The	 Female	
Spectator,	 while	 establishing	 an	 authority	 within	 a	 ‘feminine	 province,’	 still	
indicates	 her	 own	 ‘moral	 fallibility’	 and	 a	 greater	 sense	 of	 equality	 with	 fellow	
editors	and	even	readers	than	was	seen	in	the	periodicals	with	male	personae.7	As	
Kathryn	 King	 notes,	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 is	 typically	 ‘praised	 for	 its	 vigorous	
challenge	 to	 the	 masculine	 authority	 of	 [its]	 celebrated	 predecessor’,	 The	














Haywood’s	 periodical	 challenges	 its	 readers	 to	 question	 the	 authority	 of	 those	
periodicals	produced	by	 ‘male	gossips’	 in	coffee-houses.9		 	Eve	Tavor	Bannet	also	
contrasts	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 with	 earlier	 periodicals,	 suggesting	 that	 the	






censor’,	 and	he	 contrasts	 the	 voice	 of	The	Female	Spectator	with	 the	 ‘controlling	
authorial	 persona’	 found	 in	 periodicals	 by	 mid-century	 male	 writers	 such	 as	
Johnson	and	Fielding.11		
I	 aim	 both	 to	 complicate	 and	 synthesize	 the	 above	 conclusions	 by	
demonstrating	 that	 the	 two	 opposing	 claims	 about	 authority,	 in	 some	ways,	 are	
both	correct	but	also	incomplete.	Haywood	does,	in	fact,	establish	an	authoritative	
voice	 for	 her	 periodical	 persona,	 but	 it	 is	 an	 authoritative	 voice	 that	 she	 later	
deconstructs.	 Haywood	 first	 establishes	 her	 eidolon	 as	 a	 central	 authority	 and	
then,	 later,	 she	 leads	 the	 reader	 to	 doubt	 the	 very	 authority	 that	 has	 been	












Haywood’s	 reputation	 as	 an	 author,	my	 central	 concern	 is	 how	Haywood	 builds	
and	then	destabilizes	the	authority	and	voice	of	her	eidolon—the	fictional	persona	
of	the	periodical.	Although	eidolons,	to	some	degree,	‘point’	to	their	authors,	there	
is	 also	 a	 constructed	 gap	 between	 the	 two.12	As	 Powell	 puts	 it,	 ‘[The	 eidolon’s]	
function	is	performative	in	that	it	allows	the	audience	to	recognize	and	be	satisfied	
by	the	signifiers	of	authorship	while	obscuring	the	author’s	core	personality’.	My	
argument	 exploits	 this	 gap	 by	 focusing	 on	 how	 Haywood	 manipulates	 the	
perceived	 authority	 of	 her	 eidolon	without	disrupting	her	own	authority	 as	 true	
author.	Although	Powell’s	 study	 constructs	 a	 strong	 foundation	on	which	 I	 build	
my	argument,	 I	 resist	 her	 final	 conclusions	 about	how	authority	 is	 performed	 in	
The	 Female	 Spectator.	 Powell	 claims	 that	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 becomes	 more	
authoritative	by	the	end	of	the	periodical,	saying,	‘By	the	end	of	her	text,	Haywood	
alters	 the	postures	she	had	 initially	 set	up,	wherein	 the	author	 is	 the	docile	wife	
and	 the	 reader	 the	 persuadable	 but	 authoritative	 husband:	 the	 reader	 who	 has	
followed	 her	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 last	 volume	 discovers	 to	 his	 dismay	 that	 he	 has	















With	 this	 interpretation,	 I	 echo	 Earla	 Wilputte	 when	 she	 says,	 ‘In	 fine,	
Haywood	demands	 that	 her	 readers	 become	 spectators	 like	 herself,	 questioning,	
monitoring,	 challenging,	 and	 then,	 surprisingly	 after	 so	 much	 advice	 on	 silence,	




establishment	 of	 authority,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 might	 say	 her	 readers	 should	
think	 for	 themselves	 (as	 the	 parrot	 ‘author’	 repeatedly	 does	 in	 Haywood’s	
periodical	The	Parrot	[August-October,	1746]),	but	her	text	would	not	lead	readers	
to	 perform	 that	 function.	 In	 addition,	 while	 Wilputte	 suggests	 that	 Haywood’s	
scepticism	begins	 in	The	Female	Spectator	 (in	response	to	nine	months	of	 ‘broad-






tradition.	Maurer	 says	 that	 the	Female	Spectator’s	authority	 is	 ‘circumscribed	by	
the	text’s	need	for	men’s	approval	and	participation’.16	Maurer	criticizes	Haywood	












focus	 on	 courtship,	 for	 example,	 is	 ultimately	 centred	 on	 men	 and	 that	 this	
centrality	undermines	 the	 ‘authority	deriving	 from	 female	experience’.18	She	also	
criticizes	 the	 text	 because	 of	 its	 tendency	 to	 feature	 men	 as	 ‘intellectual	
ambassadors’	who	guide	the	female	editor	and	her	readers	through	topics	such	as	
politics,	 nature,	 and	 travel	 that	 are	 typically	 within	 the	 public	 (or	 masculine)	
sphere.19	In	 other	 words,	 Maurer	 criticizes	 Haywood	 for	 not	 focusing	 on	 and	
establishing	 authority	 over	 a	 decidedly	 and	 entirely	 separate,	 feminine	 sphere.	
Although	I	agree	with	Maurer	that	The	Female	Spectator	does	not	try	to	establish	
authority	based	on	an	entirely	 ‘feminine	province’	 (to	use	Shevelow’s	 term),	one	
need	 not	 see	 this	 as	mere	 ‘deference’	 to	masculine	 authority.	 Rather,	 one	might	
view	it,	as	I	do,	as	a	reflection	of	women’s	efforts	towards	authority	and	autonomy	
across	the	spheres.	It	does	not	seem	to	follow	that	engagement	with	traditionally	
male	 spheres	 of	 dialogue	 necessitates	 the	 conclusion	 of	 a	 deferral	 to	 the	 male	
voices	at	work	in	these	traditions.	Sarah	Prescott	and	Jane	Spencer	make	this	point	
as	 they	 resist	 strict	 ‘separate	 sphere’	 interpretations	 of	 eighteenth-century	
periodicals.20	Like	 Prescott	 and	 Spencer,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 eidolon	 of	 The	 Female	


















My	 argument	 about	 The	 Female	 Spectator’s	 shift	 in	 authority	 relies	 on	 a	
reading	of	 the	 text	 that	draws	connections	between	separate	 issues	or	 ‘books’	of	
the	periodical.	Alexander	Pettit,	one	of	the	editors	of	the	2001	Pickering	and	Chatto	
edition	 of	 The	 Female	 Spectator,	 cautions	 against	 such	 a	 reading	 and	 has	
encouraged	 readers	 of	 the	 modern	 edition	 of	 the	 text	 to	 remember	 that	 Eliza	
Haywood’s	 original	 periodical	 was	 an	 ephemeral	 and	 ‘wildly	 miscellaneous	
periodical	that	was	never	meant	to	be	read’	as	one	continuous	text.21	He	suggests	
that	 the	 Pickering	 and	 Chatto	 edition,	 while	 obviously	 useful	 for	 scholars,	
encourages	 a	 problematic	 mode	 of	 reading	 that	 ‘contradicts	 [the	 periodical’s]	
native	 status	 as	 ephemera’.22	He	 also	 suggests	 that,	 because	 the	 periodical	 is	
‘wildly	miscellaneous’	and	ephemeral,	it	is	‘not	a	problem’	that	‘few	Haywoodians	
have	read	the	work	cover	to	cover	(or	cover	to	cover	to	cover	to	cover)’.23	Though	I	
do	 not	 dispute	 the	 miscellaneous	 nature	 of	 the	 periodical,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	
contemporary	 scholars	 actually	 have	 much	 to	 gain	 from	 reading	 The	 Female	
Spectator	in	its	entirety	and	in	its	original	chronological	order,	and	that	doing	so	is	
not	as	problematic	as	Pettit	suggests.	First,	only	by	reading	the	different	books	in	
concert	 can	 readers	 see	 the	 unique	 ways	 in	 which	 Haywood	 creates	 dialogue	
between	the	books	themselves	and	between	author,	text,	and	reader.	In	addition,	
although	 Pettit	 cautions	 scholars	 about	 reading	 the	 periodical	 as	 a	 unified	 and	
cohesive	publication,	I	would	suggest	that	some	of	today’s	scholars	actually	tend	to	









contemporaries	 did.	 Granted,	 the	 original	 issues	 or	 ‘books’,	 as	 Haywood	 called	
them,	 were	 published	 separately,	 included	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 topics,	 and	 can,	
indeed,	 be	 picked	 up	 and	 read	 (and	 basically	 understood)	 in	 fragments.	 But,	 to	
some	degree,	our	modern-day	fragmented	way	of	reading	Haywood’s	periodical	in	
excerpts	 has	 perpetuated	 misunderstandings	 and	 misreadings.	 Before	 the	
Pickering	 and	 Chatto	 edition,	 there	 were	 no	 modern	 editions	 that	 included	 the	
periodical	 in	 its	 entirety.	 Instead,	 individual	 editors	 made	 choices	 about	 what	
selections	to	include	from	the	periodical,	and	those	selections	usually	represented	
a	 small	 percentage	of	 the	periodical	 as	 a	whole.	 Sarah	Prescott	makes	 this	point	
about	 Patricia	 Meyer	 Spacks’s	 edition	 of	 selections	 from	 The	 Female	 Spectator,	




to	 problems.	 Reading	 just	 one	 piece	 of	 the	 periodical	 can	 be	 like	 the	 blind	man	
touching	 the	 leg	 of	 an	 elephant:	 the	 selected	 piece	 might	 give	 the	 reader	 an	
inaccurate	 sense	 of	 the	 whole.	 Even	 though	 the	 modern	 Pickering	 and	 Chatto	
edition	might	 create	 a	 false	 sense	 of	 unity	 for	 today’s	 readers	 of	 the	 periodical,	
there	are,	 in	 fact,	rhetorical	strategies	that	are	difficult	 to	notice	or	understand	if	
the	text	is	not	read	wholly	and	chronologically.	For	example,	the	categorization	of	
The	 Female	 Spectator	 as	 ‘conduct	 literature’	 for	 women	 seems	 grounded	 in	 a	
reading	of	only	certain	portions	of	 the	publication,	most	notably	 the	 first	several	










While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 Haywood’s	 contemporaries	might	 not	 have	 read	 the	
entirety	of	every	book,	most	of	her	original	readers	would	have	read	the	books	in	
the	 order	 in	 which	 they	were	 published,	 and	many	 readers,	 even	 in	 Haywood’s	
lifetime,	read	the	periodical	in	collected,	bound	volumes—volumes	which	imposed	
some	 unity	 to	 the	 originally	 published	 books.25	In	 addition,	 many	 of	 the	 books	





the	 fact	 that	 Haywood	 called	 her	 issues	 ‘books’	 departs	 from	 earlier	 periodicals	
and,	 perhaps,	 suggests	 a	 state	 that	 is	 not	 so	 ephemeral	 after	 all.27	The	 Female	
Spectator,	 herself,	 assumes	 some	 level	 of	 continuity	 between	 the	 books	 as	 she	
frequently	makes	 references	 to	previous	 and	 forthcoming	books,	 suggesting	 that	
she—and	 her	 readers—are,	 to	 some	 degree,	 looking	 forward	 and	 backward	
between	published	issues.28		
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 first	 show	 how	 Haywood	 establishes	 authority	 for	 her	














demonstrate	 how,	 through	 the	 juxtaposition	 of	 her	 book	 on	 ‘lying’	 and	 her	
employment	 of	 travel	 narratives,	 she	 deconstructs	 that	 authority.	 Specifically,	 I	
draw	 connections	 between	 Book	 16	 (10	 August,	 1745),	 Book	 18	 (19	 October,	
1745),	and	Book	19	(2	November,	1745).	Book	16,	after	a	harangue	on	the	evils	of	




William	 Hatchett,	 who	 collaborated	 with	 Haywood	 on	 other	 works	 and	 who	
typically	is	assumed	to	have	been	her	long-time	personal	partner.29	However,	King	
and	Pettit	also	note	 that	 the	 island	 in	The	Female	Spectator	 is	 like	 the	original	 in	
name	only.	Whereas	the	original	focused	on	the	odd	physicality	of	the	inhabitants,	
Haywood’s	version	focuses	on	their	manners,	religion,	and	culture.	As	part	of	her	
response	 to	 Eumenes’s	 epistle,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 invites	 him	 to	 write	 again	
with	further	descriptions	of	the	politics	of	Topsy-Turvy	Island.	At	the	end	of	Book	
18,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 says	 that	 Eumenes	 has	 obliged	 her	 request,	 and	 the	
second	(and	longer)	Topsy-Turvy	narrative	is	published	in	Book	19.	In	the	second	
Topsy-Turvy	 narrative,	 Eumenes	 does,	 in	 fact,	 include	 details	 of	 the	 islanders’	


















includes	 ‘nothing	 of	 those	 monstrous	 Descriptions	 some	 Books	 of	 Travel	 have	
given	 us’	 (FS18,	 II:3,	 198).	 By	 publishing	 dubious	 travel	 narratives	 immediately	
after	harangues	about	lying	and	the	scourge	of	deceptive	travel	stories,	Haywood	
evokes	 the	 scepticism	 of	 her	 readers.	 Granted,	 the	 name	 of	 Topsy-Turvy	 island	
suggests	 its	 fictionality,	but	Haywood’s	use	of	similar	and	typical	 travel	narrative	
conventions	 for	 both	 the	 Summatra	 narrative	 and	 the	 Topsy-Turvy	 narrative	
foregrounds	 the	dubious	nature	of	 travel	narratives	 in	general.	Furthermore,	 the	
political	problems	of	the	second	Topsy-Turvy	narrative	demonstrate	the	problems	
of	 a	 passive	 body	 politic,	 thereby	 indicating	 the	 need	 for	 readers	 (as	 political	
subjects)	to	learn	to	think	for	themselves	and	question	authority.	Central	to	their	
ability	 to	do	this	 is	 their	engagement	with	the	eidolon	as	an	experimental	 image,	




Throughout	 the	 first	half	of	 the	periodical,	 the	Female	Spectator	creates	a	
sense	of	authority	for	herself	and	her	assistants,	or	fellow	spectators.	In	Book	1	of	
the	 periodical,	 which	 was	 first	 published	 24	 April,	 1744,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	






‘Spies’	 that	 she	 claims	 to	 have	 placed	 near	 and	 far	 to	 provide	 her	 with	 all	 the	
‘Secrets	of	Europe’.	Regarding	her	life	experience,	the	Female	Spectator	tells	us	that	
she	 is	 a	 reformed	 coquet	 and	 that	 she	 has	 previously,	 in	 younger	 days,	 been	
‘engross’d	by	a	Hurry	of	promiscuous	Diversions’	 (FS1,	 II:1,	17-18).	However,	by	





moral	 essay’.30	Although	 Shevelow’s	 argument	 is	 persuasive	 to	 the	 degree	 that	
Haywood’s	 periodical	 differs	 from	 those	 that	 were	 published	 early	 in	 the	
eighteenth	 century,	 I	 would	 suggest	 that	 similar	 kinds	 of	 authority	 through	
‘reformation’	might	 be	 found	 in	 pre-existing	 philosophical	 dialogues	 and	 essays.	
The	 Female	 Spectator	 implies	 this	 herself	 when,	 in	 Book	 4,	 she	 claims	 that	
‘SOCRATES	the	Philosopher,	.	.	.	who	being	addicted	to	all	Manner	of	Intemperance,	
gain’d	the	Victory	by	his	Reason	and	Resolution	over	each	inordinate	Passion,	and	
was	 the	 Pattern	 of	 Virtue	 and	 Abstemiousness’	 (FS4,	 II:2,	 135).	 The	 Female	
Spectator	 suggests	 that	 just	 as	 Socrates	 overcame	 his	 vices	 through	 serious	
thought	 and	 reflection,	 so	 has	 she,	 and	 she	 also	 suggests	 that	 this	 process	 of	
reflection	and	reformation	authorizes	her	‘lucubrations’,	a	term	that	Richard	Steele	











her	 sincerity,	 she	 says,	 ‘I	 never	was	 a	 Beauty,	 and	 am	 now	 very	 far	 from	 being	
young;	(a	Confession	[the	reader]	will	find	few	of	my	Sex	ready	to	make)’	(FS1,	II:1,	
17).	 By	 admitting	 to	 something	 so	 unflattering	 and	 against	 gender	 codes,	 the	
Female	Spectator	suggests	to	the	reader	that	she	is	a	sincere,	reliable	truth-teller.	
Her	modesty	assures	 readers	 that,	 if	 she	 is	willing	 to	admit	 to	 these	unflattering	
things	 about	 herself,	 she	 is	 unlikely	 to	 lie	 about	 anything	 else.	 Not	 only	 is	 she	
modest	 about	 her	 personal	 appearance	 and	 history,	 but	 she	 also	 confesses	 that,	
when	 she	 first	 tried	 to	write	 the	 essays	 on	 her	 own,	 her	 ‘Matter	 and	 Stile’	were	
deficient	and	that,	as	a	result,	she	had	to	get	‘assistance’	from	three	collaborators.	
Again,	 the	 Female	 Spectator,	 ironically,	 establishes	 her	 own	 credibility	 through	
self-deprecation	of	her	talents.	Shevelow	suggests	that	these	passages	do	seem	to	
‘qualify	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 persona’.32 	However,	 even	 though	 she	 is	 self-
deprecating	 and	 modest	 when	 discussing	 herself	 and	 her	 own	 abilities,	 she,	 in	
contrast,	heaps	significant	praise	upon	her	collaborators,	and	through	the	presence	
of	these	collaborators,	regardless	of	whether	they	are	real	or	fictional,	she	reclaims	
a	 general	 dominance	 and	 authority	 as	 the	 editor.33	In	 order	 to	 create	 authority	
despite	 her	 personal	 flaws	 and	 weaknesses,	 she	 identifies	 her	 collaborators	 as	
paragons	of	virtue	and	wisdom.	They	are	Mira,	 a	wife	 in	a	harmonious	marriage	
with	 a	 ‘worthy’	 husband;	 an	 unnamed	 widow	 who	 is	 joyful	 but	 virtuous;	 and	
Euphrosine,	a	 ‘charming’,	cheerful,	sweet,	and	beautiful	young	 lady	(FS1,	 II:2,	18-















evidence),	 then	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 gains	 additional	 authority	 from	 her	 class	
status.	
	 Despite	 the	 proposed	 individuality	 of	 these	 co-authors,	 the	 Female	
Spectator	 fully	 absorbs	 and	 even	 bodily	 incorporates	 their	 talents	 and	 authority	
when	she	adds	the	following:	
[W]hatever	Productions	 I	 shall	be	 favour’d	with	 from	 these	Ladies,	
or	 any	 others	 I	 may	 hereafter	 correspond	 with,	 will	 be	 exhibited	
under	 the	 general	 Title	 of	 The	 Female	 Spectator,	 and	 how	 many	
Contributors	soever	there	may	happen	to	be	to	the	Work,	they	are	to	
be	 consider’d	only	as	 several	Members	of	one	Body,	of	which	 I	 am	
the	Mouth.	(FS1,	II:2,	19)		




single,	 authoritative	 mouthpiece	 for	 the	 periodical	 published	 as	 The	 Female	










claims	 support	 arguments	 that	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 asserts	 a	 monological	
authority.	
	 In	subsequent	books,	 the	Female	Spectator	 further	develops	her	authority	
through	praise	from	her	letter	writers—that	is,	from	outside	sources	or	witnesses.	









Even	as	 this	 letter	 raises	doubt	 about	 the	Female	Spectator’s	nature	as	 a	person	
and	author,	it	simultaneously	adds	to	the	credentials	she	has	already	established—
namely	 all	 of	 the	 best	 qualities	 of	 women	 in	 every	 station	 (wife,	 widow,	 or	
virgin)—by	 asserting	 that	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 also	 demonstrates	 the	 highest	
qualities	of	a	male	writer:	‘Strength	and	Energy’.	Any	sense	of	her	‘fallibility’	seems	
to	be,	at	this	point	of	the	text,	erased	(or	at	least	overshadowed)	by	such	accolades.	
The	 Female	 Spectator	 not	 only	 has	 the	 feminine	 authority	 of	 her	 chosen	 subject	
matter,	 but	 she	 has	 additional	 authority	 based	 on	 what	 Amintor	 identifies	 as	 a	
masculine	 style.	 Whether	 or	 not	 her	 style	 is,	 in	 fact,	 masculine	 is	 somewhat	
immaterial	in	the	face	of	Amintor’s	claim;	what	matters	most	is	that	he	makes	the	





male	 or	 female,	 one	 or	 many—draws	 attention	 to	 the	 degree	 that	 the	 Female	
Spectator	 is	more	 of	 a	mind	 than	 a	 body.	 In	The	Female	Spectator,	 the	 eidolon’s	
body	is	noticeably	absent	after	her	 initial	reference	to	her	 lack	of	beauty	and	the	
‘one	mouth’	of	her	authorship.	This	 lack	of	embodiment	 is	also	 the	case	 in	other	
texts,	 such	as	 in	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer,	The	Invisible	Spy,	and	The	Tea	Table.	As	
Karen	Bloom	Gevirtz	says	in	her	analysis	of	The	Tea	Table,	 ‘Haywood	seems	to	be	
following	 the	 emerging	 and	 Lockean	 emphasis	 on	 the	 disembodiment	 of	
knowledge,	 the	 idea	 that	 the	body	 is	not	only	disconnected	 from	knowledge,	but	
also	disconnected	from	knowledge	production’.35	This	disembodiment	also	reflects	
Cartesian	philosophy,	 ‘which	broke	 the	 conception	between	women’s	minds	 and	
their	 bodies	 by	 positing	 the	 mind	 as	 independent	 of	 the	 body’.36	The	 Female	
Spectator	 reflects	 this	 ‘independence’	 as	 it	 blurs	 several	 aspects	 of	 identity,	 and	







who	 frequents	 the	 public	 taverns	 and	 coffee-houses	 that	 are	 popular	 with	 men	
about	 town	who	discuss	 serious	matters	 of	 the	world.38	The	mere	 fact	 that	 such	















of	Hungary	and	 the	Queen	of	 Spain,	 and	which	one	of	 the	 two	queens	possesses	




Side:—The	 Numbers	 on	 both	 happen’d	 to	 be	 equal,	 and	 it	 was	 at	
length	 concluded	 to	 consult	 the	 Female	 Spectator,	 and	 that	 we	
should	 allow	 that	 Opinion	 to	 be	 most	 just	 which	 you	 should	
pronounce	to	be	so	.	.	.	.	All	are	Witnesses	of	what	I	write,	and	join	to	
beg	 you	will	 give	 Judgment	 with	 Freedom	 and	 Impartiality,	 which	
will	confer	a	lasting	Obligation	on	a	Set	of	Gentlemen	who	are	most	
of	 them	 your	 Subscribers,	 and	 all	 Admirers	 of	 your	 Speculations’.	
(FS9,	II:2,	330)		
Granted,	the	men	have	asked	her	to	settle	a	question	about	women,	but	the	subject	









we	 encounter	 it	 with	 its	 authority	 already	 fused	 to	 it’.39	This	 is	 the	 kind	 of	
authority	 that	 ‘The	Querist’	 assigns	 to	 the	 Female	 Spectator.	He	 is	 not	 requiring	
any	kind	of	‘internal	persuasion’	from	the	logic	of	her	response	but	rather	he	will	






	 The	 letter	 from	 the	Querist	 adds	 another	 dimension	 to	 the	 author-reader	
relationship	as	well.	Early	eighteenth-century	periodicals	 ‘encouraged	 the	notion	
of	 the	 reader-writer	 relationship	 transcending	 the	 text,	 constructing	 out	 of	 a	
textual	 relationship	 an	 appearance	 of	 their	 extra-textual	 engagement	 in	 readers’	
lives’	and	that,	therefore,	the	periodical	journals	created	a	sense	of	both	public	and	





















Street,	 Covent	 Garden’	 (FS9,	 II:2,	 330).	 Not	 only	 does	 this	 letter	 suggest	 the	
potential	of	a	private	correspondence	that	could	exist	outside	of	the	periodical,	but	
also	it	signifies	that	its	writer	trusts	the	editor	with	the	decision	of	whether	or	not	
the	 letter	 is	 ‘improper’	 for	 publication.	 The	 letter	 writer	 defers	 to	 the	 editor	 in	
every	way	while	still	suggesting	a	sense	of	respect	and	trust.	This	respect	and	trust	
about	a	political	matter	also	confirms	the	claim	by	Sarah	Prescott	and	Jane	Spencer	
that	 ‘the	 authority	 claimed	 by	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 and	 other	 female	 editorial	
figures,	 while	 certainly	 represented	 as	 specifically	 feminine,	 staked	 a	 claim	 to	 a	
much	wider	social	field’	than	the	‘feminine	province’	suggested	by	Shevelow.42	
Since	 scholars	 do	 not	 have	 a	 clear	 sense	 about	 which	 of	 The	 Female	
Spectator’s	contributors	are	real	and	which	are	fictional,	we	do	not	know	whether	




the	 letter	 is	 real,	 then	 it	 contributes	 to	her	 authority	 in	 a	 rather	 straightforward	
and	 direct	 way	 because	 the	 letter	 writer	 and	 his	 companions	 assign	 her	 that	
authority,	 and	 readers	 see	 that	 they	 have	 done	 so.	 If,	 however,	 the	 letter	 is	
fictional,	 there	are	several	possible	effects	on	the	Female	Spectator’s	authority:	 If	
readers	consider	it	to	be	real—whether	or	not	it	is	real—then	the	development	of	














below),	 is,	ultimately,	what	occurs	over	 the	course	of	 the	periodical.	 In	general,	 I	
would	argue	that	the	letter	from	the	Querist	constructs	authority	for	the	text,	but	




In	 Books	 18	 and	 19,	 Eliza	 Haywood,	 through	 the	 persona	 of	 the	 Female	
Spectator,	 creates	 an	 earthquake	 in	 author-reader	 trust	 and	 ruptures	 the	
authority—or,	 at	 least,	 the	authoritativeness—that	 she	has	 seemingly	worked	 so	
diligently	to	establish	in	previous	books	of	the	periodical.	The	topic	of	Book	18	is	
deception,	 and	 in	 Book	 18,	 	 and	 especially	 in	 Book	 19,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	
engages	in	some	of	the	very	types	of	deception	or	‘lying’	that	she	condemns.	This	
contrast	 between	 what	 she	 says	 and	 what	 she	 does—this	 appearance	 of	
hypocrisy—evokes	 distrust	 in	 the	 reader,	 who	 might	 begin	 to	 doubt	 the	
trustworthiness	of	both	‘author’	and	text.	The	Female	Spectator	seemingly	creates	
this	distrust	 in	order	 to	emphasize	 to	 readers	 the	potential	 for	being	duped—by	
writers,	lovers,	politicians,	etc.—and	to	encourage	(or	force)	readers	to	make	their	
own	 distinctions	 between	 truth	 and	 fiction.	 With	 this	 claim,	 I	 do	 not	 mean	 to	
suggest	 that	 this	 is	 subliminal	 or	 hostile	work	 that	 readers	would	not	notice.	As	






necessary	 defence	 against	 error	 and	 deception’.44	Readers	 knew	 their	 roles	 as	
sceptics,	 but	 the	 proper	 rhetorical	 strategies	 needed	 to	 be	 in	 place	 in	 order	 for	






from	 Lycophron,	 which	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 says	 she	 must	 omit	 because	 the	
author	 spends	 his	 time	 ‘recommending’	 rather	 than	 ‘exploding’	 a	 ‘Tenet	 already	
but	 too	 much	 in	 vogue’,	 but	 she	 does	 not	 identify	 the	 ‘Tenet’	 he	 recommends,	
thereby	leading	the	reader	to	imagine	the	omitted	discourse	(FS18,	II:3,	177).	She	
also	 says	 that	 she	 and	 her	 assistants	 decided	 not	 to	 include	 contributions	 by	
Fidelio	 and	Ophelia	 because	 their	 letters	were	 ‘on	 a	 Subject	we	 have	more	 than	
once	touched	upon,	and	is	not	interesting	enough	to	be	treated	on	too	frequently’,	
a	subject	that,	at	least	in	Ophelia’s	case,	is	related	to	love.	Even	more	significantly,	
the	Female	Spectator	also	 tells	us	 that	she	cannot	 include	 the	 letters	of	Alcander	
and	 Mr.	 Tell-Truth	 because	 they	 are	 related	 to	 politics.	 As	 Kathryn	 King	 and	
Alexander	Pettit	indicate	in	a	note	to	the	text,	Book	18	was	published	19	October,	
1745,	 just	 three	months	 after	 Charles	 Edward	 Stuart,	 the	 Young	 Pretender,	 had	
‘landed	in	Scotland	and	proclaimed	his	father	King	of	England’	and,	at	the	time	of	








II:3,	 178n2).45	In	 addition,	 the	 publication	 comes	 only	 several	 months	 after	 the	
death	 of	 Robert	 Walpole,	 whom	 Eliza	 Haywood	 had	 previously	 (and	 viciously)	
satirized	in	The	Adventures	of	Eovaai	(1736).	The	Female	Spectator	makes	it	clear	
that	Alcander	and	Mr.	Tell-Truth’s	contributions	are	about	current	political	topics	
and,	 therefore,	 cannot	 be	 included.	 About	 Alcander,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 says,	
‘The	Definition	Alcander	gives	us	of	Plots	against	the	Government,	and	Plots	for	the	
Service	of	the	Government,	is	admirably	fine,	but	wholly	improper	at	this	Time	to	
be	 inserted,	 for	 Reasons	 which	 we	 are	 amazed	 he	 can	 be	 insensible	 of	 himself’	
(FS18,	 II:3,	 178).	 Regarding	 the	 second	 letter	writer,	 Mr.	 Tell-Truth,	 the	 Female	
Spectator	says,	‘Those	Remarks,	which	Mr.	Tell-Truth	has	favoured	us	with	on	the	
present	Posture	of	 our	Affairs,	 both	Abroad	 and	 at	Home,	 very	well	 deserve	our	
Thanks;	and	 if	Politics	at	 this	Conjuncture	were	not	 too	 ticklish	 for	us	 to	meddle	
with,	 should	rejoice	 in	an	Opportunity	of	 conveying	his	 sentiments	 to	 the	Public’	
(FS18,	 II:3,	 178).	 As	 Wilputte	 argues,	 Haywood	 employs	 ‘censorship’	 here	 as	 a	
rhetorical	strategy.	By	implying	that	she	cannot	discuss	or	print	anything	about	the	
Jacobite	 rebellion,	Haywood	 (through	 the	Female	 Spectator)	brings	 the	 rebellion	
and	the	related	issues	into	the	consciousness	of	the	reader.	Wilputte	says,	‘Absent	
presences	 like	 those	 of	 Britanicus,	 Alcander,	 Tell-Truth,	 and	 Haywood	 herself,	
provide	 tantalizing	 invitations	 to	 read	 between	 the	 lines,	 an	 act	 of	 critical	













Female	 Spectator	 ‘raises	 the	 notion	 of	 politics	 as	 an	 unfeminine	 subject’,	 she	
always	does	so	‘in	the	context	of	actually	bringing	the	subject	into	discussion’.47	




private	 realm	 is	 not	 total.	 The	 first	 clue	 comes	 even	 before	 she	 mentions	 the	
‘private’	 vice	 when	 she	 makes	 parting	 comments	 about	 Mr.	 Tell-Truth’s	 letter,	
saying	that	even	if	readers	were	to	be	presented	with	Mr.	Tell-Truth’s	words,	what	
he	says	still	might	not	‘remove	the	Mist	from	their	long-clouded	Eyes’	because	‘we	




to	 forthrightness	and	honesty),	 the	Female	Spectator	establishes	her	 concern	 for	
truth	within	the	context	of	political	life	as	well	as	within	the	context	of	private	life.	













and	 fiction	 in	 news,	 novels,	 and	 periodicals.	 Scholars	 like	 Lennard	 Davis,	 Kate	
Loveman,	Jack	Lynch,	Steven	Shapin,	Michael	McKeon,	and	Barbara	J.	Shapiro	have	
analysed	conventions	of	 truth	and	deception	as	 they	appear	 in	 seventeenth-	and	
eighteenth-century	 life,	 letters,	 literature,	 and	 law.49	Davis	argues	 that	 the	 ‘frame	
of	 doubt’	 established	 by	 the	 convention	 of	 presenting	 fiction	 as	 truth	 is	 what	
defines	 the	 discourse	 of	 the	 novel—a	 discourse	 that	 creates	 a	 sense	 of	 realistic	
truth	and,	ultimately,	 ideological	 truth,	despite	 the	presence	of	 factual	 falsehood.	
Davis	specifically	discusses	male	authors	(as	do	the	other	scholars	I	list	above),	but	
women	 writers	 like	 Aphra	 Behn,	 Delarivier	 Manley,	 and	 Eliza	 Haywood	 also	
employ	the	 ‘frame	of	doubt’	that	Davis	describes.	As	in	novels,	the	early	books	of	
The	 Female	 Spectator	 present	 many	 stories	 of	 people	 who	 are	 possibly	 (even	






my	 Intention	 being	 only	 to	 expose	 the	 Vice,	 not	 the	 Person’	 (FS1,	 II:2,	 20).	
However,	for	the	Female	Spectator,	ultimately,	the	factual	truth	of	these	tales	does	













the	Bible	 in	 any	 Part	 of	 it,	without	meeting	with	 something	which	 demands	 our	
Attention,	and	obliges	even	those	who	give	least	Faith	to	the	Facts	contained	in	it,	
to	acknowledge	that	in	the	Sublimnity	of	Images	it	infinitely	surpasses	all	that	ever	
were	 wrote’	 (FS24,	 II:3,	 404).	 Thus,	 regarding	 the	 factual	 truth	 of	 the	 tales	 of	
courtship	and	scandal,	 the	reader	 is	 left	with	ambiguity,	but	 the	consequences	of	
this	ambiguity	are	not	particularly	dire	since	the	ideological	truth	related	to	virtue	
and	 vice	 remain	 unquestioned.	 	 In	 other	words,	 the	message	 is	 true	 even	 if	 the	
details	are	not.	This	type	of	fictionality	or	‘lying’	is	conventional,	and	while	it	cues	
the	 Female	 Spectator’s	 readers	 to	 consider	 the	 ‘frame	 of	 doubt’,	 it	 does	 not	
necessarily	undermine	 the	eidolon’s	authoritative	voice	 in	 the	way	 that	 later	her	
inclusion	of	travel	narratives	will	do.		
	 The	Female	Spectator	claims,	however,	that	a	different	and	more	dangerous	
kind	 of	 ambiguity	 or	 ‘lying’	 exists	 in	 the	 newspapers.	 Although	 the	 newspapers	
claimed	 to	 contain	 truth,	 they	 often	were	 accused	 of	 containing	 lies.51	However,	
newspapers	did	not	contain	ideological	truths	that	could	redeem	or	mitigate	their	
factual	 falsehood.	 In	 Book	 18,	 the	 Female	 Spectator,	 herself,	 attacks	 the	
newspapers	as	a	source	of	lies:	
	 There	are	Lies	calculated	to	last	a	Month,	a	Week,	a	Day,	nay	
sometimes	contradicted	by	 those	 that	 forged	 them,	 the	same	Hour;	
and	 whoever	 should	 pretend	 to	 relate	 any	 thing	 he	 hears	 from	

















In	 newspapers,	 it	 seems,	 factual	 truth	 is	 crucial	 since	 there	 is	 not	 an	 ideological	
end	that	one	finds	in	the	Bible	or	even	a	novel.	Regardless,	Haywood	(through	her	
eidolon)	 characterizes	 her	 periodical	 work	 as	 something	 much	 different	 from	
newspapers,	 and	Manushag	Powell	 affirms	her	 claims.	As	Powell	 puts	 it,	 ‘Single-
essay	periodicals	were	not	read	 in	 the	same	way	as	news	sheets,	and	 they	had	a	
markedly	 different	 relationship	 to	 their	 readers.	 They	 present	 themselves	 as	




In	 Book	 18,	 in	 addition	 to	 attacking	 the	 lies	 in	 newspapers,	 the	 Female	
Spectator	attacks	many	other	types	of	lies,	too,	and	while	she	says	that	she	cannot	
list	them	all,	she	does	list	quite	a	few.		She	says,		
Every	 one	 knows	 that	 there	 are	 Patriot	 Lies,—Ministerial	 Lies,—
Screening	Lies,—Accusative	Lies,—Lies	to	rouze	the	Malecontent,	and	









and	 lies	 to	 depreciate	 public	 Credit,	 according	 as	 either	 serves	 the	
purpose	of	Change	Alley;—Lies	called	Private	Intelligence	from	Fleets	
and	Camps;—Lies,	 that	 bear	 the	Name	of	Secret	Histories;—Lies,	 to	




the	 various	 levels	 of	 significance	of	 those	 implications.	54	Here,	 however,	 I	would	
like	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 Female	 Spectator’s	 mentioning	 of	 ‘Secret	 Histories’.	 This	
inclusion	 might	 have	 given	 readers	 pause	 since	 Eliza	 Haywood	 wrote	 ‘secret	
histories’	herself,	including	such	works	as	The	British	Recluse;	or,	the	Secret	History	
of	Cleomira,	Supposed	Dead	(1724)	and	The	Secret	History	of	the	Present	Intrigues	of	
the	 Court	 of	 Caramania	 (1727). 55 	Although	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 was	 first	
published	anonymously,	Patrick	Spedding	says	that	‘it	seems	likely	that	Haywood	
was	 soon	known	 to	be	 the	author’,	 even	 though	evidence	of	her	authorship	only	
dates	from	1751	forward.56	Therefore,	readers	who	knew	Haywood’s	reputation	as	
a	 fiction	writer—which	 they	most	 surely	would,	 considering	 the	 fame	of	Love	 in	
Excess	 (1719)—might	 begin	 to	 wonder	 how	 sincere	 her	 words	 could	 be	 if	 they	













approach	 to	 the	 text	 and	 its	 authority.	 Granted,	 this	 type	 of	 suspicion	 was	 a	
standard	 part	 of	 the	 reading	 process,	 and	 Haywood’s	 rhetorical	 move	 is	 not	
original,	 but,	 nevertheless,	 it	 engages	 the	 readers’	 judgment	 and	opens	up	 space	
for	interpretation.57	
	 It	 is	 through	 travel	 narratives,	 however,	 that	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 finally	




There	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 Latitude,	 they	 say,	 given	 to	 Travellers	 to	
exceed	 the	 Truth,	 but	 I	 can	 by	 no	 Means	 allow	 it	 them,	 nor	 can	
imagine	 any	 Reason	why	 they	 should	 expect	 it:	We	 read	 Books	 of	
Voyages	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 us	 acquainted	 with	 the	 Customs	 and	
Manners	 of	 Nations	 remote	 from	 us,	 and	 which	 we	 have	 no	
Opportunity,	 or	 perhaps	 Inclination,	 to	 visit	 in	 Person;	 and	 if	 the	
Author,	 on	 whom	 we	 depend,	 deceives	 our	 Enquiries,	 and	 gives	 a	
fictitious	 Account	 instead	 of	 a	 real	 one,	 our	 Time	 in	 reading	 him	
would	be,	in	my	Opinion,	as	indifferently	employed	as	on	Amadis	de	
Gaul,	Cassandra,	or	any	other	Romance.	(FS18,	II:3,	183)58		
This	passage	 explicitly	 raises	 the	 issue	of	 the	 readers’	 trust	 in	 the	 author,	 and	 it	












the	disciplines	of	 law,	history,	 and	 the	new	empirical	natural	history	might	have	
disintegrated’.59	This	distrust	stemmed	from	a	long	history	of	travel	narratives	that	
blurred	fact	and	fiction	and,	at	times,	were	hoaxes	and	shams.	Kate	Loveman	gives	
detailed	 accounts	 of	 several,	 including	 A	 True	 and	 Exact	 Relation	 of	 the	 Strange	
Finding	Out	of	Moses	his	Tombe	by	Thomas	Chaloner	(1656)	and	The	Isle	of	Pines	by	
Henry	Neville	(1668),	the	latter	of	which	was	‘the	most	celebrated	hoax	of	the	later	
seventeenth	 century’.	60	As	with	 apparition	narratives	 in	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer	
and	 with	 historical	 discourse	 in	 The	 Adventures	 of	 Eovaai	 (and	 with	 natural	
philosophy	in	both),	Haywood	again	engages	with	a	male-dominated	tradition	that	
evokes	 the	 debate	 between	 scepticism	 and	 credulity.	 Travel	 narratives	 raise	
similar	problems	of	 testimony	 that	 I	discussed	 in	 chapters	one	and	 two,	wherein	
the	credibility	of	the	relator	is	central	to	authenticating	the	report.61	
	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 then	 that	when	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 follows	
her	admonition	against	false	travel	tales	with	a	travel	narrative	about	a	voyage	to	
Summatra,	 she	 attempts	 to	 assure	 the	 reader	 of	 its	 credibility.	 Specifically,	 she	
claims	 that	 the	 narrative’s	 ‘[v]eracity	 may	 be	 depended	 on’	 because	 she	 is	
acquainted	 with	 the	 ‘gentleman’	 who	 wrote	 it.	 Her	 emphasis	 on	 his	 status	 as	 a	














the	 report	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 first-person	 eye-witness	 account,	 which	 was	 an	
important	component	for	credibility.	Finally,	the	narrative	includes	many	realistic	
details	of	 topography,	people,	and	culture.	Each	of	 these	details	are	conventional	
elements	 for	 authenticating	 travel	 narratives,	 and	many	 of	 these	 elements	were	
the	 result	 of	 directions	 for	 careful	 travel	 reporting	 that	 were	 promoted	 by	 The	
Royal	 Society.63	Despite	 these	 features,	 however,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 offers	 no	
proof	for	the	narrative.	It	is,	perhaps,	this	lack	of	proof	that	leads	her	to	anticipate	
some	scepticism	about	one	part	of	the	tale	that	describes	the	native	tribe’s	worship	
of	 an	 inanimate	 idol	 of	 their	 own	 creation.	 She	 says,	 ‘You	 will	 say	 this	 is	





true.	 In	other	words,	 she	suggests	 that	 the	 truth	of	 the	 idea—combined	with	her	
own	 authority	 and	 her	 acquaintance	 with	 the	 contributor—should	 sufficiently	
affirm	the	truth	of	the	tale.	However,	if	her	readers	begin	to	question	the	narrative	














indicate	above,	 the	one	bit	of	 scepticism	 that	 the	Female	Spectator	anticipates	 is	
about	the	story	of	the	Idol	that	the	‘Indians’	built	themselves	and	then	worshipped,	
and	 the	Female	Spectator	 spends	a	 full	page	defending	 the	 realism	of	 this	detail.	
Not	only	does	she	suggest	that	this	kind	of	worship	can	be	seen	in	the	world	by	her	
readers,	 but	 also	 she	 observes	 that	 the	 Summatrans’	 idol	 is	 inanimate	 and	
therefore,	 cannot	 hurt	 anyone—unlike	 some	 of	 the	 animate	 examples	 she	 has	
observed	closer	to	home,	which	are	much	worse.	She	says,	
Unanimated	 Idols	 will	 remain	 wherever	 they	 are	 placed	 by	 those	
that	 make	 them:—They	 have	 not	 the	 Power	 of	 deceiving	 or	
betraying	us,	nor	can	take	any	thing	from	us	but	what	we	are	pleased	
to	give,	and	which	we	also	may	resume	if	we	think	fit.—But	when	we	
create	 ourselves	Deities	 of	 Flesh	 and	Blood,	 and	 blindly	 resolve	 to	





















has	digressed	 from	her	original	subject	of	 lying	and	deception;	however,	 I	would	
argue	that	her	traveller’s	tale—along	with	her	attack	on	animated	idols—is	not	a	
digression	 at	 all	 but	 rather	 a	 part	 of	 her	 rhetorical	 strategy	 to	 challenge	 her	
readers	 to	 abandon	 their	 gullibility	 and	 their	willingness	 to	 be	 deceived	 in	 both	
political	and	private	matters.	If	we	remember,	the	Female	Spectator	began	Book	18	
by	 indicating	 that	 she	 could	 not	 include	 the	 political	 letters	 of	 Alcander	 and	Mr.	
Tell-Truth	because	of	 their	political	nature,	and	she	 laments	 the	 fact	 that,	even	 if	
she	had	 included	Mr.	Tell-Truth’s	 letter,	what	 he	had	written	might	not	 ‘remove	
the	Mist	from	[the	Generality	of	the	People’s]	long	clouded	Eyes’	because	‘we	take	
Pleasure	 in	 being	 deceived’	 (FS18,	 II:3,	 178).	 That	 is	 how	 the	 Female	 Spectator	
begins	Book	18,	and	her	discussion	of	 idol	worship	does	not,	 in	 fact,	 seem	 like	a	
digression	from	her	subject.	Rather,	it	seems	like	a	perfect	example	of	the	problem	
that	 she	 has	 chosen	 (not)	 to	 address.	 Nevertheless,	 by	 telling	 the	 tale,	 and	 then	
calling	 it	 a	 ‘digression’,	 she	 keeps	 political	 concerns	 in	 the	minds	 of	 the	 readers	
while	claiming	that	such	concerns	are	not	her	subject.	This	strategy	not	only	gives	
her	some	protection	 from	accusations	of	seditious	 libel,	but	also	 it	encourages,	 if	
not	requires,	the	reader	to	take	a	more	active	role	in	interpreting	the	meaning	of	
the	text.	






have	 received	 some	worthwhile	 contributions	 and	 letters	 that	deserve	 inclusion,	
the	first	of	these	being	a	contribution	from	Eumenes,	whose	previous	 letter	from	
Book	 16	 includes	 the	 account	 of	 Topsy-Turvy	 Island	 that	 is	 purportedly	
transcribed	 from	 ‘an	 old	 Book	 of	 Voyages’	 about	 a	 society	 which	 has	 many	
‘inversions’	 of	 British	 society.	 The	 narrative	 from	 Book	 16	 is	 clearly	 a	 satirical	
fiction,	but	neither	Eumenes	nor	the	Female	Spectator	acknowledges	it	to	be	such.	
In	 addition,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 employs	 conventional	 rhetorical	 strategies	 to	
suggest	 that	 the	 letter	writer,	himself,	 is	 real.	 She	claims	 that	 she	and	her	 fellow	
editors	have	chosen	to	omit	a	paragraph	of	his	letter	because	they	‘feared	it	might	
be	taken	as	aimed	at	a	particular	Lady’	(FS16,	II:3,	116).	Here,	as	in	Book	8,	Book	
18,	 and	 elsewhere,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	 uses	 silence,	 censorship,	 and	 absence,	
creating	 what	 Earla	 Wilputte	 calls	 a	 ‘heighten[ed]	 awareness’	 of	 ‘selective	
reality’.64	However,	at	the	same	time	that	Haywood	uses	this	 ‘censorship’	to	open	
possibilities	 of	 ambiguity	 and	 interpretation,	 she	 also	 uses	 it	 to	 authenticate	 the	
letter.	 In	 other	words,	 she	 uses	 absence	 to	 assert	 the	 reality	 of	what	 is	 present.	
After	all,	 if	the	letter	were	not	real,	why	would	she	need	to	edit	 it?	Of	course,	the	
indication	that	 the	 letter	 is	real	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	 the	travel	report,	
itself,	 is	 true,	especially	since	 it	 is	one	source	removed	even	 from	Eumenes,	who	
says	that	he	took	the	narrative	from	another	book.	In	other	words,	the	narrative	is	
not	 based	 on	 an	 eye-witness	 account.	 The	 Female	 Spectator,	 herself,	 remains	
ambiguous	on	the	veracity	of	the	island	tale.	Even	as	she	expresses	curiosity	about	










has	not	yet	devoted	an	entire	chapter	 to	 the	 importance	of	 truth-telling.	 In	other	
words,	 the	 implications	 of	 fiction-presented-as-truth	 are	 not	 as	 rhetorically	
consequential	in	Book	16	as	they	are	in	Book	19.	In	addition,	the	narrative	in	Book	
19,	while	 quite	 obviously	 fictional,	mirrors	 the	 conventions	 of	 the	more	 realistic	
narrative	of	Summatra	 in	Book	18,	and	 the	 juxtaposition	of	 these	 two	 tales	casts	
additional	suspicion	on	the	Summatra	narrative,	 thereby	raising	the	potential	 for	
scepticism	 among	 readers.	 In	 his	 discussion	 of	 travel	 tales,	 Percy	 G.	 Adams	
describes	 the	spectrum	of	 travel	 ‘lies’	 from	 those	 that	are	meant	 to	deceive	 (like	





	 At	 the	beginning	of	Book	19,	 the	Female	Spectator	continues	her	 focus	on	
truth	 and	 trustworthiness.	 She	 begins	 by	 suggesting	 that	 some	 readers	 might	
suspect	 that	 she	 offers	 favouritism	 to	 some	 contributors	 over	 others—that	 she	
publishes	 her	 favourites	while	 delaying	 the	 rest.	 She	 reassures	 readers	 that	 she	
and	her	collaborators	publish	 letters	 in	the	order	 in	which	they	are	received	and	
that	 the	 dates	would	 give	 them	 away	 if	 they	 did	 not	 do	 so,	 saying	 ‘Neither	 is	 it	
possible	for	any	one	to	be	deceived	in	this	Point,	were	we	capable	of	attempting	it,	
because	the	Dates	of	the	Epistles	themselves	would	rise	up	against	us’	(FS19,	II:3,	
219).	 Of	 course,	 this	 assertion	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 letter	







easily	 be	 changed	 in	 the	 printing,	 and,	 therefore,	 it	 also	 leaves	 readers	with	 the	
realization	 that	 such	 deception	 is	 possible.	 By	 starting	 with	 this	 dubious	
reassurance,	 the	 Female	 Spectator	might	 lead	 readers	 to	 recall	 the	 discussion	 of	
Book	18,	in	which	she	says,		
To	find	oneself	the	Dupe	of	others,	even	in	the	most	trivial	Affairs,	in	
my	 Opinion,	 is	 a	 very	 great	 Mortification,	 and	 such	 a	 one,	 as	 one	
should	 think,	 was	 scarce	 to	 be	 forgiven;	 yet	 in	 these	 degenerate	




fairness	 and	 veracity	 without	 a	 sense	 that	 it	 is,	 in	 fact,	 possible	 that	 they,	 as	
readers,	are	being	duped	about	letters	from	contributors—as	well	as	about	other	
content	 in	 the	 text,	 and	 it	 seems	 that	Eliza	Haywood’s	 readers	would	respond	 to	
Book	 19	 with	 a	 similar	 awareness.	 As	 Loveman	 argues,	 the	 early	 eighteenth-




two	 weeks	 after	 the	 publication	 of	 Book	 18	 whereas	 the	 other	 books	 were	
published	 at	 least	 a	month	 apart.	 According	 to	 the	 publication	 dates	 offered	 by	









	 After	 beginning	 Book	 19	with	 the	 insistence	 that	 she	 is	 being	 fair	 to	 her	










all	 of	 the	 geographical	 details	 of	 the	 island	 since	 he	 ‘arriv[ed]	 there	 by	 very	
extraordinary	Means’:	
It	 would,	 doubtless,	 be	 easy	 for	 me	 to	 supply	 this	 Deficiency	 by	
Invention,	 and	 pretend,	 to	 have	 said	 the	 Island	 is	 North	 of	 such	 a	
Place,	 and	 South	 of	 such	 a	 Place,	 being	 in	 no	 Danger	 of	 being	
confuted	 by	 any	 present	 or	 future	 Columbus;	 but	 I	 was	 bred	 in	 a	
Detestation	 of	 Deceit,	 and	 tho’	 I	 am	 yet	 arrived,	 after	 ten	 Years	
Travels,	at	not	higher	Post	than	a	Midshipman,	could	not	answer	to	
my	 own	 Soul	 the	Meanness	 of	 Lye	 in	 any	 Shape,	 or	 to	 answer	 any	
End.	(FS19,	II:3,	221)		










However,	 because	 of	 the	 focus	 on	 truth	 in	 Book	 18,	 regular	 readers	 of	 the	
periodical	 likely	would	have	a	heightened	awareness	of	 the	discrepancy	between	
the	narrative	of	Book	19	and	claims	about	 the	text	and	 its	reality.	Lennard	Davis	
has	 suggested	 that	 readers	 (and	writers)	of	 the	 time	had	a	difficult	 time	making	
distinctions	between	 fact	and	 fiction,	but	Loveman	argues	otherwise,	 saying	 that	
readers	recognized	the	differences	and	saw	it	as	their	job	to	avoid	being	duped.68	
The	 Female	 Spectator,	 at	 least,	 has	 indicated	 that	 she	 recognizes	 the	 difference	




II:2,	376).69	Yet,	here,	 in	her	own	 travel	 tales,	 she	employs	 conventions	 that	blur	
history	 and	 romance	 and	 even	 thwart	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 two,	 and	 by	
doing	 so,	 after	 the	 diatribe	 on	 deception	 in	 Book	 18,	 she	 brings	 those	 very	
distinctions	to	the	foreground	for	her	readers,	thus	putting	them	in	charge	of	the	
determination	 of	 fact	 and	 fiction,	 a	 required	 position	 for	 readers	 of	 travel	
reports.70	


















or	 Irony,	 in	any	other	Case,	 yet	when	 it	 is	made	Use	of	 to	 cure	 the	
Faults	of	 those	Persons	we	have	no	Authority	 to	 reprove,	 I	 think	 it	
highly	laudable.	(FS18,	II:3,	203)		




in	 whom	 they	 traditionally	 are	 meant	 to	 place	 their	 trust—an	 author	 who	 has	
spent	 a	 lot	of	 time	and	 textual	 space	building	up	her	authority.	And,	 in	 addition,	
they	 are	 given	 a	 satire,	 which	 is	 the	 exact	 type	 of	 deception	 that	 the	 Female	
Spectator	has	indicated	can	be	used	to	‘cure	the	Faults	of	those	Persons	we	have	no	
Authority	 to	 reprove’.	 It	 is	 therefore	 fitting,	 that	 the	 satire	 itself	 implicates	 two	
such	 sources	 of	 authority:	 the	House	 of	 Hanover	 and	 Robert	Walpole.	 This	 shift	
back	 to	 politics	 exploits	 the	wariness	 she	has	 elicited	 in	 her	 readers	 and	directs	
that	scepticism	towards	its	more	important	target.	




a	 kind	 of	 an	 Appendix	 to	 a	 great	 Monarch	 on	 the	 Continent,	 by	 whom	 it	 had	
formerly	 been	 conquered’	 (FS19,	 II:3,	 222).	 King	 and	 Pettit	 note	 that	 the	






easily	 seen	 aspects	 of	 English	 politics	 in	 the	 account	 (FS19,	 II:3,	 222n3).	 This	
assumption	 seems	 validated	 by	 the	 text	 itself,	 which	 says,	 ‘But	 there	 is	 little	
Occasion	to	expatiate	on	this	Fate,	because	every	one	knows	the	unhappy	Situation	
of	a	Country,	which,	from	being	perfectly	independent,	is	reduced	to	being	no	more	











who	 ‘had	 a	 greater	 Share	 of	 Reason’	 and	 could	 see	 clearly	 the	 ‘Miseries	 of	 their	
Country’	(FS19,	II:3,	227).	This	man	tells	the	narrator	that,	in	the	past,	the	islanders	
rose	up	against	rulers	who	‘dar’d	to	exceed	the	Bounds	a	good	Magistrate	ought	to	
observe’,	 but	 that	 in	 recent	 times,	 a	 new	Vice-Roy,	 Hiamack,	 has	 taken	 over	 the	









from	 their	 Loins,	 from	 Generation	 to	 Generation,	 and	 from	 Age	 to	
Age,	 should	 be	 deprived	 of	 all	 Power	 of	 judging	 for	 themselves;	 of	
distinguishing	between	what	is	in	their	Interest,	and	what	is	not;	and	
in	 fine,	 from	 that	 Time	 forward	 become	 dead	 to	 all	 Sense	 of	what	
they	were,	or	what	they	ought	to	be.	(FS19,	II:3,	227)		
Hiamack	seems	to	be	a	clear	reference	to	Robert	Walpole,	an	interpretation	that	is	
supported	 by	King	 and	 Pettit	 (FS19,	 II:3,	 228n5);	 however,	most	 relevant	 to	my	
argument	is	the	characterization	of	the	islanders	who	have	fallen	under	his	spell,	
much	 like	 the	 islanders	 in	 Memoirs	 of	 an	 Uncertain	 Island	 Adjacent	 to	 Utopia	
(1725)	and	the	citizens	of	Hypotofa	in	The	Adventures	of	Eovaai.	The	very	trait	that	
they	 have	 lost—‘of	 judging	 for	 themselves’—is	 one	 that	 the	 Female	 Spectator	
returns	 to	 again	 and	 again	 through	 the	 entirety	 of	 her	 periodical	 (as	 she	 does	
throughout	her	career).	She	spends	time	on	this	issue	in	many	books	of	The	Female	
Spectator,	 including	 in	 Book	 4,	which	 focuses	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 solitude	 and	
reflection.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 Book	 4,	 for	 example,	 she	 says,	 ‘It	 is	 .	 .	 .	 the	 Business	 of	





the	 Topsy-Turvyans	 who	 are	 under	 the	 spell	 of	 Hiamack	 and,	 by	 satirical	
implication,	it	describes	what	has	happened	to	the	British	people	under	its	recent	







food,	 admitting	 that	 Hiamack	may	 have	 known	 some	 recipe	 to	 affect	 those	who	
attended	 the	banquet,	but	he	wonders	how	the	subsequent	generations	could	be	
affected,	 and	 he	 speculates	 that	while	 the	magic	 (or	 a	 chemical	 potion,	 since	 he	
confesses	 scepticism	 about	 the	 islanders’	 supernatural	 explanations)	might	 have	
directly	affected	 those	at	 the	banquet,	 their	 children	must	have	been	affected	by	
the	 ‘corrupt	manners’	of	 their	 fathers.	Ultimately,	 regarding	 the	cause	of	 this	on-
going	 ‘infatuation’	 and	 ‘indolence’	 the	 narrator	 says,	 ‘But	 to	 relate	 Matters,	 not	
refine	upon	them,	is	I	take	it	the	only	Business	of	an	Historian,	so	I	shall	leave	it	to	
the	Reader	to	judge	as	he	thinks	most	reasonable	of	the	Cause	of	this	Degeneracy	of	
a	once	brave	and	nice	people’	 (FS19,	 II:3,	229).71	Again,	 the	 reader	 is	 confronted	
with	 a	 truth	 claim	 about	 the	 historical	 nature	 of	 the	 text,	 but	 perhaps	 more	
important,	at	 this	point,	 is	 that	 the	 interpretation	of	events	 is	 left	 to	 the	readers.	
This	point	of	interpretation	is	not	just	a	matter	of	factual	truth,	but	rather	a	matter	
of	 implications	 one	 might	 draw	 from	 the	 report.	 Shapiro	 notes	 that	 in	 the	 late	
seventeenth	 century,	 there	 was	 much	 debate	 about	 whether	 or	 not	 travel	
reporters	 should	 offer	 prescriptive	 comments	 based	 on	 their	 experiences	 (e.g.,	
recommendations	 for	 changes	 to	 cultural	 behaviour	or	politics)	 or	whether	 they	
should	just	stick	to	factual	reporting.	Some	travel	reporters	were	highly	criticized	
for	offering	such	instruction,	and	their	narratives	were	labelled	as	both	biased	and	











World,	 whatever	 may	 be	 told	 them,	 or	 how	 much	 seeming	 Cause	
soever	 they	 may	 have	 to	 flatter	 themselves	 with	 an	 Assurance	 of	
Freedom,	 not	 to	 neglect	 searching,	 with	 the	 most	 enquiring	 and	
impartial	 Eye,	 into	 all	 that	 that	 passes;	 to	 examine	 into	 the	 most	
hidden	Motives;	 and,	 disdaining	 to	 be	 guided	 by	 Appearances	 and	
fair	 Pretences,	 judge	 for	 themselves,	 and	 boldly	 declare	 their	
Approbation	or	Disapprobation	of	what	is	doing.		
	 This	 alone	 is	 true	 Liberty;	 for	where	 Freedom	of	 judging	 or	






that	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 is—at	 its	 heart—a	 conservative	 conduct	 manual	 that	
prescribes	conformity	to	precept	and	custom	since	here	it	affirms	a	liberal	theory	
of	 government	 that	 relies	 on	 consent	 of	 the	 governed.73	Although	 The	 Female	
Spectator	 has	 been	 read	 as	 one	of	Haywood’s	 least	 sexually	 scandalous	 texts,	 its	
encouragement	of	autonomy	for	women	challenges	a	conservative	interpretation.	
The	above	passage	offers	a	direct	call	for	readers	to	challenge	authority,	which	is	










assumption	 that	 Haywood’s	 central	 audience	 was	 women—that	 The	 Female	
Spectator	was	‘the	first	periodical	for	women	by	a	woman’.74	Pollock	argues,	in	fact,	
that	 in	 The	 Female	 Spectator,	 Haywood	 actually	 subverts	 the	 conduct	 periodical	
genre,	rather	than	fulfilling	or	imitating	it.75	Second,	The	Female	Spectator,	because	
of	 its	 challenge	 to	 male	 authority,	 continues	 the	 admonition	 that	 readers	 must	
judge	 information	 and	 circumstances	 for	 themselves	 and	 avoid	being	duped	 and	
deceived	 by	 others,	 no	 matter	 how	 seductive	 the	 deception	 might	 be	 (an	
admonition	 reiterated	 in	The	Parrot,	which	 follows	The	Female	Spectator	by	 just	
several	 months).	 Third,	 it	 suggests	 a	 movement	 away	 from	 more	 authoritative	
earlier	 periodicals	 such	 as	 the	 Tatler,	 in	 which	 the	 editorial	 persona,	 Isaac	
Bickerstaff,	 says	 he	 hopes	 that	 readers	might	 be	 ‘instructed,	 after	 their	 Reading,	
what	to	think;	Which	shall	be	the	End	and	Purpose	of	this	my	Paper’.76	In	contrast,	





individuals’	 abilities	 to	 think	 for	 themselves	 in	 an	 effective	 way.	 In	 The	 Female	
Spectator,	however,	Haywood	offers	several	possible	processes	 for	remedying,	 to	
some	degree,	the	problems	of	 judgment	that	she	has	previously	emphasized.	One	













involves	 the	 reader’s	 relationship	 to	 the	 ‘experimental	 image’.	 Central	 to	 the	
pedagogy	of	The	Female	Spectator	 is	the	relationship	between	the	author	and	the	
reader,	 a	 relationship	 that	 is	 mediated	 through	 the	 eidolon	 of	 the	 Female	
Spectator.	 A	 significant	 contribution	 of	 eighteenth-century	 periodicals	 is,	 in	 fact,	
this	 relationship,	 which	 has	 much	 in	 common	 with	 the	 relationship	 between	
theatre	performers	and	their	audience.77	Haywood’s	experience	in	the	theatre	not	
only	gives	her	experience	with	performance,	but	also	gives	her	experience	with	the	
process	 of	 imagining	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 mindsets—something	 that	 The	 Female	
Spectator	leads	its	readers	to	do	by	offering	an	‘experimental	image’	for	its	readers.	
Mikhail	 Bakhtin	 defines	 an	 ‘experimental	 image’	 as	 the	 ‘image	 of	 a	 speaking	
person’,	 and	 he	 explains	 that	 when	 readers	 engage	 with	 such	 an	 image,	 they	
‘attempt	to	guess,	to	imagine,	how	a	person	with	authority	might	conduct	himself	
in	the	given	circumstances,	the	light	he	would	cast	on	them	with	his	discourse’.78	In	
an	 authorial	 note	 to	 his	 text,	 Bakhtin	 offers	 Socrates	 as	 an	 example	 of	 ‘the	wise	
man	and	teacher	for	the	purpose	of	experiment’.79	Some	might	resist	the	notion	of	
comparing	the	Female	Spectator’s	function	to	that	of	Socrates,	but	I	would	suggest	
that,	 for	 her	 readers,	 she,	 like	 Socrates,	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘the	 image	 of	 a	
speaking	person’	whose	 judgment	and	 thoughts	are	 imagined	and	anticipated	by	
readers.	Manushag	Powell	makes	a	 similar	point	when	 she	defines	 ‘eidolon’.	 She	
says	 that	 ‘an	 eidolon	 in	 the	 Platonic	 sense	 is	 a	 projected	 image,	 the	 double	
phantom	or	simulacrum	for	a	person.	.	.	.	It	is	the	image	of	the	author	that	is	meant	










readers	 are,	 indeed,	 imagining	 how	 she	 will	 respond	 to	 particular	 situations	 or	
‘what	light	she	will	cast’	with	her	discourse.	In	Book	9	for	example,	in	a	response	to	
a	 letter	writer	 called	 ‘John	 Careful’	who	writes	 on	 the	 abuses	 of	 tea,	 the	 Female	
Spectator	says,	‘I	DARE	say	one	Half	of	my	Readers	will	expect	me	to	be	very	angry	
at	this	Declamation	against	an	Amusement	my	Sex	are	generally	so	fond	of;	but	it	is	
the	 firm	 Resolution	 of	 our	 Club	 to	 maintain	 strict	 Impartiality	 in	 these	
Lucubrations;	 and	 were	 any	 of	 us	 ever	 so	 deeply	 affected	 by	 the	 Satire,	 (which	
thank	Heaven	we	are	not)	we	should,	notwithstanding,	allow	it	to	be	just’	(FS8,	II:2,	
283).	 So,	 before	 offering	 her	 club’s	 response	 to	 the	 letter,	 she	 indicates	 that	 her	
readers	will	 likely	anticipate	or	expect	a	particular	 response	 from	her.	 Shevelow	





imagined	 discourse,	 but,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 are	 creating	 and	 imagining	 a	
multiplicity	 of	 possible	 discourses	 for	 themselves,	 thereby	 internalizing	 the	
dialogic	 process	 and	 becoming	 ‘authors’	 of	 interpretation—something	 that,	 I	
would	 argue,	 Eliza	 Haywood	 wants	 them	 to	 do.	 	 For	 Haywood,	 it	 seems,	 this	
process	of	imagining	the	judgments	of	others	is	a	potential	strategy	for	reaching	an	











Although	 eidolons	 of	 earlier	 periodicals	 also	 functioned	 as	 experimental	
images	 (readers	 might	 wonder,	 for	 example,	 ‘What	 would	 Isaac	 Bickerstaff	 say	
about	this	or	that?’),	their	authoritative	nature	leads	to	a	different	effect	than	what	
we	see	in	Haywood.	Haywood	builds	relationships	and	readers’	authority	through	
her	 experimental	 image,	 but	 through	 this	 process,	 she	 is	 also	 teaching	 readers	 a	
particularly	important	strategy	for	 judging	well.	As	I	have	shown	in	chapters	one	
and	 two,	Haywood	demonstrates	extreme	scepticism	about	 individuals’	ability	 to	




experience’.83	However,	 as	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 Haywood	
seems	 quite	 suspicious	 of	 the	 sensory	 perceptions	 that	 come	 from	 ‘visible	 and	
tangible	experience’.	Douglas	Casson	says	that	‘Locke	sought	to	shape	the	way	his	
readers	form	judgments	and	deliberate	over	matters	of	public	importance’,	and	in	
this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 that	 Haywood	 does	 the	 same.84	However,	 whereas	 Locke	
develops	 a	 standard	 of	 judgment	 based	 on	 sensory	 experience,	 Haywood’s	
standard	 is	based	more	on	 rationalism	and	one’s	ability	 to	 imagine	and	evaluate	
multiple	judgments.		











that	 in	The	Tea	Table,	Haywood	is	 interested	 in	a	combination	of	both	the	 ‘group	
endeavor’	 and	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	 ‘independent	 individual’	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	
knowledge.85	She	 says,	 ‘Ultimately,	 Haywood’s	Tea	Table	 proposes	 that	 although	
neither	 the	 wholly	 social	 self	 nor	 the	 wholly	 isolated	 self	 can	 generate	 reliable	
knowledge,	the	self	can	generate	reliable	knowledge	when	it	balances	mental	and	
emotional	detachment	with	mental	and	social	engagement’.86	The	detachment	part	
of	 this	 balance	 can	 often	 be	 seen	 in	 Haywood’s	 work	when	 characters	 retire	 in	
solitude	 to	 have	 the	 ‘liberty	 of	 reflection’,	 a	 phrase	 used	 by	 Alovysa	 in	 Love	 in	
Excess	 (1719).87	In	 fact,	 Book	 4	 of	The	Female	Spectator	 focuses	 on	 solitude	 and	
emphasizes	the	benefit	of	retirement	as	a	time	to	think.	However,	such	moments	of	
solitude	 can	 be	 fraught	 by	 an	 individual’s	 narrow	 thinking	 or	 by	 the	 undue	
influence	of	recent	company.	For	example,	in	The	Adventures	of	Eovaai,	during	her	
moments	of	reflection,	Eovaai	tends	to	think	in	whatever	way	is	most	like	that	of	
the	 last	 person	 with	 whom	 she	 has	 spoken,	 whether	 they	 be	 libertine	 or	
republican.	 She	 is	 very	 easily	 influenced.	 The	 benefit	 of	The	Female	Spectator,	 it	
seems,	 is	 that	 it	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 for	 both	 engagement	 and	 reflection.	
Readers	 are	 able	 to	 imagine	 what	 the	 ‘author’	 thinks	 about	 a	 particular	 issue	






















people,	 and	 our	 first	 judgments	 of	 right	 and	 wrong	 concern	 the	
conduct	and	sentiments	of	other	people.88	
The	benefits	of	 impartiality	 that	Nazar	describes	have	been	 in	 the	 foreground	of	
Haywood’s	work	 since	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer,	 but	 in	The	Female	Spectator,	 she	
moves	 further	 towards	 establishing	 the	 ‘inhabitant	 of	 the	 breast’	 within	 her	
readers.	 In	 Haywood’s	 periodical,	 the	 experimental	 image,	 along	with	 the	 larger	
community	 of	 the	 periodical,	 allows	 readers	 to	 practise	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘enlarged	
mentality’,	 even	as	 they	maintain	 their	own	opportunities	 for	 reflection.89	This	 is	
not	 just	 a	 one-way	 process,	 either.	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 also	 imagines	 her	
readers,	 stating	at	 times	what	she	 thinks	 they	might	be	 thinking.	This	process	of	
imagining	the	judgments	of	others	can	decrease	the	biased,	short-sighted,	and	self-
interested	types	of	judgment	that	Haywood	problematizes	in	texts	like	A	Spy	Upon	















	 In	 my	 first	 two	 chapters,	 I	 focused	 on	 Haywood’s	 engagement	 with	 the	
concerns	of	natural	philosophers	in	order	to	examine	her	scepticism	and	attitudes	
towards	 judgment.	 In	 The	 Female	 Spectator,	 Haywood	 begins	 to	 mitigate	 her	
scepticism—not	through	sensory	experience	(as	the	natural	philosophers	do),	but	
through	 the	 development	 and	 privileging	 of	 the	 intersubjectivity	 between	 the	
eidolon	 and	 her	 readers.	 Specifically,	 Haywood	 develops	 readers’	 judgment	 by	
eliciting	 their	 interaction	 with	 an	 experimental	 image	 (thereby	 enlarging	 their	
thoughts)	and	by	invoking	their	scepticism	of	authority	as	she	first	constructs	an	
authoritative	voice	and	then,	later,	deconstructs	that	authority	in	order	to	decentre	
it.	 Central	 to	 the	pedagogy	of	 this	 periodical	 is	Haywood’s	 employment	of	 travel	
narratives,	which	not	only	trigger	the	sceptical	reading	habits	of	her	audience	but	
also	Haywood’s	 engagement	with	 an	 important	 and	 common	discourse	 that	was	
defined	and	dominated	by	men.	
	 In	 addition	 to	 teaching	 strategies	 for	 judgment,	 the	 employment	 of	 the	
‘experimental	 image’	 develops	 readers’	 imagination,	 thus	 drawing	 a	 connection	
between	judgment	and	imagination,	periodicals	and	fiction.	In	the	introduction	to	
Fair	 Philosopher:	 Eliza	 Haywood	 and	 ‘The	 Female	 Spectator’,	 editors	 Lynn	 Marie	





Spectator	 and	 Haywood’s	 fiction	 .	 .	 .	 have	 yet	 to	 be	 explored	 at	 length’.90	This	
neglect	might,	in	part,	stem	from	the	way	early	critics	like	Clara	Reeves	tended	to	
conflate	 the	 titular	 persona	 of	 the	 text	 with	 the	 true	 voice	 of	 Eliza	 Haywood,	
concluding	 that	 the	 differences	 between	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 and	 Haywood’s	
early	 novels	 could	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 Eliza	Haywood,	 the	 author,	 had	
reformed	 her	 scandalous	 and	 promiscuous	 ways.91	However,	 by	 making	 a	 clear	
distinction	between	Haywood	and	her	eidolon,	one	can	better	see	how	Haywood	
uses	 her	 fictional	 eidolon	 to	 evoke	 both	 the	 judgment	 and	 imagination	 of	 her	




above,	 have	 read	 it	 this	 way.	 However,	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 development	 of	 this	
periodical	over	its	two-year	run,	one	can	see	Haywood	moving	toward	something	
much	 more	 dialogic	 and	 polyphonic	 than	 what	 readers	 encountered	 in	 earlier	
authoritative	 essay-periodicals.	 The	 dialogic	 performance	 that	 one	 finds	 in	 The	
Female	Spectator—a	performance	that	ends	with	the	author	encouraging	readers	
to	 think,	 and	 interpret,	 for	 themselves—is	 central	 not	 only	 to	 Haywood’s	
















response	 .	 .	 .	 places	 her	 with	 the	 great	 male	 writers	 of	 her	 time,	 including	
Richardson,	Fielding,	and	Sterne,	who	were	exploring	author-reader	relationships	
and	 fictional	conventions’.93	Haywood’s	sophistication	 in	 this	regard	 is	evident	 in	
The	Female	Spectator,	which	is	innovative	in	its	employment	of	an	eidolon	in	a	way	



















puts	 less	 pressure	 upon	 the	 reader	 to	 make	 judgments	 in	 the	 face	 of	
indeterminacy.	 Instead,	 Haywood	 offers	 a	 heroine,	 Jenny	 Jessamy,	 who	
demonstrates	nearly	perfect	 judgment.	 Therefore,	 instead	of	 creating	 a	 crisis	 for	
the	 reader,	 Haywood	 offers	 a	 model	 for	 the	 reader,	 demonstrating	 several	
strategies	for	determining	truth.	Specifically,	Jenny	Jessamy,	the	heroine,	employs	
the	 position	 of	 doubt	 that	 Justicia	 (from	 A	 Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer)	 fails	 to	
demonstrate,	 she	 exercises	 the	 autonomy	 that	 Eovaai	 failed	 to	 achieve,	 and	 she	
advances	 the	 enlarged	 mentality	 that	 Haywood	 introduced	 in	 The	 Female	
Spectator.	Because	Jenny,	herself,	demonstrates	a	properly	sceptical	and	impartial	
attitude,	 she	 avoids	 being	 duped	 and	 manipulated	 in	 the	 ways	 other	 Haywood	
characters	 so	 often	 are;	 therefore,	 although	 the	 novel	 is	 still	 participating	 in	 the	
sceptical	 tradition,	 it	demonstrates	a	greater	confidence	 in	one’s	ability	 to	detect	
deception	 and	 evade	manipulation.	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 suggests	 tentative	 solutions	 to	
the	 crises	 of	 judgment	 that	 so	 often	 trouble	 both	Haywood’s	 characters	 and	 her	
readers.	Central	to	these	tentative	solutions	are	sociability	and	intersubjectivity.		
As	 I	 have	 noted	 in	 earlier	 chapters,	 Haywood	 regularly	 places	 value	 on	
solitude	 as	 a	 time	 for	 reflection,	 but	 such	 solitary	 reflection	 can	 be	 problematic	
when	an	individual’s	judgment	is	corrupted	by	insular	thinking	or	by	overreliance	
on	 the	 influence	of	 recent	 company	 (as,	 for	 example,	Eovaai’s	 so	often	 is).	When	





imagination	 to	 enter	 multiple	 standpoints	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 her	 chances	 for	
impartiality.	 Therefore,	 Jenny	 demonstrates	 practices	 that	 foreshadow	 Adam	
Smith’s	 impartial	 spectator,	 Immanuel	 Kant’s	 ‘enlarged	 mentality’,	 and	 Hannah	
Arendt’s	idea	of	‘going	visiting’	(which,	to	a	great	degree,	is	Arendt’s	interpretation	
of	 Kant).	 Each	 of	 these	 thinkers’	 concepts	 differ,	 of	 course.	 For	 example,	 Kant’s	
concept	 of	 the	 ‘enlarged	mentality’	 is	 stimulated	 by	 aesthetics,	 whereas	 Smith’s	
‘impartial	 spectator’	 is	 stimulated	by	 sentiment.1	And	Arendt’s	 theory	 focuses	on	
the	 political	 rather	 than	 the	 personal.	 Although	 I	 do	 not	 want	 to	 blur	 the	
distinctions	 between	 these	 concepts,	 they	 share	 the	 sociability	 of	 judgment	 that	
one	finds	 in	 Jemmy	and	Jenny.	Since	Haywood’s	novel	precedes	the	work	of	these	
philosophers,	 none	 of	 these	 concepts	were	 firmly	 shaped	 before	 its	 publication;	
therefore,	Haywood’s	 ideas	do	not	 fit	neatly	within	 the	constraints	of	any	one	of	
these	theories	of	 judgment,	but	I	aim	to	show	that	their	concepts	and	vocabulary	
can	help	describe	processes	of	judgment	that	have	been	overlooked	in	Haywood’s	
last	 novel	 and	 that	 prefigure	 the	 interests	 of	 later	writers.	 A	 specific	 distinction	
between	Haywood’s	novel	and	the	theories	of	Kant	and	Arendt	is	that	Haywood	is	
focused	on	the	private	sphere.	However,	with	my	application	of	 these	theorists,	 I	
follow	 the	 lead	 of	Vivasvan	 Soni	 and	Hina	Nazar,	who	have	 applied	Kantian	 and	
Arendtian	ideas	of	 judgment	to	fictional	private	spheres.	Soni	has	relied	on	these	
concepts	 to	 analyse	 judgment	 in	Emile	 and	 Pride	 and	Prejudice,	 and	 Hina	 Nazar	




















the	 ability	 to	 know	 what	 people	 were	 thinking	 and	 what	 actions	 they	 were	
intending	 to	 take.	 Although	 the	 processes	 of	 the	 legal	 system	 do	 not	 involve	
reading	minds,	per	 se,	 criminal	 trials	 required	 determinations	 about	motive	 and	
intent.	As	Alexander	Welsh	puts	 it,	 ‘The	process	of	 ascertaining	motive	or	 intent	
from	the	outside	held	new	implications	for	the	way	individuals	were	perceived	and	
perceived	 themselves’.3 	Furthermore,	 the	 legal	 system,	 as	 Barbara	 J.	 Shapiro	
argues,	 offered	 ‘the	highest	 standard	of	 proof	 that	 is	 possible	 in	 human	 affairs’.4	
Throughout	Haywood’s	novel,	Jenny	seeks	to	determine	people’s	motives,	and	she	
must	make	 inferences	 from	 circumstantial	 evidence.	Vivasvan	 Soni	 refers	 to	 this	
process	as	an	 imaginative	or	 ‘fictive’	 leap	 from	facts	 to	narrative.5	Although	Soni,	
himself,	does	not	make	connections	between	his	ideas	of	imaginative	capacity	and	

















inferences,	which	 are	 themselves	based	on	 facts	 or	 ‘circumstantial	 evidence’.6	As	
Welsh	and	Shapiro	both	point	out,	in	the	eighteenth	century	there	was	increasing	




discover	 a	 narrative	 that	 makes	 sense.	 At	 other	 times,	 rather	 than	 crafting	 a	
narrative	to	discover	truth,	Jenny	listens	to	narratives	from	other	people	in	order	
to	 judge	 their	 motives	 and	 actions.	 Throughout	 the	 text,	 Jenny	 is	 in	 the	 role	 of	





law	and	 legal	cases	 in	pamphlets	as	well	as	 in	his	periodical,	The	Convent	Garden	
Journal.8	At	 the	 same	 time,	 legal	 cases	 like	 the	 Cresswell	 Bigamy	 Case	 (which	
Haywood	fictionalises	in	Dalinda;	or,	A	Double	Marriage	[1749])	and	the	Elizabeth	
Canning	case	(which	began	 the	same	month	 Jemmy	and	Jenny	was	published	and	
which	 Haywood	 discusses	 in	 The	 Invisible	 Spy)	 were	 captivating	 the	 public.	
Although	 I	 do	 not	 mean	 to	 suggest	 a	 direct	 cause-and-effect	 influence	 between	













and	 judgment.	 In	 addition,	 her	 reliance	 on	 the	 legal	 system	 contributes	 to	 her	
mitigation	of	scepticism	since	there	was	no	room	for	extreme	doubt	in	the	realm	of	
law.	As	Barbara	Shapiro	puts	it,		
Litigation	 is	 not	 compatible	 with	 a	 skepticism	 so	 extreme	 that	
nothing	 can	 be	 known	 and	 no	 decision	 be	 worthy	 of	 acceptance.	






the	 courts,	 justice	 and	 judgment	 in	 the	 private	 sphere	 cannot	 be	 suspended	
forever;	 therefore,	 the	 legal	model	 is	 a	 fitting	 one	 as	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 seeks	 truth	
about	human	motives	and	actions.	
	 In	 this	 chapter,	 therefore,	 I	 demonstrate	 several	ways	 in	which	 judgment	
operates	 in	 Jemmy	 and	 Jenny.	 First,	 however,	 I	 discuss	 the	 novel’s	 unwarranted	
neglect,	 and	 I	 challenge	 readings	 that	 dismiss	 the	 novel’s	 central	 narrative	 as	
pointless,	 arguing	 instead	 that	 its	 interest	 in	 judgment,	 self-knowledge,	 and	
autonomy	 make	 it	 noteworthy.	 Then,	 in	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 degree	 of	










examination	 of	 two	 letters,	 I	 analyse	 how	 she	 employs	 an	 enlarged	 mentality,	
thereby	demonstrating	the	 impartiality	that	has	been	so	elusive	 for	characters	 in	
earlier	Haywood	texts.	In	further	support	of	my	argument	that	the	novel	privileges	
sociable	 judgment	and	 that	 it	 is	more	unified	 than	has	been	previously	argued,	 I	
show	 how	 the	 novel’s	 sentimental,	 interpolated	 tales	 further	 develop	 Jenny’s	
ability	 to	 function	 as	 an	 impartial	 spectator.	 Finally,	 I	 analyse	 how	 Haywood’s	
employment	of	legal	discourse	makes	visible	her	engagement	with	that	discourse	






be	remedied.	The	novel	 is	 important	because	of	 its	 focus	on	 judgment,	narration,	
and	the	autonomy	of	women.	Deborah	Nestor	and	Karen	Cajka	are	two	of	the	few	
critics	who	 have	 studied	The	History	 of	 Jemmy	and	 Jenny	 Jessamy,	 but	 they	 have	
focused	 on	 its	 three	 interpolated	 tales	 of	 ‘unprotected	 women’	 (as	 Cajka	 calls	
them)	instead	of	on	the	central	plotline	about	Jenny	Jessamy.12	Nestor,	in	fact,	has	













the	 rather	 uneventful	 plot	 concerning	 the	 long-arranged	 marriage	 between	 the	
exemplary	Jenny	and	her	cousin	Jemmy	merely	serves	as	a	frame	for	a	collection	of	
tales	 representing	 contemporary	 life.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 novel	 bears	 a	 greater	
structural	resemblance	to	texts	like	Haywood’s	The	Female	Spectator	(1744-1746)	




undervalues	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 novel’s	 central	 plotline,	 along	 with	 its	
relationship	to	the	interpolated	tales.	Nestor	seems	to	echo	complaints	like	those	
about	the	works	of	Jane	Austen,	for	example,	that	lament	that	‘nothing	happens	in	
Emma’.	 I	 am	 not,	 of	 course,	 equating	 Jemmy	and	 Jenny	 with	Emma,	or	 Haywood	




As	 the	 novel	 begins,	 we	 learn	 that	 Jemmy	 and	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 (distant	
cousins	who	have	 shared	 common	surnames	 from	birth)	have	been	promised	 to	
each	other	 in	marriage	 since	 their	 childhoods,	both	of	 their	parents	having	been	
‘resolved	on	marriage	between	their	children,	provided	that	when	they	arrived	at	
















after	 Jemmy’s	 father	 dies	 (three	 years	 after	 Jenny’s	 does),	 he	 begins	 to	 speak	 of	
marriage,	saying,	‘Then	I	suppose	there	is	nothing	left	for	us	to	do	.	.	.	but	sign	and	




This	 idea	 strikes	 Jenny	 after	 she	 visits	 several	 different	 friends	who	have	
experienced	 sudden	 and	 extreme	marital	 conflict	 and	 confusion.	 The	 surprising	
turns	in	these	marriages	alarm	Jenny	and	give	her	pause,	so	she	proposes	her	plan	
to	delay	the	wedding.	Specifically,	Jenny	argues	that	she	and	Jemmy	should	wait	a	
bit	 longer	 in	 order	 to	 ‘be	 certain	 within	 ourselves	 of	 never	 repenting	 the	
engagement	we	are	about	to	enter	into’	(27).	Jemmy	protests,	claiming	that	‘there	
is	no	danger	of	that’	and	that	he	is	already	sure	he	will	be	a	good	husband	and	she	
will	be	a	good	wife.	But	 Jenny	responds,	 ‘“That	 is	all	as	chance	directs	 .	 .	 .	 .	 [W]e	
may	think	perfectly	well	at	one	time,	and	act	very	 ill	at	another;	 in	 fine,	my	dear	
Jemmy”—continued	she,—“I	think	we	ought	to	know	a	little	more	of	the	world	and	
ourselves	before	we	enter	into	serious	matrimony”’	(27).	With	this,	she	makes	her	
case	 for	 suspending	 judgment	 (and	 action)	while	 they	 observe	 the	marriages	 of	
others,	 collecting	 knowledge	 all	 along	 the	way.	 In	 addition,	 they	 agree	 to	 report	






Jenny	has	 a	 judgment	 to	make	 about	marriage,	 and	 she	 is	 concerned	 that	
she	will	judge	poorly—not	because	she	has	a	history	of	poor	judgment	herself	but	
because	she	has	seen	so	many	other	people's	judgments	turn	out	badly	in	the	end.	







other.	 Regardless	 of	 her	 original	 intentions,	 Jenny	 is	 pushed	 out	 of	 the	 role	 of	
judging	 spectator	 and	 into	 the	 role	 of	 an	 actor	 who	must	 still	 make	 judgments.	
Therefore,	her	spectating	differs	from	that	which	one	finds,	 for	example,	 in	A	Spy	
Upon	 the	 Conjurer,	The	 Female	 Spectator,	 and	The	 Invisible	 Spy	 because	 Jenny	 is	
spectating	 not	 to	 report	 secrets	 or	 publish	 tales,	 but	 to	 gain	 knowledge	 for	 the	
express	 purpose	 of	 her	 own	 improvement.	 This	 pressure	 demonstrates	 the	
difficulty	 and,	 at	 times,	 impossibility	 of	 suspending	 judgment	 in	 the	 context	 of	
human	 affairs.	 It	 also	 creates	 the	 crisis	 that	 forces	 Jenny	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 true	
process	of	judgment,	and	it	creates	an	opportunity	for	the	narrative	development	
and	 exploration	 that	 show	 how	 one	 can	 become	 an	 impartial	 spectator	 in	 one’s	
own	life	so	that	one	can	effectively	exercise	one’s	autonomy.	
Richetti	says	that	Haywood’s	last	novel	is	of	interest	because	of	its	balance	
between	 the	 ‘objective	 moralism	 of	 the	 narrator	 and	 the	 subjective	 growth	 in	
specifically	 novelistic	 terms	 of	 its	 heroine’s	 response	 to	 her	 experiences	 in	 a	





commentary	 as	 varying	 from	 ‘light	 social	 satire	 to	 psycho-sexual	 and	 moral	
ruminations’	 (xx).	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 reading,	 he	 suggests	 that	 the	 following	
passage	from	the	narrator	is	‘an	odd	comment,	in	a	book	where	social	comedy	and	
satire	dominate’:	
There	 are	 so	 many	 secret	 windings,	 such	 obscure	 recesses	 in	 the	
human	 mind,	 that	 it	 is	 very	 difficult,	 if	 not	 wholly	 impossible,	 for	




less	 degree	 lodged	 and	 blended	 together	 in	 the	 same	 composition,	
and	 both	 equally	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 a	 thousand	 different	
passions,	which	disguise	and	vary	the	face	of	their	operations,	so	as	
not	to	be	distinguish’d	even	by	the	persons	themselves.	(136)	
Richetti	 explains	 this	 ‘odd	 comment’	 from	 the	 narrator	 by	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	
Haywood’s	 way	 of	 balancing	 the	 ‘dark	 threatening	 realities	 of	 lust	 and	 avarice’	
with	 the	 ‘bright	 sophistication	of	 the	narrator’.16	Richetti	 also	 suggests	 that,	with	
this	 balance,	 Haywood	 turns	 away	 from	 the	 ‘version	 of	 romance	 and	 sexual	
sensationalism’	that	can	be	observed	in	her	earlier	novels	from	the	1720s.	












others	and	 themselves.	 The	 problem	of	 obscure	 ‘motives’	 is	 one	 that	Haywood’s	
earlier	 texts	 struggle	 to	 resolve,	 and	 it	 is	 also	 one	 that	multiple	mid-eighteenth-
century	novels	explore.17	With	Jemmy	and	Jenny,	Haywood	finds	a	potential	answer	
to	 the	problem	of	 these	 ‘secret	 springs’	of	 action	 through	 the	development	of	 an	
‘enlarged	mentality’	through	which	she	can	both	enter	the	standpoint	of	others	and	
also	 examine	 her	 own	 thoughts	 and	 feelings	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 distance.	 	 As	 Hina	
Nazar	puts	it,	‘By	becoming	spectators	of	the	passions	or	feelings	that	motivate	our	
actions,	 and	 that	 comprise	 our	 reactions	 to	 the	 actions	 of	 others	 .	 .	 .	we	become	
capable	of	judging	the	validity	of	those	actions	and	reactions.	As	such,	we	become	
capable	 of	 autonomy	 or	 the	 independence	 that	 arrives	 from	 using	 one’s	 own	
judgment’.18	Nazar’s	 reference	 to	 passion	 and	 feelings	 suggests	 sentimentalism.	
George	Frisbie	Whicher,	one	of	the	earliest	Haywood	scholars,	calls	The	History	of	
Jemmy	and	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 a	 ‘domestic	 novel’	 that	 was	 ‘popular	 with	 sentimental	
readers’	and	says	that	it	was	‘so	far	calculated	to	stir	the	sensibilities	that	a	most	
touching	 turn	 in	 the	 lovers’	affairs	 is	 labelled	as	“not	 fit	 to	be	read	by	 those	who	
have	tender	ears	or	watry	eye”’.19	He	criticizes	the	novel,	saying	it	has	‘little	merit	
as	a	piece	of	realism’,	that	it	‘never	penetrates	beyond	externalities’,	and	that	‘the	


















Betsy	 Thoughtless	 (1751)	 and	 Louisa,	 from	 The	 Fortunate	 Foundlings	 (1744),22	
characters	 from	whom	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 differs	 greatly.	 Susan	 Staves	 also	 includes	
Jemmy	 and	 Jenny	 in	 a	 discussion	 of	 Haywood’s	 ‘moral	 novels’,	 labelling	 it	
‘sentimental	 fiction’,	 and	 James	 Joseph	 Howard	 says	 that	 with	 her	 last	 novels,	




novel	 is	 the	 contrast	 (and	 complement)	between	 Jenny’s	 reason-based	 judgment	
regarding	her	own	affairs,	 and	 the	sentimental	nature	of	 the	narratives	 from	 the	
‘unprotected	 women’.	 As	 I	 will	 show,	 Jenny’s	 encounters	 with	 the	 ‘women	 of	
feeling’,	as	one	might	call	them,	are	a	significant	part	of	the	novel’s	pedagogy	about	
how	to	become	an	impartial	spectator	and	effective	judge	rather	than	an	individual	
driven	 by	 the	 immediacy	 of	 passion	 and	 feeling,	 but	 the	 novel	 as	 a	whole	 is	 not	
driven	by	sentiment.	
It	might	 seem	 strange	 to	 discuss	 serious	 philosophies	 of	 judgment	 in	 the	
context	 of	 a	 mediocre,	 eighteenth-century	 courtship	 novel.	 However,	 I	 would	















suggestion	 that	 a	 narrative	 about	 choosing	 a	 marriage	 partner	 implicitly	
undermines	 ‘female	authority’	because	 it	 ‘rests	upon	a	 foundation	of	domesticity	
that	ironically	posits	men	at	the	center	of	women’s	existence’.24		Rather,	I	suggest	
that	 such	 narratives	 provide	 the	 context	 and	 content	 for	 exploring	 elements	 of	
female	(or	male)	authority,	autonomy,	and	judgment.	As	Hina	Nazar	puts	it	when	
speaking	 of	 Jane	 Austen,	 ‘Her	 understanding	 of	 marriage	 in	 particular	 as	
companionate	 marriage	 rather	 than	 the	 ‘elective	 affinity’	 of	 the	 culture	 of	
sensibility	imports	the	vocabulary	of	reason,	judgment,	and	justice	into	the	private	
sphere’.25	Jenny	 Jessamy,	 herself,	 says,	 ‘Marriage	 .	 .	 .	 is	 the	 great	 action	 of	 our	
lives—the	 hinge	 on	which	 happiness	 or	misery,	while	we	 have	 breath,	 depends’	
(376),	 and	 Soni	 implies	 the	 same	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 Rousseau’s	 Emile	 and	 Jane	
Austen’s	 Pride	 and	 Prejudice,	 in	 which	 the	 central	 decisions	 of	 each	 rest	 on	 the	
question	of	whom	to	marry.	Soni	claims	that	Pride	and	Prejudice	is	‘unsurpassed	as	
a	model	 for	 understanding	 the	 practice	 of	 judgment’	 (371).	 For	 his	 evidence,	 he	
focuses	 on	 Elizabeth	 Bennet’s	 reading	 and	 re-reading	 of	 Mr.	 Darcy’s	 letter,	 the	
letter	 that	 leads	her	 to	re-evaluate	her	previous	 judgments	(or	prejudices)	about	











If	 first	 impressions	are	misleading,	 it	 is	precisely	because	they	are	not	
yet	 a	 narrative,	 but	mere	data	 and	bits	 of	 information.	 It	 requires	 the	
imaginative	 power	 of	 judgment	 to	 constitute	 them	 into	 a	 narrative.	
Austen	 shows	 us	 how	 indispensable	 the	 fictioning	 power	 of	 the	
imagination	 is	 to	 good	 judgment.	 To	 read,	 in	 this	 context,	 is	 not	 to	
collect	facts	or	process	data,	but	to	read	a	narrative.26		
The	key	shift	between	Elizabeth	Bennet’s	first	and	second	reading	of	Darcy’s	letter	
is	 that	 Elizabeth	 alters	 the	 narrative	 by	which	 she	 interprets	 the	 data.	Upon	 the	








narrative.	 Granted,	 some	 of	 that	 information	 comes	 from	Wickham’s	 testimony,	
but	 her	 first	 narratives	 about	 Wickham	 and	 Darcy	 also	 stem	 from	 her	 own	














Volume	 II	 of	 The	 History	 of	 Jemmy	 and	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 begins	 with	 the	
passage	 noted	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter	 in	 which	 the	 narrator	 says,	 ‘There	 are	 so	
many	 secret	windings,	 such	 obscure	 recesses	 in	 the	 human	mind,	 that	 it	 is	 very	
difficult,	if	not	wholly	impossible,	for	speculation	to	arrive	at	the	real	spring	or	first	
mover	of	any	action	whatsoever’	(136).	Despite	the	near	impossibility	of	divining	
the	motives	of	 people’s	 actions,	many	 characters	 in	 the	novel	 find	 themselves	 in	
the	 position	 of	 trying	 to	 do	 just	 that.	 Jemmy,	 for	 example,	 tries	 (and	 fails)	 to	
understand	 why	 Liberia	 behaves	 so	 coldly	 to	 him	 the	 morning	 after	 their	
passionate	night	together.	Also,	Lady	Speck	thinks	she	knows	what	motivates	both	
Celadine	and	 Jenny	 to	 stay	at	home	while	all	of	 the	others	go	abroad	 (but	 she	 is	
wrong).	And,	perhaps	most	 importantly,	 Jenny	 tries	 to	understand	why	someone	
would	attempt	 to	destroy	her	 relationship	with	 Jemmy.	 (She	discovers	 the	 truth,	
but	 it	 takes	 time.)	 Like	 Haywood’s	 other	 works,	 the	 novel	 contains	 multiple	
incidents	of	deception	that	must	be	resisted	and	discovered,	and	before	I	analyse	
Jenny	Jessamy’s	penetration	into	that	deception,	it	is	necessary	to	detail	the	extent	
of	 her	 imposer’s	 machinations.	 It	 is	 significant	 that	 the	 deception	 she	 faces	 is	
carefully	planned	and	orchestrated	because	 that	makes	 it	 all	 the	more	 clear	 that	
her	 strategies	 for	 penetration	 and	 judgment	 are	 so	 effective,	 and	 so	 distinctive	
from	those	in	other	Haywood	texts.		
The	 deception	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 novel	 is	 Bellpine’s	 elaborate	 scheme	 to	








skilled	 at	 deception,	 Bellpine	 knows	 that	 if	 he	 merely	 asserts	 the	 lie	 directly	
through	his	 own	 testimony,	 he	 risks	 resistance.	 Therefore,	 he	uses	 schemes	 that	





a	 thing	 is	 so,	 that	 a	 story	 so	 much	 gains	 credit,	 as	 by	 half	 words,—
winks,—nods,	and	other	such	like	gestures;—these	are	the	traps	which	
catch	 the	 unwary,	 and	 give	 an	 air	 of	 reality	 to	 that	 which	 has	 no	




‘theory	 of	 mind’.	 He	 understands	 how	 others	 will	 ‘read’	 particular	 facial	
expressions	 and	 behaviours	 that	 serve	 as	 subtext	 for	 dialogue,	 and	 he	 is	 able	 to	
artificially	produce	 those	 expressions	 and	 ‘gestures’	 that	will	 lead	 to	 the	desired	
interpretations	 by	 his	 audience.	 Like	 Jenny,	 Bellpine	 demonstrates	 an	 enlarged	
mentality	in	that	he	imagines	the	thoughts	of	others,	especially	what	they	will	feel	
and	 think	 as	 they	 observe	 him.	 In	 other	 words,	 he	 is	 imagining	 what	 they,	 as	
spectators,	 will	 imagine,	 and	 he	 is	 planting	 circumstantial	 evidence	 for	 them	 to	
interpret.	
In	‘Lying	Bodies	of	the	Enlightenment’,	Lisa	Zunshine	argues	that	there	is	a	





eighteenth-century	 novels.	 She	 notes	 that	 ‘in	 the	 representation	 of	 liars	 in	
eighteenth-century	 English	 fiction	 .	 .	 .	 writers	 [such	 as	 Defoe,	 Fielding,	 and	
Richardson]	 treat	 body	 language	 as	 a	pointedly	unreliable	 source	of	 information	
about	the	person’s	true	state	of	mind,	and	yet	they	obsessively	turn	to	the	body	as	
a	 privileged	 source	 of	 such	 information’.28	In	 trying	 to	 understand	 this	 paradox,	
Zunshine	 points	 out	 that	 even	 though	 characters	 and	 readers	 are	 aware	 that	
bodies	can	‘lie’,	they	cannot	help	but	attempt	to	interpret	body	language	and	facial	
expressions.	 Zunshine	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 in	 our	 evolutionary	 nature	 to	 do	 so,	 and,	
therefore,	 we	 also	 ‘end	 up	 performing	 our	 bodies	 (not	 always	 consciously	 or	
successfully)	so	as	 to	shape	other	people’s	perceptions	of	our	mental	states’.29	In	
Bellpine’s	 case,	 the	 performance	 is	 a	 conscious	 effort	 to	manipulate	 how	 people	
read	 him.	 The	 early	 eighteenth-century	 culture	 featured	 interest	 in	 the	 various	
passions	and	how	they	could	be	identified	with	particular	facial	expressions.	This	
study	of	passions	harked	back	to	the	work	of	 the	Greeks,	and	eighteenth-century	
artists	 created	 sketches	 of	 the	 different	 expressions	 connected	 to	 the	 passions.	
These	 expressions	 were	 dramatic	 and	 clearly	 distinguished	 from	 each	 other.30	
However,	 in	Haywood’s	 last	novel,	such	expressions	have	become	subtler.	As	her	
fiction	 shifts	 from	 the	 melodrama	 of	 Love	 in	 Excess	 (a	 novel	 that,	 according	 to	
Zunshine,	 features	 bodies	 that	 speak	 ‘plainly’)	 to	 the	 greater	 (or	 more	



















behaving	 as	 he	 wants	 them	 to	 behave.	 He	 also	 knows	 that	 ‘performance’	 of	 his	
body	 is	 a	 necessary	 complement	 to	 other	 aspects	 of	 his	 scheme.	 These	 other	
aspects	include	encouraging	Jemmy	to	spend	time	with	Miss	Chit,	telling	Miss	Chit	
that	 Jemmy	 loves	 her,	 and	 indirectly	 convincing	 Jenny	 (along	 with	 the	 rest	 of	
society)	that	Jemmy	no	longer	intends	to	marry	her.	Such	deception	is	complicated	
and,	as	Bellpine	understands,	must	include	many	layers	in	order	to	be	successful.	
Crucial	 to	 his	 success	 are	 the	 rumours	 that	 will	 begin	 to	 spread	 because	 of	 his	
‘lying	body’	and	verbal	 innuendo.	Although	Bellpine’s	strategies	do	include	direct	
deception,	 such	as	 lying	 to	 Jemmy	and	Miss	Chit	 and	writing	an	anonymous	and	
false	 letter	to	Lady	Speck,	these	measures	likely	would	be	ineffective	without	the	
rumours	that	he	creates	to	support	them.	Kate	Loveman	has	studied	the	hoaxes	of	
the	 late	 seventeenth	 century	 that	 popularized	 the	 ‘sham’	 as	 a	 genre	 and	 trained	
readers	to	be	properly	skeptical	of	their	texts.	One	of	the	elements	that	encouraged	
belief	 in	such	hoaxes	was	the	 ‘word-of-mouth’	confirmation	of	written	texts	(and	
vice-versa).	 For	 example,	 Loveman	 points	 to	 a	 particular	 example,	 the	 pamphlet	












and	 sometimes	 it	 would	 be	 altered,	 with	 additions,	 he	 could	 scarce	
knowe	it	to	be	his	owne.33	
Although	 the	 centrepiece	 of	 Chaloner’s	 hoax	was	 a	 written	 text,	 that	 text	might	
have	been	 less	 likely	 to	be	believed	without	 the	hearsay	 that	 accompanied	 it.	As	
Loveman	says,	‘Sceptical	readers	who	sought	oral	confirmation	for	the	pamphlet’s	
claims	would	 find	 it—without	 realising	 that	 it	 was	 only	 another	 of	 the	 author’s	
fictions’.34	In	 Jemmy	 and	 Jenny,	 Bellpine’s	 rumours	 provide	 exactly	 this	 kind	 of	
confirmation	 for	 the	anonymous	 letter	 that	he	 later	sends	to	 Jenny’s	 friend,	Lady	
Speck.	 As	 we	 are	 told	 by	 the	 narrator,	 ‘Neither	 Lady	 Speck	 nor	 her	 sister	 were	
ignorant	 of	 those	 reports	 which	 had	 been	 so	 maliciously	 spread,	 concerning	 a	
change	in	the	sentiments	of	Jemmy;—they	had	heard	it	averr’d	by	several	of	their	
acquaintances	 as	 a	 thing	 past	 all	 dispute’	 (97-98).	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 heard	
rumours	 before	 they	 read	 the	 text,	 thus	 the	 latter	 seemed	merely	 to	 affirm	 the	
former.	
The	anonymous	letter	in	question	arrives	after	Lady	Speck,	Miss	Wingman,	
and	 Jenny	 have	 settled	 in	 Bath.	 It	 purports	 to	 inform	 Lady	 Speck	 of	 Jemmy’s	
infidelity	 to	 Jenny	 and	 of	 his	 pending	 marriage	 to	 Miss	 Chit	 in	 order	 that	 Lady	
Speck	might	warn	Jenny	and	soften	the	blow	of	such	a	devastating	discovery.	In	his	









action	 and	 to	 establish	 his	 credibility	 as	 an	 author.	 The	 following	 elements	 are	
particularly	 noteworthy	 and	 conventional	 strategies	 that	 he	 uses	 to	 fashion	
himself	as	a	credible	source.	First,	Bellpine	sends	the	letter	to	Lady	Speck	rather	to	
Jenny.	By	sending	the	letter	to	Lady	Speck,	he	gains	an	unwitting	accomplice	in	his	
task.	Had	he	 sent	 the	 letter	directly	 to	 Jenny,	 she	would	have	 received	 the	news	




explicitly	 appeals	 to	 the	 ‘superior	 judgment’	 of	 Lady	 Speck	 as	well	 as	 the	 ‘good	
sense’	of	Jenny.	This	flattery	gives	Lady	Speck	additional	motivation	for	defending	
the	 letter’s	 veracity.	 Third,	 Bellpine	 (as	 the	 anonymous	 author)	 pretends	 not	 to	





however,	 that	 he	 loves	 her	 .	 .	 .’	 (101).	 By	 pretending	 to	 be	 ignorant	 about	 one	
detail,	 he	 increases	 his	 credibility	 on	 others	 for	 which	 he	 claims	 certainty	 (a	
strategy	 also	 employed	 in	 the	 travel	 narratives	 in	Haywood’s	Female	Spectator).	
Fourth	and	finally,	Bellpine	concludes	by	guiding	Lady	Speck’s	interpretation	of	his	
words.	 He	 assures	 her	 that	 his	 concerns	 ‘proceed	 from	 a	 heart	 only	 devoted	 to	
honour	and	virtue,	and	entirely	free	from	all	views	but	such	as	may	be	conducive	
to	 promote	 the	 cause	 of	 those	 noble	 principles’	 (101).	 As	 the	 novel’s	 narrator	









can	have	 the	baseness	 to	assert	such	monstrous	untruths,	or	 the	presumption	 to	
attempt	making	your	ladyship’s	good	nature	the	dupe	of	a	design	so	villainous,	and	
withal	so	mean?’	With	this	response,	Jenny	suggests	that	Lady	Speck	is	a	‘dupe’	if	
she	 believes	 the	 letter.	 But	 Lady	 Speck	 and	Miss	Wingman	 ‘assured	 [Jenny]	 that	
they	had	heard	an	account	of	Jemmy’s	infidelity	from	many	hands	before	they	had	
left	London	.	.	.’	(102).	With	this,	they	offer	corroborating	evidence,	which	might	be	












Jenny’s	 deep	 reflection	 about	 the	 situation	 does	 not	 begin	 until	 later	 that	







to	 study	 carefully	 the	 letter	 from	 Jemmy,	 which	 she	 thinks	 might	 help	 her	
understand	the	other,	more	mysterious	letter.		The	narrator	says	that	Jenny,	‘fell	to	
examining,	with	 the	utmost	exactness,	every	sentence	of	 the	 letter	 [from	Jemmy]	
which	had	created	 in	her	so	much	uneasiness;—she	compared	 it	with	 the	others	
she	had	received	from	him	since	her	arrival	at	Bath,	and	found	it	nothing	different	
in	stile	or	manner’	(105).	As	Zunshine	points	out,	despite	the	fact	that	bodies	can	
lie,	 they	 are	 still	 elevated	 over	 speech	 as	 ‘the	 direct	 conduit	 to	 the	 mind’.35	An	
implication	 of	 her	 argument	 is	 that	 if	 the	 spoken	word	 is	 less	 reliable	 than	 the	
performance	of	 the	body,	 then	 the	written	word	becomes	 an	 even	more	 suspect	
medium	 because	 there	 is	 no	 body	 present	 to	 assist	 the	 reader	 in	 her	 efforts	 at	
‘theory	of	mind’—her	efforts	to	infer	the	motivations,	thoughts,	and	feelings	of	the	
letter	writer.	One	of	the	challenges	that	Jenny	faces,	then,	is	that	that	there	is	very	





letters.	 At	 first,	 she	 entirely	 dismisses	 the	 anonymous	 letter	 based	 on	 her	 own	
knowledge	 of	 Jemmy	 and	her	 experiences	 of	 his	 love	 for	 her,	much	 as	 Elizabeth	
Bennet,	because	of	her	previous	experiences,	first	dismisses	anything	Darcy	has	to	












that	 he	 mentions	 he	 will	 attend	 a	 musical	 performance.	 She	 infers	 that	 the	
performer	might	 be	Miss	 Chit	 and	 that	 the	 reference	 to	 the	 performance	might	
uncover	 a	 grain	 of	 truth	 that	 grew	 into	 rumours.	 With	 this	 inference,	 Jenny	
demonstrates	 an	 ‘enlarged	 mentality’	 by	 imagining	 the	 mind	 set	 of	 the	 general	
populous	and	those	involved	in	the	rumours	and	by	recognizing	that	the	rumours	
would	not	have	been	perpetuated	without	some	‘foundation’	of	truth.	Although	she	






‘thousand	 instances	of	 the	deceit	and	perfidy	of	men	 in	 the	affairs	of	 love,	which	





if	 she	 is	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 anonymous	 letter	 is	 deceptive,	 she	must	 struggle	 to	
identify	the	motivation	or	‘first	spring’	of	such	deception.	The	facts,	themselves,	do	
not	make	 the	 case.	 Therefore,	 Jenny	 tries	 to	 piece	 together	 a	 narrative	 that	will	
explain	them.	She	recognizes	that	‘the	smallest	hint	.	.	.	passes	with	many	people	as	












and	 she	 resolved	 to	 wait	 till	 time	 should	 bring	 to	 light	 what	 all	 her	
penetration	could	not	at	present	enable	her	to	discover.	(107)36	
In	this	passage,	Jenny	reflects	on	the	details—‘the	data	and	bits	of	information’,	to	




or	 clear	 interpretation	 of	 the	 facts,	 so	 she	 suspends	 judgment—holding	 a	 final	
verdict	in	abeyance	until	‘time	should	bring	to	light’	further	evidence	that	will	help	
her	 complete	 and	 verify	 a	 narrative.	 In	 this	 moment,	 Jenny	 is	 waiting	 for	 more	
reliable	 evidence,	 and	 she	 makes	 clear	 what	 kind	 of	 evidence	 she	 will	 require:	
‘[W]e	certainly	ought	not	to	believe	ill	of	any	one	without	the	testimony	of	our	own	
senses	to	confirm	the	truth	of	that	report	 .	 .	 .’	(108).	Although	Haywood	makes	it	
clear	throughout	her	work	that	sensory	perception	is	not	sufficient	for	judgment,	
Jenny	 recognises	 its	 proper	 place	 as	 a	 strategy	 for	 checking	 and	 comparing	 the	








someone	 else.	 Throughout	 the	 novel,	 it	 is	 Jenny’s	 practice	 to	 suspend	 judgment	






complacency	by	prejudice,	opinion	 (gossip),	or	 the	 rote	application	




habits	 which	 serve	 as	 surrogates	 for	 judgment.	 By	 suspending	
judgment	between	two	incommensurable	poles,	it	frees	judgment	to	
approach	 the	 situation	 as	 it	 is,	 in	 all	 the	 richness	 of	 detail.	 At	 the	
moment	 of	 crisis,	we	 are	 forced	 to	 be	 free,	 to	 apply	 our	 judgment	














that	 is	 free	 from	bias	 or	 undue	 external	 influence.	 Although	many	 of	Haywood’s	
earlier	 texts	 show	a	 concern	 for	 truth	as	 strong	as	 the	one	we	see	 in	 Jemmy	and	
Jenny,	 the	 process	 of	 carefully	 gathering	 and	 reflecting	 upon	 evidence	 is	 not	
common	 practice	 for	 characters	 in	 Haywood’s	 other	works,	 in	which	 characters	
often	are	 ruled	by	passion	and	bias.	 In	 contrast,	 Jenny	exercises	 the	 caution	and	




	 Vivasvan	 Soni’s	 ‘fictive	 leap’	 descends	 from	 several	 related	 concepts	 that	
have	been	expressed	by	other	thinkers.	He	recognises	the	connections	between	his	




interest	 in	 the	 imagination,	 however,	 is	 a	 point	 of	 connection	 between	 his	 ideas	
and	Kant’s	‘enlarged	mentality’	as	well	as	Arendt’s	idea	of	‘going	visiting’	(as	Soni,	
himself,	 acknowledges). 41 	Each	 of	 these	 thinkers	 invokes	 the	 power	 of	 the	
imagination	 to	move	 beyond	 one’s	 private,	 subjective	 reality	 to	 a	 broader,	more	
sociable	approach	to	judgment.	As	Arendt	points	out,	judgment	‘cannot	function	in	
strict	isolation	or	solitude;	it	needs	the	presence	of	others	“in	whose	place”	it	must	













ourselves	 in	 their	 place	 to	 imagine	 their	 possible	 thoughts	 and	 perspectives.	 In	
fact,	one	of	the	reasons	that	Arendt	privileges	the	spectator	over	the	actor	is	that	
disinterested	 spectatorship,	 more	 than	 the	 vested	 interest	 of	 an	 actor,	 better	
facilitates	one’s	ability	to	demonstrate	impartiality,	which	was	deemed	important	
throughout	 the	 seventeenth	 and	 early	 eighteenth	 centuries	 among	 natural	
philosophers	and	other	Enlightenment	thinkers,	and	it	was	also	a	point	of	concern	
for	Haywood.43	For	example,	Justicia	from	A	Spy	Upon	the	Conjurer	claims	a	kind	of	
detached	 impartiality	 because	 of	 her	 role	 as	 a	 ‘spy’	 and	 former	 sceptic;	 Eovaai	





which	Arendt	 identifies	 as	 ‘the	most	noble	group	of	 the	 free-born	men,	 for	what	
they	were	doing:	to	look	for	the	sake	of	seeing	only	was	the	freest,	liberalissimum,	
of	all	pursuits’.45	A	key	difference	between	Haywood’s	characters	and	Cicero’s	or	
Arendt’s	 ideal	 spectator-philosopher	 is	 that	 Haywood’s	 characters	 are	 not	













Soni	 argues	 that	 Rousseau,	 in	Emile,	 attempts	 to	 ‘shut	 down	 the	 space	 of	
judgment	as	he	attempts	to	create	a	‘sovereign	selfhood’	and	that,	in	the	novel,	‘The	
only	way	to	ensure	that	Emile	shows	good	judgment,	it	seems,	is	to	make	sure	he	
never	 has	 to	 judge	 for	 himself,	 to	 program	 his	 judgments	 by	 fiction	 or	 by	 the	
senses	and	experience’.46	In	other	words,	ideal	judgment	in	Emile	is	one	that	does	
not,	in	fact,	enter	any	standpoints	other	than	one’s	own.	As	evidence,	Soni	points	to	
the	 tutor’s	 attempts	 to	 prevent	 Emile	 from	 drawing	 any	 conclusions	 that	 move	
beyond	 his	 own	 sensory	 data.	 Soni	 argues,	 however,	 that	 a	 conclusion	 that	 is	
‘tethered’	to	the	senses	is	not	really	a	judgment	at	all.	Although	I	understand	and	
find	 important	 Soni’s	 criticisms	 of	 the	 sensory-based	 knowledge	 privileged	 in	
Emile,	 I	 do	 not	 agree	 that	 such	 a	 conclusion	 is	 not	 a	 judgment.	 Rather,	 I	 would	
suggest	that	if	it	involves	a	conclusion	that	extends	at	all	beyond	perception,	it	is	a	
judgment,	 even	 if	 it	pretends	 to	 be	 knowledge.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 is	 an	 inference	
that	 claims	 to	 be	 fact.	 Still,	 I	 take	 Soni’s	 point	 that	 such	 conclusions	 do	 not	
acknowledge	 a	 true	process	 of	 judgment	 but	 rather	 seek	 (or	 claim)	 to	 avoid	 the	
process	altogether,	especially	the	inferential	or	‘fictive’	leap	that	judgment,	as	Soni	
asserts,	 so	 often	 requires.	 Rousseau’s	 confidence	 in	 and	 overreliance	 on	 sensory	
experience	 as	 a	 reliable	 standard	 of	 judgment	 ignores	 the	 possibility	 that	 other	
people	will	experience	the	same	data	in	different	ways,	a	possibility	that	disrupts	










from	 his	 or	 her	 own	 ‘Sensation’	 and	 ‘Reflection’,	 then	 what	 is	 to	
prevent	each	person	from	slipping	into	complete	solipsism?	What	is	
to	 hold	 the	 community	 of	 knowers	 together?	 Locke	 gave	 a	
commonsense	answer:	‘Experience	and	Observation’.	The	usefulness	
of	 experience	 as	 a	 touchstone	 for	 communal	 truth,	 however,	
depends	on	the	shared	nature	of	experience,	and	Locke	assumes	that	
all	knowers	share	a	homogenous	experience.	As	The	Female	Quixote	




Arabella	 is	 isolated	 from	 society	 and	 draws	 her	 interpretive	 hermeneutic	 from	
romance	novels	and	amatory	 fiction.	Therefore,	even	 though	she	has	a	system	of	
knowledge	 to	 draw	 from,	 it	 is	 an	 insular,	 fictional	 system	 that	 leads	 her	 astray.	
Emile	is	also	isolated,	and	in	some	ways,	has	less	to	draw	on	than	Arabella	does.	As	
a	 result,	 not	 only	 do	 Emile’s	 ‘judgments’	 actually	 attempt	 to	 evade	 judgment	













letter,	 the	 ‘intensity	 of	 her	 emotional	 reaction’	 prevents	 her	 from	 getting	 the	
‘critical	distance	or	impartial	perspective’	that	she	needs	in	order	to	read	the	letter	
well.48	One	benefit	of	the	epistolary	form,	as	Soni	points	out,	is	that	it	allows	time	
for	 reflection	 and	 re-reading.	 This	 benefit	 relates	 to	 my	 analysis	 of	 The	 Female	
Spectator:	 readers	 can	 imagine	 the	 ideas	 of	 the	 ‘author’	 (and	 the	 other	 readers)	
while	at	a	distance	and,	therefore,	can	form	a	sociable	judgment	while	still	in	less	
danger	of	undue	influence	on	their	autonomous	processes.	Elizabeth	Bennet,	upon	




in	Haywood’s	Female	Spectator,	 for	 example,	 the	 eidolon’s	 claim	 to	 an	 ‘impartial	
moral	 authority	 that	 is	 universal’	 by	 necessity	 signifies	 a	 male	 authority,	 and	
therefore	 fails	 to	 be	 ‘partial	 to	 the	 female	 sex’	 as	Maurer	 implies	 it	 should	 be.49	
However,	 the	 notion	 that	 impartiality	 must	 be	 male	 fails,	 I	 think,	 to	 accept	
impartiality	 as	 a	 process	 of	 enlarged	mentality	 that	 by	 its	 very	definition	 resists	
such	limits	and,	in	fact,	requires	greater	extension.	A	male	impartiality	would	not,	
in	an	Arendtian	sense,	be	impartiality	at	all.	Although	I	understand	Maurer’s	point	
that,	 in	a	patriarchy,	any	 ‘universal’	way	of	 thinking	must	be	male,	 I	do	not	think	
her	reasoning	follows	by	necessity.	As	Nazar	argues,	judgment	and	autonomy	need	










their	 societies	 and	 to	 constitute	 alternative	 principles	 of	 action	 requires	 active	
social	 engagement	 in	 the	 form	 of	 critical	 debate’.50	In	 other	 words,	 Nazar—like	
Marilyn	Friedman,	Linda	Zagzebski,	Benjamin	McMyler,	as	well	as	others,	including	
Arendt—resists	 definitions	 of	 impartiality,	 judgment,	 and	 autonomy	 that	 are	
‘atomistic’	 and	 entirely	 self-reliant.51		With	 enlarged	 thought	we	 extend	 thinking	






	 As	 I	 previously	 noted	 in	 this	 chapter,	 Jemmy	and	 Jenny	 has	 typically	 been	
characterized	as	a	sentimental	text.	And	although	I	resist	that	designation	for	the	
novel	as	a	whole,	the	interpolated	tales	do,	in	fact,	reflect	the	intense	emotions	of	
sensibility	 as	 well	 as	 the	 sentiment-based	 judgment	 to	 be	 found	 later	 in	 Adam	
Smith’s	 Theory	 of	 Moral	 Sentiments	 (first	 published	 in	 1759).	 George	 Frisbie	
Whicher,	 like	 Deborah	 Nestor	 and	 Karen	 Cajka,	 finds	 the	 novel’s	 merit	 in	 these	
interpolated	tales,	or	what	he	calls	the	‘digressions’	of	the	novel,	and	says	that	their	
plots	are	more	‘compressed’	and,	‘at	times	even	sprightly’,	than	the	novel’s	plot	as	
a	 whole.52	Each	 of	 them	 involves	 a	 young	 woman	 in	 distress.	 The	 first	 is	 Mrs.	












‘fair	 stranger’,	 who	 has	 escaped	 from	 home	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 being	 forced	 into	
marriage	with	an	elderly	man.	The	third	is	Sophia,	Jenny’s	friend	who	is	the	victim	
of	a	con	artist	who	poses	as	a	true	and	honourable	lover	in	order	to	steal	Sophia’s	
fortune.53	The	 first	 two	young	women	 tell	 their	 tales	 to	 Jenny	and	 several	 of	her	
friends,	and	Sophia	tells	her	tale	just	to	Jenny	alone.	These	tales	do,	indeed,	have	a	
high	 level	 of	 sensibility.	 However,	 in	 using	 the	 label	 ‘sentimental’	 in	 order	 to	
dismiss	 the	 novel	 as	 just	 generally	 bad,	 its	 critics	 have	 failed	 to	 consider	
sufficiently	the	role	of	judgment	in	these	tales	and	how	they	connect	to	the	larger	
narrative	about	Jenny.	
	 These	 tales	 are	 not	 merely	 sources	 of	 gratuitous	 emotion;	 rather,	 they	
repeatedly	turn	Jenny	and	her	friends	(but	mostly	Jenny)	into	impartial	spectators	
who	 both	 sympathize	 with	 and	 judge	 the	 three	 women	 who	 tell	 their	 stories.	
Central	 to	 sentimental	 literature	 is	 ‘the	 communication	 of	 common	 feeling	 from	
sufferer	or	watcher	 to	reader	or	audience’,	and	 this	quality	characterizes	each	of	
the	three	tales.54	In	the	first	one,	Mrs.	M______	presents	her	story	to	Jenny	and	her	
companions	 after	 she	 has	 nearly	 stabbed	 Jenny	 in	 an	 attack	 prompted	 by	 the	
jealousy	 she	 feels	 when	 she	 sees	 Celadine	 making	 advances	 on	 Jenny	 in	 the	


















consider	 and	 judge,	 and	 Mr.	 Lovegrove	 tells	 Mrs.	 M______,	 ‘“You	 neither	 can	 be	
justified	nor	be	condemn’d	in	our	opinion,	without	your	letting	us	into	the	secret	of	
this	crime”’	(118).57	Mrs.	M______,	therefore,	tells	her	tale	as	Jenny	and	her	friends	
listen.	 For	 several	 pages	 after	 Mrs.	 M______’s	 explanation,	 much	 of	 the	 novel’s	
narrative	 is	 taken	up	with	Lady	Speck’s	 jealousy	 (she	has	 tender	 feelings	 for	 the	
cruel	Celadine),	but	eventually	readers	receive	a	very	detailed	account	of	 Jenny’s	
response	 to	Mrs.	M______’s	 story.	 Central	 to	Mrs.	M______’s	 explanation	 is	 that	 her	
affair	with	Celadine	began	as	pretence	on	her	part	when	she	wanted	to	make	her	






	 The	second	tale	 is	told	by	 ‘the	fair	stranger’	and	is	 in	stark	contrast	to	the	
first	tale	by	Mrs.	M______.	The	‘fair	stranger’	or	‘fair	fugitive’	is	introduced	to	Jenny	
and	her	friends	by	the	woman	who	runs	the	house	where	they	are	staying	as	they	
travel	 from	 Bath	 back	 to	 London.	 The	 introduction	 occurs	 because	 ‘the	 fair	
stranger’	 is	 trying	to	sell	a	 jewelled	box	 in	order	to	get	some	money,	and	Jenny’s	










house	 says	 she	 will	 bring	 them	 the	 ‘fair	 stranger’	 because	 they	 ‘will	 be	 better	





as	 means	 for	 safe	 passage	 to	 her	 destination.	 Important	 to	 the	 tale	 of	 ‘the	 fair	
stranger’	 is	 the	 degree	 of	 sympathy	 it	 evokes	 in	 comparison	 to	 Mrs.	 M	 ______’s.	
These	 are	 not	 equal	 tales	 of	 two	distressed	women;	 rather,	 they	 are	 contrasting	
tales	 in	which	 the	 ‘judges’	of	 the	 case	 reach	very	different	 conclusions	about	 the	
young	women’s	‘guilt’	for	their	‘crimes’,	and	these	contrasts	reflect	the	importance	





important	 than	what	 he	 or	 she	 is	 looking	 at.	 As	 Janet	 Todd	 puts	 it,	 sentimental	
literature	 ‘is	 a	 kind	 of	 pedagogy	 of	 seeing	 and	 of	 the	 physical	 reaction	 that	 this	
seeing	 should	 produce’. 61 	The	 most	 important	 part	 of	 this	 ‘looking’	 is	 the	











£1,000—half	 of	 her	 inheritance.	 After	 hearing	 Sophia’s	 story,	 Jenny	 first	 judges	
Sophia	as	blameworthy,	but	then	she	truly	attempts	to	‘cultivate	the	standpoint	of	
impartiality’	as	she	imagines	herself	in	Sophia’s	position:62		
	 [Sophia’s]	 unhappy	 adventure	 had	 made	 a	 very	 great	
impression	 on	 the	mind	 of	 our	 young	 heroine;	 she	 sincerely	 loved	
her,	 and	 pitied	 her	misfortune;	 but	 could	 not	 help	 thinking	 it	 both	
strange	and	blameable	in	her	to	entertain	so	violent	a	passion	for	a	
man	whose	character	she	knew	so	little	of.—‘People	make	their	own	
unhappiness,	 and	 then	 lament	 it’,	 cried	 she	 somewhat	 peevishly;	
‘sure	 I	 never	 could	 have	 been	 so	 indiscreet’;	 but	 this	 thought	 no	
sooner	 came	 into	 her	 head	 than	 it	 was	 check’d	 by	 another;	—‘Yet	
how	vain	am	I	to	flatter	myself	with	such	an	imagination,	or	presume	
so	far	on	my	own	strength	of	reason	.	.	.	.	




guilty	 of	 the	 like	 error,	 serve	 only	 to	 fill	 her	 with	 the	 warmest	
gratitude	 to	 Heaven	 that	 had	 not	 exposed	 her	 to	 the	 like	 danger’.	
(337-38)	
Although	 Jenny	 finds	 Sophia’s	 actions	 unwise	 and	 preventable,	 she	 generously	
recognizes	that	had	she	been	in	Sophia’s	shoes,	had	she	not	been	raised	with	good	
sense	by	her	father,	she	might	have	acted	differently.	She	uses	her	imagination	to	







judgment	 connects	 these	 interpolated	 tales	 to	 the	 themes	of	 ‘enlarged	mentality’	
and	judgment	that	concern	the	central	narrative	of	the	novel.	However,	the	nature	
of	 the	 tales	 should	 not	 be	 conflated	 with	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 novel	 as	 a	 whole.	
Although	these	tales	are	sentimental,	the	rest	of	the	novel	is	not.	In	fact,	when	one	
considers	 Jenny’s	 actions	 and	 thinking	 processes	 as	 she	 navigates	 her	 own	
relationship	 with	 Jemmy—actions	 which	 are	 always	 measured	 and	 guided	 by	
reason	and	inquiry—the	characterization	of	the	novel	as	one	of	intense	sensibility	
seems	strikingly	inaccurate.	Nevertheless,	the	content	of	each	tale	foregrounds	the	
problems	 of	 young	 women’s	 judgment	 and,	 therefore,	 complements	 the	 novel’s	




	 Karen	 Cajka	 has	 written	 about	 the	 ‘unprotected	 woman’	 in	 Jemmy	 and	
Jenny,	 and	 as	 both	 a	 contrast	 and	 complement	 to	 her	 study,	 I	 consider	 here	 the	
opposite	subject:	 the	protected	woman.63	Jenny	 Jessamy	 is	not	only	an	exemplar,	
as	I	have	shown,	of	how	to	think	and	behave,	or,	as	Richetti	puts	it,	‘a	font	of	good	













important.	 Jenny’s	 legal	 and	 economic	 autonomy	 are	 the	 happy	 result	 of	 her	
family’s	economic	status	along	with	the	wisdom	and	benevolence	of	her	father	and,	
later,	her	guardian	(Jemmy’s	father),	who	secured	her	future.	Both	of	these	father	






avoid	 the	potential	seizure	of	 the	property	 if	he	 is	 jailed	 for	duelling.	As	a	result,	








characters	 in	 perpetual	 legal	 subjugation.65	If,	 as	 Jane	 Spencer	 suggests,	 ‘The	
History	of	Miss	Betsy	Thoughtless	 is	about	 the	dangers	of	 too	much	 independence	












also	 the	 difficulty	 of	 exercising	 it	 effectively.	 	 Through	 the	 character	 of	 Jenny’s	
friend,	 Sophia,	 Haywood	 shows	 what	 can	 happen	 when	 a	 legally	 autonomous	
woman	 exercises	 her	 judgment	 poorly.	 Although	 Cajka	 describes	 Sophia	 as	
‘unprotected’,	 Sophia	 begins	 the	 novel	 in	 a	 legally	 protected	 position	 as	 a	
financially	independent	single	woman.	She	goes	astray,	however,	when	she	takes	a	
criminal	 rake	 at	 his	 word	 and	 ‘loans’	 him	 £1000	 (half	 of	 her	 fortune)	 without	
having	 him	 sign	 a	 contract	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 debt.	Many	 of	Haywood’s	 earlier	
texts	 foreground	 the	 near	 impossibility	 of	 discovering	 truth;	 however,	 it	 is	 clear	







Central	 to	Sophia’s	story	 is	not	only	her	 interaction	with	 the	 legal	system,	
but	also	its	vocabulary	and	methods.		Throughout	the	novel,	characters	are	put	in	
the	 position	 of	 judging	 other	 characters	 and	 their	 actions,	 and	 those	 situations	
often	involve	the	language	of	law	and	criminality.	For	example,	when	Sophia	visits	
Jenny	to	tell	her	she	is	leaving	town	in	self-imposed	exile,	she	says,	‘“Judge	now,	my	
dear	Miss	Jessamy	.	 .	 .	 if	to	remain	in	a	place	where	I	must	expect	to	be	made	the	







been	 guilty	 of	 no	 crime’,	 and	 Sophia	 later	 acknowledges	 ‘the	 justice	 of	 these	
arguments’.	 Although	 they	 are	 discussing	 a	 private	 matter,	 they	 employ	 legal	







‘It	 is	 no	 new	 thing,	 Sir	 Thomas,’	 said	Mr.	 Lovegrove,	 ‘to	 hear	Miss	
Jessamy	plead	the	cause	of	the	accused:	strong	as	was	the	indictment	
laid	against	Lord	Huntley	in	your	letter,	I	can	assure	you,	it	lost	half	
its	 force	 by	 the	 arguments	 which	 this	 fair	 advocate	 urg’d	 in	





invoke	 the	 language	 of	 the	 law,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 authority.	 The	 latter	 occurs,	 for	
example,	 when	 characters	 visit	 magistrates	 (or	 threaten	 to	 do	 so)	 and	 when	
Jemmy	has	to	run	away	to	France	after	wounding	Bellpine	in	a	duel.	
	 With	 these	 examples,	 I	 aim	 to	 support	 my	 claim	 that	 legal	 language	
pervades	Jemmy	and	Jenny,	but	I	also	aim	to	show	that	legal	thinking—in	terms	of	









through	 careful	 reflection	 and	 investigation,	 and	 these	 methods	 of	 discovery	
contrast	with	those	in	many	earlier	texts,	such	as	The	Rash	Resolve	(1724),	which	
relies	 on	 confession,	 and	 A	 Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer	 and	 Eovaai,	 which	 rely	 on	
supernatural	 means.	 When	 Lord	 Huntley	 is	 accused	 of	 bigamy,	 for	 example,	 he	
immediately	travels	back	to	London	from	Bath	in	order	to	investigate,	and	he	goes	
directly	to	his	accuser,	Sir	Thomas.	Sir	Thomas	then	takes	him	to	the	source	of	the	
rumour,	where	 they	 find	 that	 someone	has	been	pretending	 to	be	Lord	Huntley.	
Consequently,	 Lord	Huntley’s	 name	 is	 cleared,	 and	 he	 and	 Sir	 Thomas	 pursue	 a	
‘search-warrant’	 that	 can	be	executed	by	 the	 ‘officers	of	 justice’.	 In	 this	 example,	
Huntley	 does	 not	 allow	 the	 accusation	 to	 stand.	 Rather	 he	 takes	 active	 steps	 to	
interrogate	the	narrative	and	investigate	the	truth,	and	he	 leads	Sir	Thomas	on	a	
fact-finding	mission.	Once	he	 and	Sir	Thomas	discover	 the	 truth,	 he	 turns	 to	 the	
legal	 system	 for	 justice.	 These	 strategies	 invoke	 the	 methods	 of	 criminal	
investigation	 in	 order	 to	 discover	 deception	 and	 find	 truth,	 a	 process	 that	 is	
necessary	to	counterbalance	the	imaginative	leap	necessary	when	moving	from	a	
set	of	data	to	a	narrative.	
Problems	 of	 legal	 knowledge	 and	 judgment	were	 centre	 stage	 during	 the	
mid-eighteenth	century	as	legal	cases	(and	not	just	criminals	themselves)	became	
matters	 of	 public	 interest.	 One	 of	 those	 was	 a	 bigamy	 case	 that	 Haywood	
fictionalizes	 in	 Dalinda;	 or,	 The	 Double	 Marriage	 (1749).68	Another,	 the	 case	 of	









Both	 of	 these	 cases	 are	 characterized	 by	 the	 kinds	 of	 problems	 that	 Haywood	
addresses	in	Jemmy	and	Jenny,	particularly	those	related	to	the	difficulty	of	relying	
on	 testimony	 as	 opposed	 to	 factual	 or	 circumstantial	 evidence.	 In	 the	 face	 of	
testimony,	one	is	left	to	merely	compare	narrative	assertions	from	different	points	
of	view.	The	Cresswell	bigamy	case,	for	example,	hinges	on	three	separate	versions	
of	 events	 surrounding	 Elizabeth	 Scrope’s	 accusation	 of	 bigamy	 towards	 Thomas	
Cresswell.	As	Earla	Wilputte	explains	it,	‘The	Cresswell	case	was	told	[in	the	press]	
from	 three	 points	 of	 view:	 Elizabeth	 Scrope’s,	 Thomas	 Cresswell’s,	 and	 Lancelot	
Lee’s,	Miss	 Scrope’s	 suitor.	 The	public	was	 left	 to	 judge	 among	 these	 viewpoints	
and	to	sift	through	the	opinions	and	questions	of	by-standers	who	also	weighed	in	
through	public	letters’.69	The	truth	in	this	matter	was	difficult	to	determine	since	it	
rested	 so	 heavily	 on	 competing	 and	 conflicting	 testimonies	 and	 so	 little	 on	
circumstantial	evidence.	The	Elizabeth	Canning	case	was	similar	because	it	rested	
on	 competing	 narratives.	 Canning	 had	 accused	 Mary	 Squires	 and	 Virtue	 Hall	 of	
kidnapping	and	abusing	her.	 First,	 they	were	 found	guilty,	 but	 after	 that	 verdict,	
people	 began	 to	 say	 that	 Canning	 had	 falsely	 accused	 them.	 Eventually,	 Canning	
was	 found	 guilty	 of	 perjury	 and	 transported	 to	 the	 American	 colonies.	 In	 the	
Canning	case,	Henry	Fielding,	who	was	the	magistrate,	could	not	study	empirical	or	















truth	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 human	 affairs.72	The	 legal	 system	 and	 its	 language,	 then,	
provide	a	potential	solution	to	the	problems	that	trouble	Haywood,	especially	the	
problems	 of	 sensory	 perception,	 isolated	 experience,	 and	 testimony.	 	 Many	
eighteenth-century	novels	focus	on	the	problems	and/or	potentialities	of	the	legal	
system.	As	David	Punter	puts	 it,	 ‘Eighteenth-century	 fiction	 is	 obsessed	with	 the	
law’.73	To	 support	 his	 claim,	 he	 considers	mostly	male	writers	 like	Daniel	Defoe,	
Henry	Fielding,	Tobias	Smollett,	and	William	Godwin,	with	brief	attention	to	Ann	
Radcliffe.	 Nancy	 Johnson	 examines	 women	 writers	 in	 the	 law,	 explaining	 that	
‘[l]iterature	and	the	law	reached	an	important	moment	of	conflation	in	Britain	in	
the	 late	eighteenth	century’	 that	 led	to	 ‘a	group	of	women	novelists	of	 the	1790s	
who	were	.	 .	 .	engaged	in	a	narrative	dialogue	that	wrestled	with	female	attempts	
to	 acquire	 agency	 and	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 full	 legal	 subjects’.74	These	 narrative	



















and	 legal	 agency	or	discourse	 in	works	by	women,	 and	 those	who	have	done	 so	
have	 typically	 focused	 on	 the	writers	 of	 the	 later	 eighteenth	 century.76	Of	 those	
who	have	studied	earlier	texts	by	women,	even	fewer	have	considered	legal	issues	
in	Haywood.	
This	 neglect	 is	 surprising	 since,	 as	 Kathryn	 King	 asserts,	 Haywood	 has	 a	
‘preoccupation	with	the	law	that	[features]	importantly’	after	1724.77	King,	herself,	
focuses	on	Haywood’s	interest	in	the	power	of	 law	to	provide	(or	fail	to	provide)	
‘redress’	 in	 Memoirs	 of	 a	 Certain	 Island	 Adjacent	 to	 Utopia	 (1725),	 and	 she	
concludes	 that,	 for	 Haywood,	 ‘virtue	 is	 ineffectual’	 against	 an	 unsupportive	 or	
oppressive	 legal	 system.78	Relatedly,	 Jennifer	 Hobgood	 argues	 that	 Haywood’s	
work	is	‘deeply	concerned	with	the	concept	of	contract’,	both	in	terms	of	the	social	
contract	and	 the	marriage	contract,	 and	Hobgood	 looks	 specifically	at	how	 these	
issues	figure	in	three	of	Haywood’s	texts	from	the	1720s—A	Wife	to	be	Lett	(1724),	
The	City	Jilt	 (1726),	 and	The	Mercenary	Lover	 (1726).79	Cheryl	Nixon	also	 studies	
Haywood’s	 critique	 of	 the	 law,	 but	 her	 interpretation	 suggests	 a	 slightly	 more	



















fiction	 predicts	 the	 legal	 shift	 from	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 guardian	 and	 property	 to	 an	
increasing	 interest	 in	 the	 welfare	 of	 the	 child’.80	Nixon	 says	 that	 Haywood’s	
prediction	looks	beyond	the	failings	of	the	legal	system	in	order	to	suggest	it	future	
potentialities,	 an	 example	 of	which	 can	 be	 seen	 in	The	Distress’d	Orphan	 (1726)	
when	the	law	(eventually)	offers	recourse	for	Annilia,	whose	guardian	has	abused	
his	 legal	power	 in	order	to	divest	her	of	her	 inheritance.	 In	 Jemmy	and	Jenny,	 the	
legal	 system	and	 lawyers	assist	 Jenny	honestly,	 and	attempt	 to	help	Sophia	after	
she	has	been	betrayed.		





and	 she	 is	 regularly	 suspicious	 of	 the	 testimony	 of	 others.	 Hers	 is	 a	 ‘mitigated	
scepticism’,	 which	 involves	 putting	 ‘assumptions	 to	 the	 test,	 to	 compare	 them	
against	 facts’.81	As	 Andrew	 Sabl	 explains,	 fact-checking	 does	 not	 always	 indicate	























her	 to	 exercise	 her	 autonomy	 effectively.	 Her	 successful	 autonomy	 implies	 that	
even	though	external	social	forces	can	threaten	autonomy	and	female	subjectivity	
(as	they	do	in,	say,	Eovaai),	they	also	can	be	harnessed	for	an	effective	autonomy	
that	 is	not	 the	extreme	 individualism	of,	 say,	Descartes,	 but	 is	 an	 intersubjective	
autonomy	 that	 relies	 on	 sociable	 modes	 of	 judgment.	 In	 this	 final	 novel,	 then,	
Haywood’s	 Cartesian	 doubt	 has	 been	 modified.	 Although	 her	 doubt	 still	 has	 a	





Because	 of	 her	 autonomy	 and	 good	 judgment,	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 operates	 in	
contrast	to	characters	from	Haywood’s	other	fiction	as	well	as	other	contemporary	
heroines	 from	 texts	 like	 Clarissa	 (1748),	 The	 History	 of	 Miss	 Betsy	 Thoughtless	
(1751),	 and	The	Female	Quixote	 (1752).	 All	 of	 Jenny’s	 reasoning	 and	 actions	 are	
both	 ‘penetrating’	 and	 ‘judicious’,	 and	 this	 stunning	 consistency	 serves	 her	 well	
since,	 throughout	 the	 narrative,	 many	 situations	 present	 themselves	 that	 do,	 in	
fact,	require	her	to	 judge	and,	ultimately	to	act,	despite	her	 initial	goal	of	being	a	
spectator	 or	 spy.	 Important	 to	 her	 success	 is	 her	 careful	 consideration	 of	







commitment	 to	 suspending	 judgment	 in	 the	 face	 of	 uncertainty.	 Another	
significant	 difference	 from	 the	 heroines	 of	 other	 mid-century	 novels	 (and	 from	
Haywood’s	 other	 novels)	 is	 Jenny’s	 status	 as	 a	 legally	 autonomous	 individual.	
Whereas	 other	 works	 typically	 feature	 young	 women	 who	 attempt	 to	 exercise	
their	will	against	resisting	fathers	(or	brothers),	Jenny	has	no	such	resistance.	As	a	




understanding	 the	 practice	 of	 judgment’	 because,	 ‘instead	 of	 oscillating	 between	
the	 equally	 unsatisfying	 poles	 of	 radically	 grounded	 experience	 and	 a	 radically	
ungrounded	 fictiveness,	 it	 reveals	 the	co-constitutive	structure	of	 fictionality	and	
experience	in	producing	good	judgment’.83	The	History	of	Jemmy	and	Jenny	Jessamy	
reveals	a	similar	process	of	judgment,	in	which	Jenny	neglects	neither	experience	





think,	 but	 also	 how	we	 should	 read.	 This	 sociable	 judgment	 is	 based	 on	 putting	
oneself	 in	 the	 standpoint	 of	 others	 and	 imagining	 their	 thoughts,	 thereby	








Although	 this	 novel	 is	 still	 part	 of	 the	 sceptical	 tradition—because	 it	
examines	 the	 practice	 of	 sceptical	 thought—as	 a	 whole	 it	 does	 not	 share	 the	
sceptical	 aesthetic	 and	 instability	 of	 Haywood’s	 earlier	 texts.	 However,	 it	 does	





















in	 The	 Adventures	 of	 Eovaai,	 when	 the	 young	 queen	 is	 wandering	 alone,	 in	 the	




Then,	 Eovaai	 is	 lowered	 from	 the	 chariot	 and	 ‘set	 down	 on	 the	 Earth’	 by	 ‘an	
invisible	hand’	(95).	At	this	point,	she	 is	 truly	 left	on	her	own,	and	the	anxiety	of	
her	 solitude	 and	 indirection	 is	 reflected	 in	 her	 thoughts	 and	 in	 the	 landscape	
around	her:	
What	more	 dreadful	 than	 this	 Solitude	 can	 Imagination	 figure	 out!	
No	Mark	of	any	Footstep,	no	Path	to	direct	the	forlorn	Princess	in	her	
uncertain	 Pilgrimage,	 no	 grassy	 Bank	 on	 which	 she	 might	 repose,	
nor	Tree	to	shelter	her	from	the	rude	Winds,	or	more	injurious	Sun,	
but	 all	 around	 a	 Sense	 of	 Desolation.	 She	 expected	 no	 less	 than	 to	











the	 libertine	minister	 and	 the	 revolutionary	 republican.	 The	 lack	 of	 footsteps	 to	
follow	and	the	absence	of	a	path	to	guide	her	signify	 that	she	must	 find	her	own	
way—in	terms	of	both	the	physical	landscape	and	the	political	landscape.	In	other	
words,	 she	 has	 been	 left	 on	 her	 own	 and	 must	 discover	 how	 to	 exercise	 her	
autonomy	 as	 an	 individual	 and	 assert	 her	 authority	 as	 a	 queen.	 Her	 journey,	








	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 argue	 that	 Haywood	 is	 a	 sceptical	 writer	 who	 should	 be	
considered	 as	 a	 serious	 contributor	 to	 the	 literary	 tradition	 of	 scepticism,	 and	 I	
also	 argue	 that	 her	 sceptical	 aesthetic	 leads	 to	 innovation	 in	 her	 work	 that	 has	
been	overlooked.	My	first	example	is	her	biography/defence	of	Duncan	Campbell,	




Campbell,	 there	 are	 numerous	 rhetorical	 and	 structural	 elements	 that	 suggest	 a	
distance	 between	 Haywood	 (the	 author)	 and	 Justicia	 (the	 narrator)—a	 distance	







reader	 should,	 in	 the	 end,	 believe	 about	 him.	 Ultimately,	 this	 tension	 privileges	
doubt	as	the	proper	method	of	inquiry	for	the	narrator	and	for	the	reader.	Not	only	
does	 the	 text	 privilege	 a	 position	 of	 doubt,	 but	 it	 demonstrates	 an	 extreme	
scepticism	 about	 knowledge	 that	 puts	 the	 text	 in	 conversation	 with	 other	
writers—mostly	 male—who	 are	 part	 of	 the	 sceptical	 tradition.	 One	 of	 these	
writers	is	William	Bond,	who,	several	years	before	Haywood’s	Spy,	wrote	The	Life	
and	Adventures	 of	Mr.	Duncan	Campbell	 (1720),	 his	 own	 defence	 of	 the	 fortune-
teller.	 His	 text,	 which	 begins	 with	 an	 apparition	 narrative,	 reflects	 work	 by	
members	 of	 the	 Royal	 Society,	 like	 Joseph	 Glanvill,	 who	 wrote	 and	 defended	
apparition	 narratives	 based	 on	 the	 evidence	 of	 experience	 and	 testimony	 from	
credible	 ‘relators’.	 Haywood’s	 text,	 through	 its	 unreliable	 narrator,	 takes	 a	more	
skeptical	 position	 and	 directly	 challenges	 the	 credulity	 and	 ‘naïve	 empiricism’	
advocated	 by	 many	 natural	 philosophers.	 In	 addition,	 Haywood’s	 unreliable	
narrator,	 combined	 with	 her	 second-person	 references	 to	 her	 identified	 reader,	
creates	 an	 innovative	 sceptical	 aesthetic	 that	 puts	 the	 reader	 in	 a	 position	 of	
authority	to	judge	whether	Duncan	Campbell	is	legitimate	or	not.	At	the	same	time,	
however,	 the	 text	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 such	 judgments	 are	 nearly	 impossible	 to	
achieve,	and	therefore	the	reader’s	position	is	an	anxious	one.	This	innovative	and	
‘novel’	 authority	 advances	 fictionality	 at	 the	 same	 time	 that	 it	 advances	 the	
reader’s	capacity	for	judgment.	
	 The	Adventures	of	Eovaai	(1736)	is	a	more	complicated	text	than	A	Spy	Upon	
the	Conjurer	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 form	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 investigation	 into	 the	
problems	 of	 judgment.	 A	multiplicity	 of	 generic	 labels	 have	 been	 applied	 to	 this	
text,	but	in	my	argument	I	add	one	more	as	I	argue	that	the	text	should	be	read	as	a	





Haywood	 is	 concerned	 with	 problems	 of	 perception	 and	 partiality,	 but	 in	 this	
political	 satire	 of	 England’s	 Walpolean	 government,	 Haywood	 demonstrates	




foundational	 to	 historical	 knowledge.	 As	 Haywood	 destabilizes	 this	 foundation,	
she,	as	in	Spy,	enters	a	traditionally	male	discourse	that	invokes	the	negotiation	of	
credulity	 and	 scepticism.	 In	 addition,	 the	 apparatus	 of	 Haywood’s	 mock-history	
offers	 an	 innovative	 fictional	 form	 that	 pushes	 the	 reader	 into	 a	 position	 of	
authority.	Although	other	scholars	of	the	text	have	studied	the	 implications	of	 its	
form	on	the	reader,	they	have	not	recognized	the	degree	to	which	epistemological	






46)	 that	 claim	 the	 periodical’s	 persona	 to	 be	 either	 authoritative	 or	 not	
authoritative.	 Instead,	 I	 demonstrate	 how,	 in	 the	 periodical,	 Haywood	 first	
establishes	an	authoritative	voice	 for	her	eidolon	but	 then	 later	destabilizes	 that	
authority	in	order	to	continue	her	project	of	developing	readerly	authority.	In	The	
Female	 Spectator,	 this	 destabilization	 is	 triggered	 by	 the	 juxtaposition	 of	 a	
publication	issue,	or	‘book’,	on	lying	with	another	book	that	contains	lies.	Although	






of	 her	 own.	 Barbara	 Shapiro	 asserts	 that,	 in	 the	 eighteenth-century,	 travel	
narratives	were	perhaps	the	most	significant	flashpoint	in	debates	about	fact	and	
truth,	 and	 Haywood’s	 inclusion	 of	 these	 narratives	 further	 demonstrates	 her	
interest	 in	 the	 negotiation	 between	 scepticism	 and	 credulity	 and,	 once	 again,	
requires	 her	 reader	 to	 do	 the	 difficult	 work	 of	 judging	 truth	 from	 falsehood.	
However,	 the	 reader’s	 task	 in	 The	 Female	 Spectator	 is	 less	 anxiety	 ridden	 that	
those	 from	 earlier	 texts	 because	 in	 this	 periodical	 Haywood	 begins	 to	 explore	 a	
sociable	standard	of	 judgment	 that	mitigates	problems	of	bias	 that	dominate	her	
earlier	 texts.	 This	 sociable	 process	 of	 judgment	 derives	 from	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 reader	 and	 the	periodical’s	 eidolon,	 the	 latter	 of	which	becomes	 an	
‘experimental	 image’	 onto	 which	 the	 reader	 can	 project	 judgments.	 In	 order	 to	
project	 these	 judgments	 onto	 the	 experimental	 image,	 readers	 must	 use	 their	
imaginations	in	ways	that	prepare	them	for	the	increasing	intersubjectivity	of	the	
novels	of	the	later	eighteenth	century.		
	 The	 History	 of	 Jemmy	 and	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 (1753)	 further	 develops	 the	
pedagogy	 of	 sociable	 judgment	 that	 is	 introduced	 in	 The	 Female	 Spectator.	
Although	I	argue	that	Haywood’s	last	novel	is	still	part	of	the	sceptical	tradition—
as	 it	 clearly	 advocates	 a	 sceptical	 approach	 to	 judgment—it	 does	 not	 share	 the	
narrative	 tension	and	 sceptical	 aesthetic	of	 the	other	 texts	 studied	 in	 this	 thesis.	











Haywood	 challenges	 Locke’s	 self-reliant	 empiricism	 and	 Descartes’s	 self-reliant	
rationalism	 and,	 instead,	 prefigures	 the	 kinds	 of	 judgment	 that	 can	 be	 found	 in	
later	 thinkers	 like	Adam	Smith	and	 Immanuel	Kant.	 In	 addition,	 some	aspects	of	
sociable	 judgment	in	Jemmy	and	Jenny	stem	from	its	 invocation	of	the	vocabulary	
and	methods	of	 the	 legal	 system,	 thereby	demonstrating	Haywood’s	engagement	
with	legal	discourse	as	another	flashpoint	for	debates	about	testimony	and	truth.	
Most	 importantly,	 I	 argue	 that	 The	 History	 of	 Jemmy	 and	 Jenny	 Jessamy	 is	 more	
unified	 and	 innovative	 than	 scholars	 have	 allowed.	 Although	 the	 novel	
traditionally	has	been	dismissed	as	sentimental,	I	argue	that,	in	fact,	it	is	only	the	
interpolated	 tales	 that	 are	 sentimental	 and	 that	 the	 central	 narrative	 is	 not	
sentimental.	 Furthermore,	 I	 challenge	 claims	 that	 the	 interpolated	 tales	 are	
‘digressions’	from	a	pointless	central	plot,	and	I	demonstrate	instead	that	that	they	
are	pivotal	to	Jenny’s	development	as	an	impartial	spectator.	In	short,	Haywood’s	













Haywood’s	 work	 is	 the	 regular	 shifting	 of	 ideas	 in	 the	 public	 sphere.	 This	 is,	
perhaps,	a	self-evident	claim,	but	it	does	not	seem	to	have	born	proper	weight	on	





In	Eovaai,	 Haywood	 is	 still	 interested	 in	 problems	 of	 sensory	 perception,	 but	 in	
that	 text,	 she	 also	 puts	 pressure	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 historical	 discourse	 and	 the	
problems	 that	 arise	 from	 its	 necessary	 reliance	 on	 testimony.	 In	 The	 Female	
Spectator,	 Haywood	 addresses	 many	 topics,	 but	 it	 is	 her	 inclusion	 of	 travel	
narratives	 that	 punctures	 the	 narrator’s	 authority	 and	 evokes	 the	 reader’s	
negotiation	 between	 credulity	 and	 scepticism.	 Finally,	 in	 Jemmy	 and	 Jenny,	
Haywood	is	not	only	engaged	with	the	problem	of	judgment	as	it	relates	to	the	idea	
of	an	enlarged	mentality	and	the	impartial	spectator	(themes	that	 later	will	be	of	
central	 concern	 to	 other	 writers),	 but	 also	 she	 uses	 the	 language	 of	 the	 legal	
system	to	both	signify	the	process	of	judgment	and	demonstrate	the	autonomous	
status	 of	 her	 heroine.	 Each	 of	 these	 four	 texts	 demonstrates	 Haywood’s	
engagement	with	 Enlightenment	 ideas	 and	 concerns	 that	were	 contemporary	 to	
their	publication,	 thereby	 showing	 that	Eliza	Haywood,	 throughout	her	 life,	 read	











	 Although	 other	 scholars	 have	 recognized	 epistemological	 themes	 in	
individual	Haywood	texts,	this	study	is	the	first	to	examine	the	specific	processes	
of	judgment	at	work	throughout	her	career,	and	the	first	to	place	Haywood	in	the	
sceptical	 tradition.	With	 this	 thesis,	 I	 fill	a	gap	 in	Haywood	studies	 that	has	been	
created,	 in	 part,	 because	 of	 a	 traditionally	 narrow	 focus	 on	 issues	 such	 as	 sex,	
marriage,	and	curiosity.	Alex	Pettit	has	even	stated	 that	 ‘sex,	and	not	philosophy,	
[was	Haywood’s]	 favorite	topic	since	her	debut	 in	print’,3	but	such	claims	rest	on	
an	 unnecessary	 binary	 distinction,	 and	 they	 oversimplify	 Haywood’s	 work.	




courtship	 in	 order	 to	 connect	 her	 individual	 works	 to	 other	 contemporary	
concerns	and	writers.	For	example,	more	studies	comparing	early	Haywood	with	
Defoe	would	be	very	 fruitful.	Not	only	did	Haywood	and	Defoe	both	write	about	
sex	 and	 courtship,	 but	 they	 both	 wrote	 about	 the	 supernatural,	 they	 both	
demonstrate	 interests	 in	social	contracts	and	the	 law,	and	they	both	wrote	many	
genre-bending	texts	that	are	often	difficult	to	finalize	in	terms	of	their	political	and	
moral	 attitudes.	 In	 addition,	 new	 approaches	 to	 the	 connections	 between	 early	











other	 concerns	 about	 epistemology	 and	 judgment.	 These	 connections	might	 also	
lead	to	additional,	productive	considerations	of	Lockean	ideas	in	Haywood’s	work,	
thereby	 furthering	 the	 work	 of	 scholars	 like	 Helen	 Thompson	 and	 Jonathan	
Kramnick.4	The	 fall	 2014	 special	 issue	 of	 the	 Journal	 for	 Early	 Modern	 Cultural	




connections	 to	 topics	 such	 as	 the	 law,	 the	 tabloids,	 portraiture,	 and	 ‘speculative	
economics’.5			
	 In	 addition,	more	attention	 should	be	paid	 to	Haywood’s	work	of	 the	 late	
1740s	and	early	1750s	and	to	The	History	of	Jemmy	and	Jenny	Jessamy	in	particular.	
Haywood’s	last	novel	was	deemed	to	be	a	bad	novel	as	soon	as	it	was	released,	and	





















The	 Female	Quixote).	 Although	 the	 novel	 historically	 has	 been	 dismissed,	 it	 was	
clearly	 well	 known,	 as	 can	 be	 inferred	 from	 criticism	 by	 the	 likes	 of	 Scott,	




fiction.	Another	particularly	productive	area	of	 study	 for	 Jemmy	and	Jenny	would	
involve	 further	 investigation	 of	 law	 and	 philosophy	 in	 the	 novel.	 Although	 I	
establish	the	significance	of	 these	elements	 in	this	 thesis,	 further	study	would	be	
fruitful.	Of	specific	value	would	be	inquiry	about	connections	between	Jemmy	and	
Jenny	 and	 Fielding’s	 legal	 writings,	 as	 well	 as	 examination	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	ideas	of	judgment	in	Jemmy	and	Jenny	and	the	ideas	of	judgment	in	works	
by	Adam	Smith	and	David	Hume.		
	 Finally,	 additional	 work	 should	 be	 done	 on	 women	 and	 the	 sceptical	
tradition.	Women	writers	are	woefully	neglected	in	studies	of	scepticism,	and	this	
neglect	 narrows	 our	 understanding	 of	 both.	 Of	 particular	 interest	 should	 be	 the	
fact	that	traditional	scepticism	advocates	an	adherence	to	custom	and	the	political	
status	quo;	however,	Haywood,	despite	her	scepticism,	often	challenges	the	status	
quo.	 These	 challenges	 demonstrate	 that	 our	 current	 ideas	 about	 scepticism	 in	
eighteenth-century	literature	are	limited	and	partial	because	of	gender	bias.	A	very	
productive	study	could	be	made	of	the	line	of	scepticism	in	women’s	writing	that	
goes	 from	 Behn	 to	 Austen,	 with	 Haywood,	 Lennox,	 and	 Burney	 bridging	 the	









the	 existing	 narrative	 about	 eighteenth-century	 sceptical	 literature	 and	 thought,	
while	also	clarifying	the	role	of	mid-century	women’s	fiction.8	
	 To	 my	 mind,	 the	 most	 important	 implication	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 Eliza	
Haywood	 should	 be	 read	 not	 just	 as	 an	 ‘Arbitress	 of	 Passion’	 or	 even	 as	 a	 ‘Fair	
Philosopher’,	 but	 as	 a	 significant	 Enlightenment	 author.	 Currently,	 this	 is	 not	
always	the	case.	As	I	noted	in	the	introduction,	studies	of	scepticism	in	 literature	
do	 not	 include	 Eliza	 Haywood,	 and	 neither	 do	 most	 studies	 of	 women	 and	 the	
Enlightenment.	 For	 example,	 Judy	 A.	 Hayden’s	 excellent	 collection	 of	 essays	The	
New	 Science	 and	 Women’s	 Literary	 Discourse	 only	 includes	 one	 reference	 to	
Haywood	 when,	 in	 the	 introduction,	 Hayden	 quotes	 The	 Female	 Spectator’s	
suggestion	that	women	should	study	natural	philosophy.9	Haywood	is	not	included	
in	Women,	 Writing,	 and	 the	 Public	 Sphere,	 and	 she	 is	 only	 mentioned	 once	 in	
Women,	 Gender,	 and	 Enlightenment	 (in	 a	 brief	 reference	 to	 Love	 in	 Excess).10	
JoEllen	 DeLucia’s	 recent	 book	A	 Feminine	 Enlightenment:	 British	Women	Writers	
and	 the	 Philosophy	 of	 Progress,	 1759-1820,	 does	 not	 include	 references	 to	
Haywood.	Granted,	Haywood	died	before	the	time	period	that	DeLucia	studies,	but	
it	 is	 still	 significant	 that	DeLucia	chose	 to	start	 in	1759	and	 that	Haywood	 is	not	

















the	 neglect	 of	 what	 Betty	 Schellenberg	 calls	 the	 ‘sandwich	 filling’	 of	 women’s	
writing	in	the	long	eighteenth	century,	meaning	the	writers	of	the	mid-century	that	





the	 course	 of	 four	 decades	 and	multiple	 genres,	 Eliza	Haywood	 interrogates	 the	
central	 concerns	 of	 the	 Enlightenment.	 Also	 through	 those	 multiple	 genres,	 she	
experiments	 with	 innovative	 forms,	 such	 as	 unreliable	 narrators,	 scholarly	
apparatus,	and	interpolated	tales	that	productively	complicate	the	development	of	
the	 novel	 and	 put	 pressure	 on	 concepts	 of	 truth	 and	 fictionality.	 Eighteenth-
century	 readers	 have	 been	 described	 as	 struggling	 in	 the	 face	 of	 blurred	
distinctions	between	fact	and	fiction,13	but	Kate	Loveman	has	argued	persuasively	
that	 readers	 not	 only	 understood	 these	 differences	 but	 also	were	wary	 of	 being	
fooled. 14 	Haywood’s	 sceptical	 aesthetic	 effectively	 exploits	 this	 wariness	 and	
















Adams,	 Percy	 G.	 Travelers	 and	 Travel	 Liars,	 1660-1800.	 New	 York:	 Dover,	 1980.	
Reprint.	First	published	in	1962	by	University	of	California	Press.	
Arendt,	 Hannah.	 ‘The	 Crisis	 in	 Culture:	 Its	 Social	 and	 Political	 Significance’.	 In	
Judgment,	 Imagination,	 and	 Politics:	 Themes	 from	 Kant	 and	 Arendt,	 3-25.	
Lanham,	Maryland:	Roman	&	Littlefield	Publishers,	2001.	
———.	 ‘Lectures	 on	 Kant’s	 Philosophy’.	 In	 Hannah	 Arendt:	 Lectures	 on	 Kant’s	
Political	Philosophy,	 edited	 by	 Ronald	 Beiner,	 7-77.	 Chicago:	 University	 of	
Chicago	Press,	1992.	
———.	 ‘Postscriptum	to	Thinking’.	 In	Hannah	Arendt:	Lectures	on	Kant’s	Political	
Philosophy,	 edited	 by	 Ronald	 Beiner,	 3-5.	 Chicago:	 University	 of	 Chicago	
Press,	1992.	
















Bakhtin,	 M.	 M.	 From	The	Dialogic	 Imagination,	 translated	 by	M.	 Holquist	 and	 C.	








Behn,	 Aphra.	 The	 History	 of	 the	 Nun;	 or	 The	 Fair	 Vow	 Breaker.	 Printed	 for	 A.	




Bertlesen,	 Lance.	Henry	 Fielding	 at	Work:	Magistrate,	 Business	Man,	Writer.	 New	
York:	Palgrave,	2000.	
Blouch,	 Christine.	 ‘Eliza	Haywood	and	 the	Romance	of	Obscurity’.	SEL:	Studies	 in	
English	Literature	1500-1900	31.3	(1991):	535-51.	
Bond,	William.	 The	History	 of	 the	Life	and	Adventures	of	Mr.	Duncan	Campbell,	A	
Gentleman,	who	 tho’	 Deaf	 and	 Dumb,	writes	 down	 any	 Stranger’s	 Name	 at	
first	 Sight:	 with	 their	 future	 Contingencies	 of	 Fortune.	The	 Second	 Edition	
corrected.	London:	Printed	for	E.	Curll:	And	sold	by	W.	Mears	and	T.	Jauncy	







Boone,	 Troy.	 ‘Narrating	 the	 Apparition:	 Glanvill,	 Defoe,	 and	 the	 Rise	 of	 Gothic	
Fiction’.	The	Eighteenth	Century	35.2	(1994):	173-89.	
Bordo,	 Susan.	 ‘Feminist	 Skepticism	 and	 the	 ‘Maleness’	 of	 Philosophy’.	 In	 Harvey	
and	Okrulik,	Women	and	Reason,	245-262.		
Bowers,	 Toni.	 Force	 or	 Fraud:	 British	 Seduction	 Stories	 and	 the	 Problem	 of	
Resistance,	1660-1760.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011.	
Buckley,	 Jenifer.	 ‘“Bankrupt	 in	all	but	my	good	wishes”:	Speculative	Economics	in	
Cleomelia;	 Or,	 The	 Generous	 Mistress’.	 Journal	 for	 Early	 Modern	 Cultural	
Studies	14.4	(2014):	79-100.	




















Code,	 Lorraine.	 What	 Can	 She	 Know?	 Feminist	 Theory	 and	 the	 Construction	 of	
Knowledge.	Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	1991.	
Conrad,	 R.	 and	 Barbara	 C.	 Weiskrantz.	 ‘Deafness	 in	 the	 17th	 Century:	 Into	
Empiricism’.	Sign	Language	Studies	45	(1984):	291-379.	
Coppola,	 Al.	 ‘Without	 the	 Help	 of	 Glasses’.	 The	 Eighteenth	 Century	 54.2	 (2013):	
263-77.	
Cornett,	Judy	M.	‘“Hoodwink’d	by	Custom”:	The	Exclusion	of	Women	from	Juries	in	
Eighteenth-Century	 Law	 and	 Literature’.	 William	 and	 Mary	 Journal	 of	
Women	and	the	Law,	4.1	(1997),	1-89.	
Craft,	Catherine	A.	‘Reworking	Male	Models:	Aphra	Behn’s	Fair	Vow-Breaker,	Eliza	





Creel,	 Sarah.	 ‘(Re)framing	 Eliza	 Haywood:	 Portraiture,	 Printer’s	 Ornaments,	 and	
the	 Fashioning	 of	 Female	 Authorship’.	 Journal	 for	 Early	 Modern	 Cultural	
Studies	14.4	(2014):	25-48.	
Croskery,	 Margaret	 Case.	 ‘Masquing	 Desire:	 The	 Politics	 of	 Passion	 in	 Eliza	
Haywood’s	Fantomina’.	 In	Saxton	and	Bocchicchio,	Passionate	Fictions,	69-
94.		






DeLucia,	 JoEllen.	 A	 Feminine	 Enlightenment:	 British	 Women	 Writers	 and	 the	
Philosophy	of	Progress,	1759-1820.	Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	
2015.	




Donoghue,	 William.	 Enlightenment	 Fiction	 in	 England,	 France,	 and	 America.	
Gainesville:	University	of	Florida	Press,	2002.	
Drury,	 Joseph.	 ‘Haywood’s	 Thinking	 Machines’.	 Eighteenth-Century	 Fiction	 21.2	
(2008-9):	201-228.	
Eger,	 Elizabeth,	 Charlotte	 Grant,	 Cliona	 O	 Gallchoir,	 and	 Penny	Warburton,	 eds.	
Women,	Writing,	and	the	Public	Sphere,	1700-1830.	 Cambridge:	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	2001.	
Farmer,	 Anna.	 ‘A	 Heroine	 Addiction’:	 Love	 and	 the	 Law	 in	 The	 Female	 Quixote,	
Griffith	Law	Review	13	(2004):	233-254.	
Fielding,	 Henry.	 A	 Clear	 State	 of	 the	 Case.	 Dublin:	 Printed	 for	 George	 Faulkner,	
Peter	Wilson,	and	Matthew	Williamson,	1753.	
———.	 Joseph	 Andrews	 with	 Shamela	 and	 Related	 Readings,	 edited	 by	 Homer	
Goldberg.	New	York:	W.	W.	Norton	and	Company,	1987.	
———.	Tom	Jones.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1996.	







Fowler,	 Joanna.	 ‘Narrative	Person,	Perspective	and	Voice	 in	Eliza	Haywood’s	The	
Adventures	of	Eovaai’.	Early	Modern	Englishwomen	Testing	Ideas,	edited	by	
Jo	Wallwork	and	Paul	Salzman,	121-34.	Farnham:	Ashgate,	2011	
Friedman,	 Marilyn.	 Autonomy,	 Gender,	 Politics.	 Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	
2003.	
Furbank,	 P.	 N.	 and	W.	 R.	 Owen.	Defoe	De-Attributions:	 A	 Critique	 of	 J.	 R.	Moore’s	
Checklist.	London:	Hambledon	Press,	1994.	





Women's	 Literary	 Discourse:	 Prefiguring	 Frankenstein,	 edited	 by	 Judy	
Hayden,	85-98.	New	York:	Palgrave,	2011.			





Barbarity.	 The	 Powerlessness	 of	 Political	 Skepticism	 According	 to	 the	
Discours	 sceptiques	 (1657)	 of	 Samuel	 Sorbiere’.	 In	 Laursen	 and	Paganini,	
Skepticism	and	Political	Thought,	113-129.	























Haywood,	 Eliza.	 The	 Adventures	 of	 Eovaai,	 Princess	 of	 Ijaveo,	 edited	 by	 Earla	
Wilputte.	Ontario:	Broadview	Press,	1999.	
———.	The	Distress’d	Orphan.	 In	Three	Novellas:	 ‘The	Distress’d	Orphan’,	 ‘The	City	
Jilt’,	 and	 ‘The	 Double	 Marriage’,	 edited	 by	 Earla	 A.	 Wilputte,	 27-63.	 East	
Lansing:	Michigan	State	University	Press,	1995.	First	published	in	1985.	










there.	 As	 also	 the	 various	 and	 diverting	 Occurances	 that	 happened	 on	 his	
Departure.	 London:	 Printed	 for	 W.	 Ellis	 at	 the	 Queen’s	 Head	 in	 Grace-
church-Street;	 J.	 Roberts	 in	 Warwick-lane;	 Mrs.	 Bilingsly	 at	 the	 Royal-
Exchange;	 A.	 Dod	 without	 Temple-bar;	 and	 J.	 Fox	 in	 Westminster-Hall,	
1725.	
———.	 The	 Female	 Spectator,	 in	 Selected	 Works	 of	 Eliza	 Haywood,	 edited	 by	
Kathryn	R.	King	and	Alexander	Pettit.	London:	Pickering	and	Chatto,	2001.	








———.	 Love	 in	 Excess;	 or	 The	 Fatal	 Inquiry,	 edited	 by	 David	 Oakleaf.	 Ontario:	
Broadview	Press,	Ltd.,	2000.		
———.	Memoirs	of	a	Certain	Island	Adjacent	to	the	Kingdom	of	Utopia.	Written	by	a	






———.	 Present	 for	 a	 Servant	Maid,	 ed.	 Alexander	 Pettit	 (London:	 Pickering	 and	
Chatto,	2000),	I.1.224-225.	
———.	 A	 Spy	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer:	 A	 Collection	 of	 Surprising	 Stories,	 with	 Names,	
Places,	 and	 particular	 Circumstances	 relating	 to	 Mr.	 Duncan	 Campbell,	
commonly	 known	 by	 the	 Name	 of	 the	 Deaf	 and	 Dumb	 Man;	 and	 the	
astonishing	 Penetration	 and	 Event	 of	 his	 Predictions.	 London:	 Sold	 by	 Mr.	








Made	 by	 Magnifying	 Glasses	 with	 Observations	 and	 Inquiries	 Thereupon.	
London:	Printed	by	Jo	Martyn	and	Ja.	Allestry,	Printers	to	the	Royal	Society	
and	are	to	be	sold	at	their	Shop	at	the	Bell	in	S.	Paul’s	Church-yard,	1665.	
Howard,	 James	 Joseph.	 The	 English	 Novel’s	 Cradle:	 The	 Theatre	 and	 the	 Women	
Novelists	of	the	Long	Eighteenth	Century.	Riverside:	UC	Riverside	Thesis	and	
Doctoral	Dissertations,	2010.	
Hutton,	 Sarah.	 British	 Philosophy	 in	 the	 Seventeenth	 Century.	 Oxford:	 Oxford	
University	Press,	2015.	















King,	 Kathryn	 R.	 ‘Eliza	 Haywood,	 Savage	 Love,	 and	 Biographical	 Uncertainty’.	
Review	of	English	Studies	59	(2008):	722-739.	
———.	 Introduction	 to	The	Female	Spectator,	 by	 Eliza	Haywood,	 edited	 by	King	
and	Pettit,	1-11.	
———.	 ‘Patriot	 or	Opportunist?	Eliza	Haywood	and	 the	Problems	of	The	Female	
Spectator.	In	Newman	and	Wright,	Fair	Philosopher,	104-21	
———.	 A	 Political	 Biography	 of	 Eliza	 Haywood.	 London:	 Pickering	 and	 Chatto,	
2012.	
———.	 ‘Spying	 Upon	 the	 Conjurer:	 Haywood,	 Curiosity,	 and	 “The	 Novel”	 in	 the	
1720s’.	Studies	in	the	Novel,	30	(1998):	178-179.	












Kubek,	 Elizabeth.	 ‘The	 Key	 to	 Stowe:	 Toward	 a	 Patriot	 Whig	 Reading	 of	 Eliza	














the	 Seventeenth	 and	 Eighteenth	 Centuries.	 Los	 Angeles:	 University	 of	
Toronto	 Press	 in	 association	 with	 the	 UCLA	 Center	 for	 Seventeenth-	 and	
Eighteenth-Century	 Studies	 and	 the	 William	 Andrews	 Clark	 Memorial	
Library,	2015.	
Locke,	 Jennifer.	 ‘Dangerous	 Fortune-telling	 in	 Frances	 Burney’s	 Camilla’.	
Eighteenth-Century	Fiction	25.4	(2013):	701-20.	






Lynch,	 Jack.	 Deception	 and	 Detection	 in	 Eighteenth-Century	 Britain.	 Aldershot:	
Ashgate,	2008.	
Manley,	 Delarivier.	 The	 New	 Atalantis,	 ed.	 Rosalind	 Ballaster.	 London:	 Penguin	
Books,	1991.	




McKeon,	 Michael.	 The	 Origins	 of	 the	 English	 Novel,	 1600-1740,	 15th	 Anniversary	
Edition.	Baltimore:	John’s	Hopkins	University	Press,	2002.	
———.	 The	 Secret	 History	 of	 Domesticity:	 Public,	 Private,	 and	 the	 Division	 of	
Knowledge.	Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	2005.	
McMyler,	 Benjamin.	 Testimony,	 Trust,	 and	 Authority.	 Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	
Press,	2011.	
Merritt,	 Juliette.	 Beyond	 Spectacle:	 Eliza	 Haywood’s	 Female	 Spectators.	 Toronto:	
University	of	Toronto	Press,	2004.	













Moore,	 Judith.	 The	 Appearance	 of	 Truth:	 The	 Story	 of	 Elizabeth	 Canning	 and	
Eighteenth-Century	Narrative.	Newark:	University	of	Delaware	Press,	1994.	








Nazar,	 Hina.	 Enlightened	 Sentiments:	 Judgment	 and	 Autonomy	 in	 the	 Age	 of	
Sensibility.	New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2012.	





Nixon,	 Cheryl.	 ‘Regulating	 the	 Unstable	 Family:	 Eliza	 Haywood’s	 Fiction	 and	 the	
Development	of	Family	Law’.	Journal	for	Early	Modern	Cultural	Studies	14.4	
(2014):	49-78.	
Noggle,	 James.	 The	 Skeptical	 Sublime:	 Aesthetic	 Ideology	 in	 Pope	 and	 the	 Tory	
Satirists.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001.	
Nunning,	 Ansgar.	 ‘Reconceptualizing	 the	 Theory,	 History,	 and	 Generic	 Scope	 of	









in	 the	 Long	 Eighteenth	 Century.	 Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	
2003.	
———.	 ‘Speechless:	 Haywood’s	 Deaf	 and	 Dumb	 Projector’.	 In	 Saxton	 and	
Bocchicchio,	Passionate	Fictions,	194-216.		
Orr,	Leah.	 ‘The	Basis	 for	Attribution	 in	 the	Canon	of	Eliza	Haywood’.	The	Library	
12.4	(2011):	335-375.	
Parker,	 Fred.	 Scepticism	 and	 Literature:	 An	 Essay	 on	 Pope,	 Hume,	 Sterne,	 and	
Johnson.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2003).	
Pettit,	 Alexander.	 ‘Our	 Fictions	 and	 Haywood’s	 Fictions’.	 In	 Talking	 Forward,	
Talking	Back:	Critical	Dialogues	with	the	Enlightenment,	 edited	by	Kevin	L.	
Cope	and	Rudiger	Ahrens,	145-66.	New	York:	AMS	Press,	2002.		
———.	 ‘The	 Pickering	 &	 Chatto	 Female	 Spectator:	 Nearly	 Four	 Pounds	 of	
Ephemera,	Enshrined’.	In	Newman	and	Wright,	Fair	Philosopher,	42-59.	














———.	 Introduction	 to	 Historical	 and	 Critical	 Dictionary:	 Selections,	 by	 Pierre	
Bayle,	 translated	 by	 Richard	 H.	 Popkin,	 viii-xxxvi.	 Indianapolis:	 Hackett	
Publishing	Company,	1991.	
Powell,	 Manushag.	 ‘Eliza	 Haywood,	 Periodicalist(?)’.	 Journal	 for	 Early	 Modern	
Cultural	Studies	14.4	(2014):	163-86.	
———.	 Performing	 Authorship	 in	 Eighteenth-Century	 English	 Periodicals.	
Lewisburg:	Bucknell	University	Press,	2012.	
Prescott,	 Sarah.	 ‘The	 Debt	 to	 Pleasure:	 Eliza	 Haywood’s	 Love	 in	 Excess	 and	
Women’s	Fiction	of	the	1720s’.	Women’s	Writing	7.3	(2000):	427-445.	
———.	 ‘A	 Market	 Share:	 Recent	 Editions	 of	 Eighteenth-Century	 Writing	 by	
Women’.	Women’s	Writing	9.2	(2002):	319-20.	
———.	 Women,	 Authorship	 and	 Literary	 Culture,	 1690-1740.	 London:	 Palgrave	
Macmillan,	2003.	
Prescott,	 Sarah	 and	 Jane	 Spencer.	 ‘Prattling,	 Tattling,	 and	 Knowing	 Everything:	
Public	 Authority	 and	 the	 Female	 Editorial	 Persona	 in	 the	 Early	 Essay-
Periodical’.	British	Journal	for	Eighteenth-Century	Studies	23	(2000):	43-57.	
Punter,	 David.	 Fictional	 Representation	 of	 the	 Law	 in	 the	 Eighteenth	 Century’,	
Eighteenth-Century	Studies	16.1	(1982):	47-74.	
Raphael,	 D.	 D.	 The	 Impartial	 Spectator:	 Adam	 Smith’s	 Moral	 Philosophy.	 Oxford:	
Clarendon,	2007.	
Reeves,	 Clara	 The	 Progress	 of	 Romance,	 Through	 Times,	 Countries	 and	 Manners;	
with	Remarks	 on	 the	Good	and	Bad	Effects	 of	 it,	 on	 them	Respectively;	 in	 a	












Sabl,	 Andrew.	 ‘David	 Hume:	 Skepticism	 in	 Politics?’.	 In	 Skepticism	 and	 Political	
Thought	 in	 the	 Seventeenth	 and	 Eighteenth	 Centuries,	 edited	 by	 John	
Christian	Laursen	and	Gianni	Paganini,	149-76.	Los	Angeles:	University	of	
Toronto	 Press	 in	 association	 with	 the	 UCLA	 Center	 for	 Seventeenth-	 and	





Haywood:	 Essays	 on	 Her	 Life	 and	 Work.	 Lexington:	 University	 Press	 of	
Kentucky,	2000.	
Schellenberg,	 Betty	 A.	 The	 Professionalization	 of	 Women	 Writers	 in	 Eighteenth-
Century	Britain.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005.	









the	 Experimental	 Life.	 Princeton:	 Princeton	 University	 Press,	 2011.	 First	
published	in	1985.		
Shapiro,	 Barbara	 J.	 ‘Beyond	 a	 Reasonable	 Doubt’.	 In	 Fictions	 of	Knowledge:	 Fact,	
Evidence,	 and	 Doubt,	 edited	 by	 Yota	 Batsaki,	 Subha	 Mukherji,	 and	 Jan-
Melissa	Schramm,	19-39.	London:	Palgrave,	2012.	




Smith,	Adam.	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments,	 6th	 ed.	 London:	 Printed	 for	A.	 Strahan;	
and	T.	Cadell	 in	 the	Strand;	and	W.	Creech,	and	 J.	Bell	&	Co.	at	Edinburgh,	
1790.	
Smith,	 Hilda	 L.	 ‘Intellectual	 Bases	 for	 Feminist	 Analyses:	 The	 Seventeenth	 and	
Eighteenth	Centuries’.	In	Harvey	and	Okrulik,	Women	and	Reason,	19-38.		
———.	 Reason’s	 Disciples:	 Seventeenth-Century	 English	 Feminists.	 Urbana:	
University	of	Illinois	Press,	1982.	
Soni,	Vivasvan.	 ‘Committing	Freedom:	The	Cultivation	of	 Judgment	 in	Rousseau’s	



















Starr,	 George.	 ‘Why	 Defoe	 Probably	 Did	 not	 Write	 The	 Apparition	 of	 Mrs.	 Veal’.	
Eighteenth-Century	Fiction	15.3-4	(2003):	421-50.	





Swenson,	 Rivka.	 ‘History’.	 In	 The	 Cambridge	 Companion	 to	 Women’s	 Writing	 in	
Britain,	 1660-1789,	 edited	 by	 Catherine	 Ingrassia,	 135-46.	 Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2015.	
———.	 ‘Optics,	 Gender,	 and	 the	 Eighteenth-Century	 Gaze:	 Looking	 at	 Eliza	
Haywood’s	Anti-Pamela’.	The	Eighteenth	Century,	51	(2010):	27-43.	






Taylor,	 Richard	 C.	 ‘James	 Harrison,	 The	 Novelist’s	 Magazine,	 and	 the	 Early	






Thorne,	 Christian.	 The	 Dialectic	 of	 Counter-Enlightenment.	 Cambridge:	 Harvard	
University	Press,	2009.	




Religious,	 and	 other	 Important	 Subjects,	 edited	 by	 Ronald	 Hamowy.	
Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	1995.	
Waller,	 John.	 Leaps	 in	 the	 Dark:	 The	 Making	 of	 Scientific	 Reputations.	 Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	2004.	
Watt,	Ian.	The	Rise	of	the	Novel:	Studies	in	Defoe,	Richardson,	and	Fielding.	Berkeley:	











Williamson,	 Marilyn.	 Raising	 Their	 Voices:	 British	 Women	 Writers,	 1650-1750.	
Detroit:	Wayne	State	University	Press,	1990.	
Wilputte,	 Earla	 A.	 ‘Eliza	 Haywood’s	 Frederick,	 Duke	 of	 Brunswick-Lunenburgh’.	
Studies	in	English	Literature,	1500-1900	41.3	(2001):	499-514.	
———.	 ‘Haywood's	Tabloid	Journalism:	Dalinda:	or,	The	Double	Marriage	and	the	









———.	 ‘“Too	 ticklish	 to	 meddle	 with”:	 The	 Silencing	 of	 The	 Female	 Spectator’s	
Political	 Correspondents’.	 In	 Newman	 and	Wright,	 Fair	 Philosopher,	 122-
140.		
Wolfgang,	Aurora.	 ‘Intertextual	Conversations:	The	Love-Letter	 and	 the	Footnote	
in	 Madame	 de	 Graffigny’s	 Lettres	 d’une	 Persienne’.	 Eighteenth-Century	
Fiction	10.1	(1997):	15-28.	
Wright,	 Lynn	Marie	 and	Donald	 J.	Newman,	 eds.	Fair	Philosopher:	Eliza	Haywood	
and	“The	Female	Spectator.”	Lewisburg:	Bucknell	University	Press,	2006.	











Zomchick,	 John	 P.	 ‘“A	 Penetration	 Which	 Nothing	 Can	 Deceive”:	 Gender	 and	
Judicial	 Discourse	 in	 Some	 Eighteenth-Century	 Narratives’’.	 Studies	 in	
English	Literature,	1500-1900	29.3	(1989):	535-61.	
Zunshine,	 Lisa.	 ‘Lying	Bodies	of	 the	Enlightenment:	Theory	of	Mind	and	Cultural	
Historicism’.	 In	 Introduction	 to	 Cognitive	 Cultural	 Studies,	 edited	 by	 Lisa	
Zunshine,	115-33.	Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	2010.	
	
	
	
